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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

TURKEY

PART 11

January to December 1957

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GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

RK 1022/1

No. 1

REVIEW OF TURKISH POLICY IN THE TURKISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 7*)

(No. 1. Confidential) *Ankara, January 2, 1957.*

Sir,

It is rarely that the Turkish National Assembly discusses foreign affairs, but in recent weeks members of the Opposition parties have asked a number of questions in the Assembly on this subject and have both privately and publicly expressed resentment at being kept without information. In consequence, the Acting Foreign Minister, M. Ethem Menderes, made a full statement on Turkish foreign policy on the 28th of December, a summary of which, taken from the semi-official Anatolian Agency, I now have the honour to transmit to you.

2. M. Ethem Menderes first repeated the Turkish view that peace is indivisible and that any danger in any part of the world contains the seeds of a general conflagration. Until the recent incidents there prevailed the false impression that conditions were favourable to the establishment of world peace; the events in Poland and in Hungary had, however, made clear the real dangers of the situation. These events had been no surprise to Turkey, which had never been deceived by the peace offensive. Turkey would be the first to rejoice in any real evidence of progress towards world peace; but unfortunately the Free World was in danger of falling under the yoke of domination, and it was necessary either to obtain a renunciation of the aggression which threatened Turkey or to take measures of collective security which would protect her against such aggression. Failing the first alternative Turkey considered that the Atlantic Treaty, the Bagdad Pact and the Balkan Alliance, being essential elements in these measures of collective security, were the foundations of her foreign policy.

3. Speaking of the Atlantic Treaty the Minister said that the Egyptian incident had led those who hoped to see a breach in the pact or who were pessimistic about its future to change their opinions. They had supposed that the differences of opinion between the United States on the one hand and Britain and France on the other showed a lack of solidarity within the pact. The communiqué published at the end of the recent Ministerial meeting of NATO, however, proved that there was complete solidarity between all its members, that military precautions would not be neglected, that close political consultation would be established between its members and that any questions which arose between them would also be solved between themselves.

4. The references in the communiqué to Hungary and the Middle East did not mean that NATO was considering intervening in the internal affairs of the countries concerned since it was firmly attached to the ideals of the United Nations, but as far as the Middle East was concerned the organisation could not remain indifferent to the danger of Soviet infiltration into this vital region.

5. Turning to the Bagdad Pact the Minister emphasised that from the beginning it had been attacked by the enemies of peace and stability, which alone proved its importance. He spoke of the meetings of the four members of the pact at Tehran and Bagdad and the part which the pact had played in the carrying out of the resolutions of the United Nations Assembly. The reference in the Bagdad communiqué (Bagdad telegram No. 1454) to the conference of Arab States held at Beirut meant that the members of the pact were ready to hold out their hands to all countries showing goodwill. Countries were at liberty to join the pact or not, but a distinction must be made between this and attempts to destroy the pact, against which Turkey considered herself free to take counter-measures.

6. The Minister regretted deeply that Egypt and Syria in particular were violently attacking the Bagdad Pact; this was the work of the present leaders of the two

countries and was certainly not approved by the great majority of their inhabitants. The excesses of these leaders were even reflected in the improper actions of their diplomatic representatives in Turkey, and Turkey would be obliged to take against them such measures as were appropriate to international practice. Hostility of Egyptian leaders followed by those of Syria had now reached such a degree that it was irreparable; they had made a principle of their foreign policy to create an abyss between the Western countries and those of Africa and Asia and thus to serve as an instrument of Communist policy. Posing as defenders of Islam they gave the worst enemies of Islam the possibility of establishing themselves on Egyptian territory; and at the time when they spoke of liberty and independence they turned their backs on Hungary in order to attract for themselves votes at the United Nations and try to establish domination over the other Arab countries. There were two causes of this shameless impudence, Communist tactics and the general malaise and instability in the Middle East. In this connection Egypt had posed as the victim of the operations of Israel and later of Britain and France, whereas she herself had deliberately provoked them.

7. Speaking of Israel the Minister insisted on the need for a conference between all interested countries to deal with this question, bearing in mind that some countries would attend with the aim not of contributing to a solution but of obstructing it. The principal reasons which had induced the Turkish Government to recall their Minister from Israel was to deprive the Egyptian and Syrian leaders of an argument which they were exploiting in order to incite public opinion in their countries against Turkey.

8. Turning to the Balkan Alliance and Cyprus, the Minister affirmed that the alliance, which had been concluded in the same spirit as the Atlantic Treaty and the Bagdad Pact, still retained its full importance for Turkey. For a tripartite pact to be effective, however, all partners must collaborate, and this unfortunately was not happening. The Minister then referred to the statement by M. Karamanlis that the alliance would remain moribund until Greek aspirations over Cyprus were achieved and that even its denunciation was under consideration. Greece tried the same tactics within NATO but had not achieved, and would not achieve, the result that she had hoped for, for the simple reason that there she had only one vote among fifteen whereas in the Balkan Alliance she had one among three. Turkey's ally Yugoslavia said that she attached importance to the pact but Turkey was not persuaded that Yugoslavia fully appreciated the obligations which it entailed; in a conflict between members it was the duty of the neutral party to invite that party which was acting arbitrarily (Greece) to fulfil its engagements.

9. The Minister said that the question of Cyprus at present presented the following aspect:—

(i) It was on the agenda of the United Nations Assembly on two counts: the Greek demand that the inhabitants of the island should have the right of self-determination, and the British complaint that terrorism in the island was the work of Greece.

(ii) The North Atlantic Council had decided with the concurrence of Greece that member countries which did not succeed in solving a dispute would not take it before another international organisation but would submit it to the North Atlantic Council. Nevertheless, Greece had not brought this dispute before NATO.

(iii) On the 19th of December the British Government had published a draft Constitution for self-government. The statement made by the Turkish Prime Minister on the 20th of December to the Anatolian Agency on this point was constructive and favourable—constructive because it considered the draft as a basis for discussion, and favourable because it looked forward to a solution of the Cyprus question on a logical basis.

10. The Minister emphasised the British declaration that the new Constitution would not be put into force so long as terrorism in Cyprus continued. The British Government had accepted the Turkish point of view on this.

11. Another condition which Turkey considered indispensable was that the Turkish Cypriots should have equal rights with the other community. The Turkish Government would examine the Radcliffe Report from this point of view and would communicate their conclusions to the British Government.

12. The self-governing Constitution was a provisional solution; what counted was

self-determination, under pretext of which Greece wished to annex the island. If the British Government had proclaimed from the beginning, as had Turkey, that self-determination was not possible in all cases, that the inhabitants of the island were of different races, and that there was an undying hostility between the two communities, also that the strategical importance of Cyprus for Turkey and her geographical, juridical and general position did not permit the grant of the right of self-determination, then it would merely have been a question of self-government. However, the British Government had from the beginning accepted in principle the right of self-determination for Cyprus under certain conditions and without fixing the date. This policy of Britain had been the origin of terrorism, fomented with the aim of hastening self-determination, or at least the application of a form of self-government which would lead to this final result. Turkey had stated many times in the most formal manner that she would never accept the annexation of Cyprus to Greece.

13. The Minister spoke of the statement in the House of Commons by the Colonial Secretary in which he said that if the Turkish community voted for Turkey it would not be left under foreign domination, thus implying partition of the island, and the only adequate solution. Great Britain should still maintain bases and military installations on Cyprus since these were necessary for the security of Turkey and of the region.

14. Though this long formal statement was made by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, in practice, as you know, it is the Prime Minister himself who directs Turkish foreign policy, and it was he who replied to the various questions raised in the debate which followed.

15. Speaking of Article 3 of the communiqué published after the Bagdad meeting (referring to the Beirut communiqué enclosed in Mr. Middleton's despatch No. 188 of the 22nd of November), the Prime Minister gave an assurance that this did not constitute any commitment for Turkey and was merely an expression of opinion. (It is a point to which the opposition People's Republican Party attach particular importance that Turkey should not undertake further commitments in the Middle East.) In fact, he pointed out, the Beirut communiqué spoke of the application of the United Nations resolutions of the 2nd, the 4th and the 7th of November for the suspension of hostilities in Egypt and the evacuation of Egyptian territory, and this was a point with which Turkey was completely in agreement. Another point with which Turkey agreed was Article II of the Beirut communiqué, which said that the question of the Suez Canal should be kept entirely independent from the question of aggression against Egypt. The point of view of the Turkish Government with regard to the operation of the Suez Canal had been made clear in their statements at the time of the London Conference.

16. The recall of the Turkish Minister from Tel Aviv had had its effect since the enemies of Turkey, seeing this weapon struck from their hands, had turned to fresh manifestations of hostility.

17. Speaking of Cyprus the Prime Minister stated that the Government considered the partition of the island a proposal worth serious consideration. This did not mean that the Government accepted in their entirety the British proposals either for self-government or for self-determination; he was examining the question with the leaders of the Turkish community and would, if necessary, make suggestions to the British Government. For the Turkish Government the most important point was the final fate of Cyprus. Turkey wished Great Britain to remain on the island, but, in the light of the new solution which had been offered, the Government were convinced that partition would ensure the continued existence under the Turkish flag of their brothers of Turkish race and that the island would thus no longer be a danger spot for Turkey.

18. Replying to a question on what would be the position in the event of a change of government in Great Britain, the Prime Minister said that Turkish policy would remain the same. His recent declaration was in favour only of the present decision of Great Britain and any change in this decision would involve a revocation of his agreement to it.

19. These statements were well received by all parties, and even supporters of the Opposition have commented favourably on their frankness. They are in effect the public expression of a consistent foreign policy of which Her Majesty's Government are aware and on which I have reported as has been necessary. There is therefore little to which I need draw particular attention. I should explain that the reference to unfriendly activities of Egyptian and

Syrian diplomatic missions in Turkey (paragraph 6) refers to anti-British propaganda which they have been putting about. In particular the Egyptian Military Attaché has recently been taken to task by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for circulating offensive anti-British cartoons, and I have no doubt that we may count on the Turkish Government to act firmly if this practice is continued. I should also draw attention to the explicit statement that Egypt had deliberately provoked both the Israeli and the Anglo-French attacks on her. I should also add that the justifications given for the withdrawal of the Turkish Minister from Israel (paragraphs 7 and 16) have struck many in this country as lame.

20. Finally, there are one or two points in the statement about Cyprus to which I should invite notice. The first is the implication that Turkey would accept discussion of the dispute by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Secondly, you will have remarked the implication, unfounded but perhaps not of great importance, that it was Turkey who had persuaded Great Britain to make the condition that no constitution should be introduced in Cyprus until terrorism had ceased. Lastly, you will note the public expression of what has already been said privately, namely, that Turkey attached much more importance to the final fate of the island than to the application of self-government and that she regarded her acquiescence in the present proposals as a bargain from which she would be free to withdraw if the attitude of Her Majesty's Government were to change.

21. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Athens, Belgrade, Bagdad, Tehran, Karachi, Beirut, Tel Aviv; also to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at New York and Paris and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1111/2 No. 2

TURKISH ATTITUDE TO CYPRUS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received January 28*)

(No. 12. Restricted) *Ankara,*
Sir, *January 22, 1957.*

I have the honour to inform you that the Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was discussed in the Budget Committee of the Grand National Assembly on the 17th and 18th of January.

2. The discussions were divided into two parts. On the first day over 30 questions were put by Democrat Party and Opposition Deputies, ranging over a wide field of Turkish foreign policy. Some of these questions were simply requests for information but others were framed critically of the Government's policy especially over Cyprus and Turco-Greek relations.

3. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for time to consider the questions; and the answers were given in the discussions on the 19th of January. The task of answering was divided between the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and finally the Prime Minister. Further questions were asked between each series of answers and the discussion on Cyprus closed with a long exchange between the Prime Minister and a Freedom Party Deputy. The Budget itself was eventually approved by the Committee.

4. The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to questions about the Turkish Foreign Service and the establishment of new Turkish Diplomatic Missions abroad while the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister concentrated on replying to the many political questions mainly connected with the Cyprus problem. The following is a summary of the main points in the various replies.

5. M. Ethem Menderes said that 11 new Turkish Ambassadors had been appointed and that *agrément* had been received for nine of these. He also referred to the decision to open new Diplomatic Missions in Ethiopia, Korea, Tunis, Morocco and Indonesia.

6. M. Birgi began by saying that the principles of Turkish foreign policy had already been explained in the President's opening speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 1st of November, 1956 (my despatch No. 201 of the 6th of November, 1956) and also in subsequent statements by the Prime Minister and others (my despatch No. 1 of the 2nd of January). Turkey could not pursue a homogeneous policy in Asia and Africa but was in sympathy with Asian and African countries. The French Government appeared strong in Algeria but those with a sense of justice were on the side of those fighting for independence. The American failure to join the Baghdad Pact was not a sign of weakness in the Pact. The recent meetings in Tehran and Baghdad and the present meeting in Ankara had strengthened the Pact.

7. Turning to Cyprus he said that the three Allies concerned would accept any solution which was agreeable to all, since they all realised that the Cyprus problem had become a problem which was upsetting the power and unity of the free world.

8. Turkey had not originated the idea of partition. This idea had originated in a statement by the British Government; and the reasons for Turkey's acceptance of it had been explained to the Grand National Assembly. Turkey's acceptance of this idea before awaiting the decision of the Greek Government demonstrated Turkey's goodwill and desire to help in a solution of the problem.

9. Turkey had not withdrawn from her original thesis on Cyprus and no concessions of principle had been made which would harm the rights and interests of Cypriot Turks or the political, strategic and historic interests of Turkey.

10. The idea of a condominium for Cyprus had been examined by the Turkish Government but was considered unnatural and open to manoeuvres based on secret calculations.

11. The report being prepared by M. Nihat Erim was not a proposal for a constitution but a report about how the constitution should be put into effect. Professor Erim would have talks with the Governor of Cyprus and with Lord Radcliffe.

12. The visit by the Turkish Goodwill Mission to Latin American countries had produced very favourable results.

13. After a long discussion in which the Prime Minister criticised the Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party, M. Kasim Gülek, for seeking an interview with President Eisenhower's Citizen Advisers on Mutual Security who have been visiting Turkey recently, he (the Prime Minister) turned to answering a series of questions put by a Freedom Party Deputy criticising the Government's Cyprus policy. He said that the Turkish Government had already made clear that their policy was the right one and were satisfied that it would provide a just solution to the problem.

14. He defended the concept of equal rights for self-determination for the two communities in Cyprus and said that the Turkish Government were satisfied that the island was divisible. The fact that one part of the island was mountainous and the other flat was no deterrent. Human beings had created countries before on rocky ground.

15. The dividing line in the island could be drawn on the same principle as the frontier dividing Thrace. The Turkish Government did not say that partition should be based on the exact proportion of the population. This would be a Greek thesis. In Turkey's view the property and possessions of the people of the island must also be a basis for partition. When one part of the island constituted a protective outpost for the Turkish motherland with the Turkish flag flying over it, the Turkish forces stationed there could control incidents on the other side of the frontier. It was not necessary for all the Turks in the island to come over to the Turkish side. A voluntary exchange of population could be envisaged.

16. M. Menderes' main theme was in fact that there was no possible practical alternative to the present policy of the Turkish Government on this problem.

17. The General Assembly of the People's Republican Party subsequently published a communiqué (on the 20th of January) outlining the Government's Cyprus policy and saying that they (the P.R.P.) were following developments with interest towards a solution most suitable to Turkey's national interests. The communiqué added that there was no contact between the Government and the P.R.B. on foreign affairs; and that the Prime Minister had given no reason for refusing to meet the leader of the P.R.P. to discuss foreign affairs. The section of the communiqué dealing with foreign affairs ended by deploring the fact that Britain did not participate in the meeting in Ankara of the four Baghdad Pact countries; expressing the hope that all member countries of the Pact would function together for its preservation; and welcoming the Eisenhower Plan for the Middle East.

18. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens, Washington, Baghdad and Tehran, to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at New York and Paris, the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi, the Governor of Cyprus and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1011/1

No. 3

TURKEY : ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1956

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 5*)

(No. 18. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *January 31, 1957.*

I have the honour to submit the following review of developments in Turkey during 1956.

Internal Affairs

2. The year 1956 produced little change in internal affairs, though there was a gradual consolidation of the Prime Minister's authority in the country and within his own Party. Already in January it seemed likely that the promises of constitutional reform and other liberal measures which had been forced on M. Menderes by the revolt in his own Party and the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 would not be carried out; and in fact they were not. On the contrary, at intervals during the year the Government took new measures to limit the possibilities of independent minded criticism or effective opposition. In May they compulsorily retired a number of judges; and with this threat hanging over them the remainder were under pressure to accept political direction in giving decisions. In June the Government passed amendments to the already severe Press Law, whose main effect was to limit even further the freedom of the press to criticise Government policy. At the end of the same month they introduced a new law of meetings, which required official approval for any political meeting except during an electoral campaign; this in practice debarred Opposition politicians from holding any meetings at all. During the summer and autumn recess of the National Assembly, which is the season for political campaigning in the provinces, the Government made use of these two laws to harass the members of the Opposition to a ridiculous degree, even to the extent of preventing them from shaking hands with their supporters. The result was an infinite number of law-suits, particularly against the Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party, M. Kasim Gülek, which, owing to the infinite possibilities of appeal in Turkish law, never seemed to come to any final conclusion. In December the Government took steps to suppress the growing opposition in the Universities, particularly in the Political Science Faculty of the University of Ankara. The extent to which teachers and students should be free to indulge in politics had been a long-standing subject of argument. The Dean of the Faculty, known for his hostility to the Government, was suspended from office for some critical statement in his speech at the ceremonial opening of the academic year. He thereupon resigned and a number of other teachers in the Faculty resigned in sympathy.

3. Each successive measure aroused great protest and controversy in the Press and elsewhere, and the Government as well as the Opposition exaggerated their importance; in fact, they are so much a part of the pattern of Turkish political life that undue attention need not be paid to claims, whether from inside or outside the country, that they mean the end of democracy in Turkey. It is, however, a regrettable fact that as a result of these measures and of his general attitude of impatient rejection of any criticism, M. Menderes makes little appeal to the limited number of younger Turks who are genuinely interested in their country's progress in the less materialistic domains than those which fill the horizon of the present administration.

4. Nevertheless, the Opposition parties were left with little opportunity for constructive action and it cannot be said that they took full advantage of such as they had. The traditional Opposition party, the People's Republican Party, offered no serious alternative programme to the Government. The new Freedom Party did not make the progress that had been hoped. Though its supporters in the Assembly increased in number so that it had become the largest Parliamentary Opposition party and though a good deal of effort was spent on establishing an organisation throughout the country by the end of the year, it had in fact achieved little influence outside intellectual circles in the large towns. Little was heard of the third Opposition party, the Republican National Party. In the autumn there were proposals for an alliance between these three Parties, but they came to nothing and each side blamed the other for the failure. Responsibility seems to have

been in fact divided; ex-President Inönü and the leaders of the People's Republican Party were jealous for their personal position in any such alliance; the Freedom Party insisted too much on concentrating on proposals for constitutional reform to the exclusion of any constructive policy; the Republican National Party adopted an equivocal attitude throughout. Since the Opposition's only hope of a victory in the next election seems to be to present a united front, their prospects remained dim.

5. Apart from these inter-party manoeuvres there is little else to report, but it would be unfair to criticise the Government on this count. Their plans for the social and economic development of the country went forward and a good many of them came to fruition in 1956. Consequently there has been a series of ceremonial openings of barrages, sugar factories and other industrial undertakings which have given the Prime Minister an opportunity to draw attention to the achievements of the Democrat Party Government and to belittle the achievements of twenty-five years of People's Republican Party rule. Their economic importance is discussed below; their political significance has been to reinforce the Government's influence in the country. The same is true of the new National Protection Law, passed in June, which had the effect of temporarily reducing or stabilising a very wide range of prices.

6. Concurrently with the rise in the stock of his Party, the Prime Minister's own self-confidence and energy returned. He regularly devoted a part of his public speeches to strong and bitter attacks on what he described as the unpatriotic attitude of the Opposition in making capital from the economic difficulties of the country, but later in the year his vehemence turned to lofty contempt. He made no concession to critics within his own Party, and any whose criticism had been too outspoken were expelled (and formed the main recruits of the new Freedom Party). Rumours of widespread discontent within the Democrat Party Group died away as the year progressed, and at the end of the year it seemed certain that they were well to heel. The Prime Minister rid himself of Ministers who would not work closely to his direction. With the resignation of Professor Köprülü from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June (owing to differences over Party matters rather than foreign policy) he eliminated perhaps the only member of his Cabinet who because of his great support within the Party might perhaps have been prepared to stand up to him. Over much of the year M. Menderes was effectively in personal charge of all the principal Departments of State, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Finance and Defence. He found time in the autumn to set on foot an extensive town planning scheme in Istanbul and a lesser one in Ankara. Those who had been the subjects of Parliamentary investigation as a result of the Cabinet crisis at the end of 1955 (all friends of the Prime Minister) were formally cleared. A year later he felt himself strong enough to reappoint to the Ministries of the Interior and Finance former Ministers who had had to resign, one after the riots of September 1955 and the other during the Cabinet crisis. In short, at the end of the year it only wanted the return of M. Zorlu to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to restore the position of M. Menderes and his Government to that which they had held in the summer of 1955.

7. The economic situation at the end of 1956 was confusing. Though the trade deficit had been reduced, mainly by lower imports, there was little real improvement compared with 1955. Externally, Turkey's situation continued seemingly precarious, with a heavy burden of foreign indebtedness and no likelihood for a number of years to come that exports would be able to pay for all the necessary imports. Internally too the picture was dark. The measures taken in June under the National Protection Law to curb inflation, after a temporary stabilisation, did not have the expected results. Many consumer articles, including an ever-increasing number of every-day household requirements, were unobtainable, and shortages of essentials developed through the effects of price control. The cereals crop was grossly overestimated, and large quantities of wheat (U.S.$46 million) and some other foodstuffs were imported from the United States, against payment in Turkish lira. Exports suffered from high internal prices. Turkish commercial debts, which included some £17 million to the United Kingdom, showed no sign of decreasing, and there were defaults on payments in respect of major capital projects undertaken by foreign firms.

8. The Turkish Government, and in particular the Prime Minister, remained undismayed by these dismal facts, claiming that they were temporary worries unavoidable in the process of furnishing Turkey

with the modern equipment essential to a country in her position in world affairs. This attitude was exemplified in the Turkish Government's report for O.E.E.C. in October which stated: "Turkey .... firmly believes in the objectives which it has set itself; it is convinced that its partners will be ready to participate with increased understanding and sympathy in the efforts made to attain those objectives." In accordance with this conception of Turkey's economic destiny, the investment programme continued through the year unchecked. It covered the construction of new ports, barrages, electric power stations, iron and steel works, textiles and other factories, the increase of coal production and the modernisation of Istanbul and Ankara with wholesale demolitions to make way for new thoroughfares. Some of these projects were manifestly extravagant. There was still insufficient co-ordination so that much of the vast expenditure on capital projects was failing to produce a proper return. Nevertheless, much progress was made during the year on projects which undoubtedly are essential for the country's development. Moreover, some of the investments were already beginning to pay off, particularly in regard to electricity and cement production and roads. Twelve foreign companies were working on exploration for oil, with reasonable hopes of success, and at the end of the year negotiations were in progress with British and American firms for the construction of a large refinery near Istanbul.

9. The economic situation during 1956 was thus characterised by a continuing ferment and a steady urge towards modernisation, combined with the facile and characteristically Turkish feeling that by about 1960 a new era of prosperity would dawn as present investments came to fruition. While, however, much rapid progress was made, the weaknesses in Turkish economy and the peculiarities and limitations of Turkish mentality continued to belie the justification for such rosy prognostications. Little attention was given to such hard realities as the fact that growing industrialisation was creating new claims requiring increased imports of raw materials and equipment, that more and better roads was creating the need for more vehicles, and that even if oil were found in significant quantities, huge sums would be required for its effective exploitation. Thus, at the end of the year, the best that Turkey could hope for in the next few years was to be able to pay her way on a minimum basis without adding unduly to her accumulated foreign indebtedness, and to keep inflationary forces under some degree of control. Even these objectives called for greater discipline in planning and expenditure than had been exercised hitherto.

10. Defence expenditure, despite substantial contributions from America and N.A.T.O., remained a heavy burden on Turkish economy, totalling over 25 per cent. of the general budget. Military defence measures progressed during the year at a slow but steady pace and within the framework of programmes formulated by N.A.T.O. No notable change of concept or material took place and the active manpower content of the Turkish armed forces and their ancillaries remained between 350,000 and 400,000. The American Military Mission to Turkey continued to be the dominating foreign influence and to render inestimable, if not always appreciated, service to the Turkish forces. Military progress in general continued to be impeded by the outmoded organisation of the Turkish General Staff. The Turkish Navy played a full part in N.A.T.O. exercises. With the exception of a combined amphibian exercise and a N.A.T.O. air exercise, the training programmes of the Army and Air Force continued on the usual somewhat parochial lines and without the benefit of practical work in the field with forces of other nations. In response to persistent appeals from the Turkish Government that Her Majesty's Government should negotiate the transfer of a number of British ships from the Reserve Fleet to the Turkish Navy in replacement of obsolete vessels now in service, Her Majesty's Government offered to make available four destroyers on very long-term credits. At the end of the year the Turks were still pressing an additional request for a small cruiser. Following the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt Turkish forces took a number of precautionary measures which in the case of the Army amounted to partial mobilisation. Most of these measures had been cancelled by the end of the year.

Foreign Affairs

11. International developments gave Turkey increasing cause for anxiety as the year advanced. Her voice was heard and her influence felt in a variety of international forums. The loss of impetus, as she saw it, on the part of N.A.T.O., the state of suspended animation of the Balkan Alliance, and the arrested development of

the Bagdad Pact, had already in the earlier months of the year created a sense of growing isolation. With the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East following on Colonel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal and later the Israeli attack on Egypt and the Franco-British intervention, Turkey's anxieties grew, particularly as the internal situation in Syria gave clear indications of Soviet penetration of the Middle East area south of her borders.

12. There was little that Turkey could do to inject vigour into the Balkan Alliance. Although Yugoslavia, in her fresh difficulties with Russia, showed signs of renewed interest in the Alliance, Greece continued to make it quite clear that as far as she was concerned nothing could be done to revive the tripartite alliance as long as the existing tension continued with Turkey over Cyprus. After the visit of the Greek Prime Minister to Belgrade in December, the Turkish Government asked the Yugoslav Government bluntly to explain their present attitude to the Alliance in view of what seemed to be the aim of the Greek Government to use it as an instrument for strengthening relations between Greece and Yugoslavia, to the exclusion of Turkey.

13. In the Middle East Turkey played an active role. Throughout the year she repeatedly called the attention of Britain and America to the pressing necessity of strengthening the Bagdad Pact, and this was one of the themes developed by the Turkish Prime Minister during your visit to Ankara in March. Colonel Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal confirmed, as the Turks felt, the views which they had frequently expressed about his dangerous ambitions and in private they made little secret of their disappointment that Britain had not intervened with force at that juncture. Turkey accepted promptly the invitation to attend the conference on Suez convened in London in August, and on that occasion, as at the Second London Conference in September, the Turkish Delegation, headed by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supported the Anglo-French proposals. In a memorandum communicated to America and Britain in September, the Turkish Government called attention to the particular threats to Turkey resulting from the increasing evidence of Russian designs in Syria and the alleged violation of Turkish air space by Russian military aircraft. The memorandum urged the early accession of America to the Bagdad Pact as the most effective means of giving it the strength and stability which it so urgently needed. After the Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Canal following the Israeli attack on Egypt, the Turkish Prime Minister, at the meeting of the Prime Ministers of the four Muslim members of the Bagdad Pact hurriedly convened at Tehran, effectively supported the Shah of Iran in deprecating any idea of discarding Britain from the Alliance. At the subsequent meeting of the Four at Bagdad ten days later, M. Menderes gave further timely encouragement to Nuri Pasha. At the same time he thought it expedient to agree to the insistent request of the other three Muslim members of the Pact that Turkey should withdraw her Minister from Israel.

14. The Turkish Government took the lead in bringing to the attention of N.A.T.O. the situation in the Middle East and its disturbing possibilities for the Western Alliance. The attendance at a N.A.T.O. Council meeting of the Turkish Acting Foreign Minister at the end of November was followed the next month by the participation, for the first time, of the Turkish Prime Minister at the Ministerial meeting of the Council, at which a Turkish memorandum was circulated and the situation in the Middle East accepted as a subject which N.A.T.O. should keep under continuing study. The Turkish Government regarded this as a first step towards creating some link between N.A.T.O. and the Bagdad Pact which would provide for regular contacts between the two groupings and some measure of military planning.

15. On Cyprus the Turkish Government maintained the attitude that they could not agree to any solution which kept alive the possibility of Enosis. It was on that basis that they rejected the proposals which Her Majesty's Government put to them in June whereby a date would be fixed for considering the application of self-determination, despite the carefully devised safeguards for Turkey's interests which the proposals contained. Logically enough, however, the Turkish Government accepted as a basis of discussion Lord Radcliffe's report on a Constitution for Cyprus published in December. This they did in the framework of Her Majesty's Government's statement of policy made at the time of the publication of the report, which established the principle of eventual application of self-determination equally to the Turkish and Greek communities in the island and accepted partition as a possible ultimate solution. By this time the Turkish Government had reached their own conclusion that partition was the only practical solution of a problem which was continuing to create such a dangerous tension in Turco-Greek relations. In accepting Her Majesty's Government's proposals as a basis for discussion, they showed plainly their belief that a Constitution would prove impracticable and expressed the hope that if such proved to be the case Her Majesty's Government would abandon further attempts in that direction and proceed at once to the conception of what the Turkish Government called integral application of the principle of self-determination. The flying visit paid to Turkey by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies for the purpose of explaining Her Majesty's Government's proposals to the Turkish Government no doubt contributed greatly towards their favourable reception.

16. Your official visit to Ankara in March gave the Turkish Government, and the Turkish Prime Minister in particular, a welcome opportunity of demonstrating their oft-repeated desire to work in all aspects of foreign policy in close consultation and co-operation with Britain. Your discussions with M. Menderes covered a wide range of subjects and the reference in the communiqué, issued at the end of your visit, to an effective and lively friendship being more than a formal document referred to only in times of crisis, was generally regarded as a fitting description of Anglo-Turkish relations. As stated above, the British position in regard to Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez Canal was supported by Turkey, and after the subsequent Anglo-French intervention the Turkish Government exerted themselves actively to mitigate its effects on Britain's relations with the three other Muslim members of the Bagdad Pact, and to preserve her associations with the Pact. Turkey's attitude on Cyprus continued to be that as far as Turkey was concerned the Cyprus problem existed only by reason of the fact that Britain had accepted the possibility of eventually relinquishing her sovereignty over the island.

17. Friendly approaches to Turkey from Russia continued through most of the year and included hints of large-scale economic assistance. Turkey maintained her attitude of cold reserve and, as mentioned above, became increasingly perturbed as the year advanced over growing Russian penetration of the Middle East area, especially in Egypt and Syria. To Turkey's relief the year passed without any of the signatories of the Montreux (Straits) Convention availing itself of the option under article 29 of asking for an amendment of any of its provisions.

18. America, with her numerous teams administering military and economic assistance, remained the source from which most material blessings flowed and the country whose day to day relations with Turkey were the closest and the most widespread. The blessings remained on more or less the same scale as last year in spite of Turkish hopes of greater favours, though from time to time extra assistance was forthcoming over certain acute shortages, especially oil and wheat.

19. There were manifestations during the year, through exchanges of visits of various kinds, of the desire to develop further economic and political relations with Germany, though at the end of the year arrangements for a contract for Turkey to supply a large quantity of small arms and ammunition had not been finalised. Turkey's relations with other European countries were mostly concerned with arrangements for continuing commercial exchanges and liquidating arrears of Turkey's debts.

20. There were exchanges of formal visits with countries of the Bagdad Pact and Afghanistan, and the King of Libya paid a visit to Turkey in July. Little happened during the year to emphasise Turkey's membership of the Afro-Asian group of nations.

21. I attach a chronological summary of the main events of the year.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Bagdad, Tehran and Karachi and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

Chronological Summary of Events in Turkey during 1956

I.—INTERNAL AFFAIRS

January

11 Decision by National Assembly for a Parliamentary Investigation into the conduct while in office of the ex-Ministers of Finance (Hasan Polatkan), Economy and Commerce (Sitki Yircali) and the ex-Deputy Prime Minister (Fatin Rüştü Zorlu).

February

8 Decision by National Assembly for a Parliamentary Investigation into the conduct while in office of the ex-Minister of State for Press Affairs, Dr. Mükerrem Sarol.
14 Disastrous fire at Gerze, on Black Sea Coast, virtually destroying the town.
20 Serious earthquake at Eskişehir.
28 Decree No. 1961 extending Martial Law in Istanbul for a further three months.
28 Law No. 6684 and No. 6685 about compensation for damage and loss suffered in the riots of September 6–7, 1955.
29 Approval by National Assembly of budget of £T.3,272,942,152, an increase of £T.332 million on last year's figure.

March

31 Opening of extension to power station at Çatalağzi, built by Metropolitan-Vickers, Braithwaites and Babcock and Wilcox.

April

5 Resignation of Minister of Economy and Commerce, Fahrettin Ulaş and appointment of Hadi Hüsman, Minister of Customs and Monopolies, as Minister of Economy and Commerce *ad interim*.
8 Opening of Seyhan Barrage near Adana.
25 Opening of "Türk" Jeep assembly factory at Tuzla.

May

2 Compulsory retirement of three members of the Court of Cassation and thirteen other judges.
7 Appointment of Zeyyad Mandalinci as Minister of Economy and Commerce.
22–24 XIIth General Congress of the People's Republican Party. Ex-President Inönü unanimously re-elected leader of the party.
31 Formal opening of international airport at Ankara (Esenboğa).

June

7 Law No. 6732 amending and tightening up Law No. 6634 on offences arising out of publications and broadcasts; and Law No. 6733 amending and tightening up the Press Law No. 5680.
7 Martial Law in Istanbul ended.
11 Law No. 6731 amending and tightening up the National Protection Law (in order to bring down prices and control inflation).
14 Kasim Gülek, Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party, sentenced to one year's imprisonment for "offending the moral character" of the National Assembly in 1955. (Sentence since rejected by Court of Appeal.)
15 Death of Dr. Ekrem Hayri Üstündağ, ex-Minister and Chairman of Freedom Party Parliamentary Group.
18 Exoneration of Dr. Mükerrem Sarol by Parliamentary Investigation Commission and National Assembly after a strong debate.
19 Resignation of Minister for Foreign Affairs, Fuat Köprülü, and appointment of Minister of the Interior, Ethem Menderes, as Minister for Foreign Affairs *ad interim*.
20 Exoneration of Hasan Polatkan, Sitki Yircali and Fatin Rüştü Zorlu by Parliamentary Investigation Commission and National Assembly.

June

27 Law No. 6761 amending and tightening up the law on public meetings and demonstrations.

July

6 Motion calling for right of proof for journalists rejected by National Assembly.
8 Joint communiqué by three main Opposition Parties condemning the Government's policies.
10 Decree No. 4/7474 giving effect to the laws on compensation for damage and loss suffered during the riots of September 6–7, 1955.
11 National Assembly decided against holding by-elections in 1956.
16 National Assembly adjourned on note of bitter enmity between Government and Opposition.
Aug. 15–Sept. 1 Special summer session of National Assembly.

August

23 Resignation of Minister of Finance, Nedim Ökmen; and appointment of the Prime Minister as Minister of Finance *ad interim*.
27 Law No. 6821 in connection with the formation of an Atomic Energy Commission attached to the Prime Ministry.

September

1 Law No. 6834 extending the period between village headman ("muhtar") elections from two to four years.
12 Start of trial of those alleged to have been responsible for the riots of September 6–7, 1955.
16 Issue of (abortive) memorandum by Freedom Party calling for co-operation between all Opposition Parties.
29 Closing of Her Majesty's Consulate at Iskenderun.
Sept. 30–Oct. 1 Opening of new sugar factories at Erzincan, Erzerum, Malatya and Elazig.

October

8 Decree No. 4/8029 and communiqué No. 7 on new basis for *blocage* and *déblocage* and a new tourist rate of exchange.
12 Resignation of Minister of Public Works, Muammer Çavuşoğlu; and appointment of Minister of Interior, Ethem Menderes, as Minister of Public Works (he remained Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs); appointment of Minister of Justice, Hüseyin Avni Gökturk, as Minister of Interior *ad interim*.
29 Celebration of 33rd anniversary of the Turkish Republic.

November

1 President Bayar opened the new session of the National Assembly. His opening speech was as usual a catalogue of Democrat Party achievements.
16 Inauguration of Middle East Technological Institute in Ankara.
20 Petrol rationing introduced.
20 Closing of Her Majesty's Consulate at Trabzon.
23 Court of Appeal rejected sentence of one year's imprisonment passed on Secretary-General of P.R.P., Kasim Gülek.
28 Resignation of Minister of Economy and Commerce, Zeyyad Mandalinci; and appointment of Abdullah Aker as Minister of Economy and Commerce.

December

1 Appointment of Hasan Polatkan as Minister of Finance.
2 Ceremonial opening of Sariyar Barrage, built with American aid funds, equipment mainly German.
2 Suspension of Dean of Political Faculty of Ankara University for bringing "day-to-day" politics into a speech.
5 D.P. Parliamentary Group communiqué deploring the resignation of members of the Political Science Faculty following the suspension of the Dean.
24 Appointment of Namik Gedik as Minister of the Interior.

II.—Foreign Affairs

January

8–15 Visit of Italian Parliamentary Delegation, headed by Vice-President of Chamber of Deputies.
8–10 Visit of French Parliamentary Delegation, headed by M. Patent.
19–21 Visit of United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, *en route* for Cairo.
25 Law No. 6646 ratifying Turco-Bulgarian Trade Agreement.

February

1–8 Visit of Mr. Clarence Randall, special adviser to President Eisenhower on foreign economic affairs.
11–15 Visit of Mr. Abdulwahhab Khan, President of Pakistani National Assembly.
Feb. 27–March 3 Visit of Syrian Trade Delegation led by Minister of Economy, M. Rizkallah Antaki; and Turco-Syrian Trade Agreement signed (on March 3).

March

2 Departure of Mr. Avra Warren, retiring United States Ambassador.
5–25 Visit of Turkish Parliamentary Delegation to Iraq, headed by Chairman of National Assembly, M. Refik Koraltan.
11–15 Official visit of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
12 Signature of Anglo-Turkish Cultural Agreement.
15–20 Visit of Sayyid Awni Khalidi, Secretary-General of the Bagdad Pact.
16 Exchange of friendly messages between Presidents Bayar and Voroshilov on the occasion of the 35th Anniversary of the conclusion of the Turco-Soviet Treaty of 1921.
18–25 Official visit by the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Pakistan.

April

10 Conclusion of Turco-Australian visa abolition agreement.
14 Departure of Prime Minister, accompanied by Minister for Foreign Affairs, for Tehran to attend the meeting of the Bagdad Pact Council (returned on April 23).
21 Signature in Bonn of Turco-German Trade Agreement.
Apr. 22–May 25 Visit of International Monetary Fund Delegation, headed by Mr. H. Merle Cochrane, for Article XIV consultations.

May

1 Departure of Minister for Foreign Affairs for the meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council in Paris.
11 Arrest of Soviet Assistant Military Attaché at Ankara on charge of espionage. Released under diplomatic immunity and expelled from Turkey.
12 Visit of party from NATO Defence College.
14–19 Visit of party from Canadian Defence College.
15–27 State visit of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Iran and the Empress Soreya.
24–26 Visit of Admiral Denny, Permanent British Military Representative on the NATO Standing Group, Washington.
30 Visit of Turkish Parliamentary Delegation to Italy, headed by Refik Koraltan.

June

6–11 Official visit to Istanbul by units of the Mediterranean Fleet. Admiral Sir Guy Grantham, Commander - in - Chief, Mediterranean, received by President Bayar.
11–16 Meeting in Istanbul of Educational sub-committee of Bagdad Pact.
13 Despatch of message on Cyprus to all Parliaments by Chairman of National Assembly.
19–24 Visit of Air Marshal Nicholetts, Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.
22 Departure of Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Air Force, for Moscow to attend Soviet Air Force flying demonstrations.
25–29 Meeting in Ankara of the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Bagdad Pact.

July

2–8 Visit of C.I.G.S., General Sir Gerald Templer.
5 Departure of Minister of Labour, Mümtaz Tarhan, for the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government.
9 Law No. 6793 ratifying Turco-Pakistani Air Services Agreement.
9–10 Visit of Vice-President of United States, Mr. Nixon.
15–29 State visit of the President of Pakistan and the Begum Mirza.
24 Departure of Prime Minister and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs on official visit to Afghanistan, calling at Karachi *en route* and returning to Turkey on August 1.

August

6–11 State visit by the King of Libya, accompanied by the Libyan Prime Minister.
15 Departure of Turkish Delegation headed by Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs for 1st London Conference on Suez.
Aug. 25–Sept. 2 Visit of Iranian Military Delegation, headed by Chief of General Staff, General Hedayat.

September

4–19 Visit of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ethem Menderes, to Federal Germany.
10–17 Visit of General Bailly, Commander-in-Chief of French Air Force.
11 Departure of Turkish Delegation, headed by Director of Religious Affairs, to the Senussi ceremonies in Libya.

September

12–14 Visit of Federal German Minister of Communications, Dr. Seebohm.
14–29 Visit of Acting Minister of Defence, Şemi Ergin, to Iran.
18 Departure of Turkish Delegation, headed by Secretary-General of Ministry for Foreign Affairs for 2nd London Conference on Suez.
18–24 Visit of Minister of Communications, Arif Demirer, to Federal Germany.
19–20 Visit of United States Secretary for Air, Mr. Quarles, in connection with delivery of new American jet aircraft.
26–27 Farewell visit of General Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
26–27 Visit of President of United Nations General Assembly, Jose Mazu.
27 Communiqué announcing Turkish Government's decision to join S.C.U.A.

October

13 Signature in Tehran of Turco-Iranian Trade Agreement.
23–30 Visit of General Ahmet Vossouq, Iranian Minister of War.
25–30 Visit of Federal German military delegation headed by General Kammhuber.
Oct. 26–Nov. 2 Official visit of Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs, José Artajo.
Oct. 27–Nov. 3 Visit of Italian Chief of General Staff, General Mancinelli.

November

6 Departure of Prime Minister for Tehran to attend meeting of Moslem members of Bagdad Pact.
9 Departure of Turkish Delegation headed by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu for Bangkok to attend International Parliamentary Conference.
16 Departure of Prime Minister for Bagdad to attend meeting of Moslem members of Bagdad Pact.
16 Meeting in Ankara of Pest Control Sub-Committee of Bagdad Pact.
22–27 Visit of party from NATO Defence College.
26 Announcement of decision to withdraw Turkish Ambassador from Israel.
29 Arrival in London of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ethem Menderes.

December

9 Departure of Prime Minister, accompanied by Minister of State, Emin Kalafat, for Paris to attend the NATO Ministerial Meeting (returned on December 16).
15–16 Visit of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs to discuss the Radcliffe proposals on Cyprus with the Prime Minister.
Dec. 21–Jan. 19, 1957 Visit of Dr. Küçük and Faiz Kaymak, Turkish Cypriot leaders, for consultations with the Turkish Government about the Radcliffe proposals.

RK 1015/6

No. 4

CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL RESULTING FROM THE ANTI-GREEK RIOTS OF SEPTEMBER 1955

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received February 5*)

(No. 19. Confidential)
Sir,

Ankara,
January 30, 1957.

I have the honour to report with reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 21st of February, 1956, that those accused of responsibility for the riots in Istanbul on the 6th/7th of September, 1955, were acquitted on the 24th of January.

2. The acquittal did not come as a surprise. As early as April 1956 the Defence Counsel for M. Hikmet Bil (Annex 2 of my despatch No. 34) said in confidence that the trial would continue for several months and that none of the defendants would be convicted. In May, three generals, dismissed from their appointments after the riots, were cleared by a Court of Enquiry which had been investigating their conduct on the night of the riots; and within a week of their acquittal, the trade unions which had been suspended following the riots were allowed to resume their activities.

3. The following is an account of the main events in the course of the trial. The trial continued at the Martial Law Tribunal, Istanbul, on the 3rd of March, 1956. At this hearing Kamil Onal, Osman Tan and Mustafa Eroglu who had been in custody, were released. In consequence of the lifting of martial law in Istanbul on the 7th of June, 1956, however, the Tribunal declared that it was not competent to proceed with the case. The case documents were therefore handed over to the Public Prosecutor of Istanbul.

4. The trial was resumed at the First Criminal High Court, Istanbul, on the 12th of September. The number of accused had by then risen to 20 but 5 of them did not appear. At this hearing, the Prosecutor demanded that the trial be held *in camera* in accordance with Article 373 of the Penal Code. One of the accused, Hikmet Bil, objected, and when the trial was resumed on the 3rd of October, the Court ruled that the hearings should be in public but that the proceedings should not be published. The Press reported this ruling and thereafter remained silent.

5. Reports indicated that thereafter the case was heard about once a fortnight and that evidence damaging to the Government was adduced by the Defence. It appeared that the accused never believed that they would be convicted, and Hikmet Bil was on record as saying in private that the trial was a "window dressing." Though he was on bail, no onerous restrictions were placed upon his movements.

6. The Press broke its silence on the 25th of January to report that at the hearing on the 24th of January, the Public Prosecutor asked for the acquittal of all the accused on the grounds that "investigations revealed that the defendants were not guilty of the charges brought against them." He went on to say that "the events of the 6th of September were the direct result of Greek provocations." The Court ruled that "no convincing evidence had been submitted to the Court to substantiate the charges brought against the accused," and they were consequently acquitted. As far as the Turkish Government are concerned this is no doubt the end of the affair; and there have been no subsequent reactions in the Turkish Press or Parliament.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens, Belgrade and Washington and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1022/8 No. 5

GENERAL REVIEW OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BY THE ACTING TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received March 8*)

(No. 40. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *February 28, 1957.*

I have the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 40 of March 5, 1956, to inform you that the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Ethem Menderes, gave the usual general review of Turkey's foreign policy in the debate in the Grand National Assembly on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 25.

2. M. Ethem Menderes began with a brief review of the world situation. The world was still far from the ideal of a true and just peace. It was divided into two camps, one of which was united by force in the framework of a policy of domination and expansion. This camp, which was contained in Europe by the joint efforts of the free nations, was now trying to spread out in other parts of the world and its " pacifist " propaganda was only designed to weaken and break the true peace front.

3. Turkey's principle was to be in the front rank of those making efforts to assure peace and stability for humanity. She was however resolved not to be misled by lying suggestions or by a policy whose deeds were contrary to its promises. Turkey was firmly convinced of the indivisibility of peace and would continue to consider as essential the measures taken by the free nations to safeguard their liberty and independence.

4. M. Menderes then turned to more detailed aspects of Turkey's foreign policy.

5. *Cyprus.*—Two months ago he had made a statement in the Grand National Assembly about the state of affairs over the Cyprus problem (cf. my despatch No. 1 of January 2). Since then the situation had deteriorated and as a result of the recrudescence of terrorism and of the present untenable situation of the Turkish community, the situation had entered a delicate and grave phase.

6. He deplored the fact that Greece, a member of the United Nations and of the Balkan Pact, had sent subversive elements to the island to stir up trouble and to support terrorism. In the eyes of Greece Turkish friendship should have been more valuable than Cyprus. If acts of terrorism which sometimes extended to attacks on the lives of Turkish Cypriots, continued, the amelioration of Turco-Greek relations would become impossible.

7. The final solution of this problem was essential both in the interests of the Turkish community in the island and also in the interests of NATO.

8. The Turkish Government had admitted that both communities in the island had the right separately to determine their future. The Turkish Government had welcomed the proposal for administrative self-government in Cyprus as a transitional régime, subject to certain suggested amendments. The Greeks had however rejected it utterly.

9. The Turkish Government was satisfied with the United Nations decision rejecting the Greek demand for the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and recommending the settlement of the Cyprus problem between the three countries concerned.

10. *Middle East.*—Certain leaders in Middle Eastern countries, closing their eyes to the common danger, were following a policy designed to satisfy their personal and paltry interests.

11. Turkey had supported throughout the United Nations decisions about the withdrawal of British and French troops from the Suez Canal and for their replacement by a United Nations Police Force. The Turkish Government hoped that the Israeli forces also would conform with these decisions which would contribute to the settlement of the Canal problem. Turkey would welcome with

great satisfaction a settlement of this problem which respected the sovereignty of Egypt over the Canal and at the same time maintained free international passage.

12. As regards the Eisenhower Plan, a distinction should be established in its application between the countries which had taken a stand in the front of the free world and had thus accepted heavy sacrifices; and those countries which were collaborating with or indirectly serving Communist imperialism.

13. The Baghdad Pact was a unique element capable of establishing peace and stability in the Middle East. It had proved this in its fundamental contribution to the settlement of the recent crisis. Successive meetings of the Members of the Baghdad Pact had confirmed the unity of view between them.

14. As regards the Palestine question which was one of the causes of instability in the Middle East, the Turkish Government hoped that a just solution would be found in the framework of United Nations decisions. It could be settled little by little by taking in hand the problems of the refugees and of compensation which did not appear to be insoluble.

15. *Tunisia and Morocco.*—These two countries had just entered an era of full maturity thanks to the efforts of their leaders, with whom Turkey would develop relations to the maximum, both in the interests of the Middle East and in the interests of peace and the stability of the free world.

16. *Libya.*—The recent visit of the Turkish Prime Minister had reinforced the ties of friendship between the two countries. Turkey felt the most cordial sentiments of friendship towards the Arab world and her ardent desire was to see the Arab countries assured of prosperity and progress. The Arab nations also nourished these sentiments in spite of the regrettable propaganda designed to create hostile currents against Turkey.

17. *The Balkan Pact.*—Turkey was convinced of the advantages and necessity of this Pact. If it was now paralysed the fault was that of Greece who had also neglected her obligations to NATO and of Yugoslavia whose recent attitude the Turkish Government regretted very much. They hoped that these two countries would become convinced that their present attitude was to their own detriment as well as to the disadvantage of Turkey.

18. *United Nations.*—M. Menderes mentioned the Turkish contribution to the work of the United Nations. He regretted that the Soviet Union had not conformed with the decision of the General Assembly to withdraw its troops from Hungary and that it considered the United Nations merely as a platform for its political activities; whereas Great Britain and France had withdrawn their troops from the Suez Canal in accordance with the recommendations of the Assembly. The Turkish Government were well satisfied with the resolution on Algeria recommending the just settlement of this question by bilateral negotiations. He stressed the conciliatory role that Turkey had played in the acceptance of this resolution by the two parties.

19. *Kashmir.*—The fact that this problem had not yet been settled was due to the attitude of unwillingness to conform with decisions of the General Assembly. Turkey, applying the principle of respect for United Nations decisions, supported the attitude of Pakistan which was in conformity with this principle.

20. *NATO.*—The North Atlantic Treaty was a Treaty designed to face a great danger which threatened the very existence of its member countries; nevertheless many vital questions for Europe remained in suspense, including unification of Germany.

21. M. Menderes emphasised the importance of the Ministerial Council decision to take seriously in hand the situation in the Middle and Near East.

22. In the military field, Turkey had received, under the infrastructure programme for 1957, aid amounting to £90 million. This was 20 per cent. of the total aid provided to NATO members under this programme, whereas Turkey's personal contribution to this programme was only £10 million. 35 per cent. of the £90 million would go for the construction of airfields; £25 million for fuel installations; £14 million for telecommunications; £8 million for naval installations; and £8 million for headquarters, radar and other projects. Under this programme

22 airfields would be constructed in Turkey; more than 2,000 km. of pipelines; fuel depots of a capacity of 270,000 cubic metres; a telecommunications network of 140,000 km.; naval bases in ten places; and two headquarters as well as radar and other installations.

23. *Atomic Energy.*—M. Menderes spoke of the Turkish Government's decision to create a centre for Atomic Research to encourage and control scientific work directed to making atomic energy available for the prosperity of the country and for the defence of its interests. An agreement had been concluded with the United States Government to make available to Turkey two atomic reactors and technical personnel as well as to train Turkish technical personnel in the United States. Forty Turkish scientists would go to the United States in the course of the next three years. Turkey was also participating in the atomic energy activities of O.E.E.C. and the Baghdad Pact.

24. *Council of Europe.*—M. Menderes spoke briefly of the activities of the Council of Europe which symbolised for Turkey the ideals of the common principles of the European countries which represented Western culture and civilisation.

25. *Turkey's foreign trade and United States aid.*—During 1956 fruitful trade negotiations had taken place with Japan, Yugoslavia, Syria, Iran, Holland, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Germany, France, Bulgaria and Great Britain. The Turkish Government had decided to increase the efficiency of their activities in this field.

26. As regards American aid, economic aid to Turkey had been raised during 1956 to $107 million, making a total of $800 million since 1948. Turkey had also received against payment in Turkish liras, agricultural products amounting to $26 million in 1954, $28 million in 1955 and $65 million in 1956.

27. A credit of $200 million had been appropriated in the American Budget for military aid for Turkey during 1956–57; thus Turkey would have received a total of $700 million in military aid. It was an agreeable duty to accept with gratitude this aid from Turkey's great ally and friend, designed to create a modern Turkish army.

28. It should also be emphasised with thanks, that the military aid of Turkey's friend and ally Canada had reached $100 million.

29. M. Menderes concluded by saying that if Turkey hoped to obtain an increase in aid, this stemmed from her desire to serve the cause of collective security more favourably and to reach an economic position which would allow her to meet her obligations from her own resources.

30. M. Menderes' speech was shorter and less comprehensive than the equivalent speeches delivered by Professor Köprülü in recent years. This was partly due no doubt to the fact that full statements had already been made on Turkish foreign policy this year (cf. my despatches No. 1 and No. 12 of January 22) as well as many Press conferences covering a wide field of foreign affairs. I also understand that in M. Birgi's absence the Ministry of Foreign Affairs forgot to prepare M. Menderes' brief until the last moment and that it was therefore a hastily constructed exercise. Nevertheless, the contents of the speech emphasised that there had been no fundamental change in Turkey's foreign policy in any important field.

31. After M. Ethem Menderes had concluded, the session was adjourned until the afternoon when the smoothness of the proceedings was upset by a violent exchange between the Freedom Party leaders and the Prime Minister. The Freedom Party spokesman, M. Fethi Çelikbaş, one of the Prime Minister's main debating opponents, criticised the Baghdad Pact on the grounds that it had not produced the results expected from it. He also criticised the Government's Cyprus policy saying that it had been unsuccessful and finally said that the Turkish Press law had damaged Turkish prestige abroad and quoted a reply by Mr. Dulles to a Press question on this subject.

32. As expected, the Prime Minister reacted fiercely to these charges. He defended the Baghdad Pact and the Government's Cyprus policy on familiar lines but in the strongest terms and pointed out the harmlessness of Mr. Dulles' comment on the Turkish Press law, condemning M. Çelikbaş for mentioning it in the context of " foreign interference in Turkey's affairs."

33. The leader of the Freedom Party, M. Fevzi Lutfi Karaosmanoglu, also intervened in the debate and there were a series of ugly scenes which led to the temporary adjournment of the session. Finally the Prime Minister spoke again and reiterated his defence of Turkey's policy in regard to Cyprus and the Baghdad Pact, and the discussion closed with the acceptance of the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Paris, Athens, Belgrade, Baghdad, Tehran, Karachi, Beirut, Tel Aviv, Tunis, Rabat and Tripoli; to the United Kingdom delegations at Paris and New York; and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1015/12 No. 6

POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROSPECTS IN TURKEY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 1)

(No. 62. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *March 27, 1957.*

Members of my staff have recently paid calls on the leaders of the four main political parties in Ankara (the Democrat Party, the Freedom Party, the People's Republican Party and the Republican National Party) and on the Ankara representative of the more insignificant Peasants' Party. In the light of the information gained at these interviews and of separate observation during recent months, I have the honour to submit comments on the present state of inter-party and internal party relations and of the feeling in the country towards the various parties, bearing in mind the fact that the next general elections are due to take place in just over one year's time.

2. Since the secession from the Democrat Party of the nineteen " rebels " who formed the nucleus of the Freedom Party, and since the resolution of the Cabinet crisis of November 1955, there has been only slight outward evidence of discontent within the Democrat Party itself. There have been periodical individual resignations and expulsions from the party, all of which have served to swell the ranks of the Freedom Party to its present position as numerically the largest Opposition Party in the Grand National Assembly. Equally, the then chairman of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group resigned in 1956 in protest over the summary retirement of a number of judges of the Court of Cassation; and there was at one time considerable speculation whether the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor Köprülü, would lead an active Opposition group to M. Menderes within the party. More recently there have been two separate instances of dissension in the Democrat ranks at provincial congresses at which certain Democrat Party members spoke out strongly against the undemocratic policies of the Government. There have also been recent rumours, mainly emanating from Opposition circles, of considerable discontent about M. Menderes in the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group and of uneasiness among certain Ministers and Deputies about the results of the next general elections.

3. In spite of these various portents, there is as yet no evidence that any discontent there may be is becoming focused around any one single powerful man in the Democrat Party, or even around a group of influential Deputies as was the case in the days leading up to the secession of the " nineteen." Until such a focus emerges, if it ever does, the sporadic signs of discontent cannot be regarded as more than scratches on the surface of the monolith, as opposed to structural cracks. They appear at present to be little more than the small upsets inevitable in any party long in power, and there are so far no indications of the emergence of any figure who could conceivably replace M. Menderes in his dominant position.

4. In its relations with the electorate, the greatest single blow to Democrat popularity in recent years has been the enactment in 1956 of the National Protections Law designed to control prices and to prevent hoarding and black marketeering. The other repressive legislative and administrative acts by the Democrat Party régime—the Press Law; the Law on Public Meetings; the treatment of the judiciary; the constant persecution of Opposition journalists; the dismissal of the Dean of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University, &c.—have all in their turn aroused storms among the vocal but numerically weak intellectuals and journalists, but have probably had little effect on the mass of the agricultural electorate. Although the peasants may sympathise with the sufferers under these laws, and although they may question their ethical validity, the benefits they continue to enjoy from the agricultural subsidies and the golden promise of industrialisation under M. Menderes's economic programme have too much attraction for them to think of changing their vote for the sake of abstract and to them irrelevant principles. There is a growing mentality among the Turkish peasantry that the very presence of industrial installations in their midst will provide the solution to the evil of having to scratch barren ground for a poor living. Such installations are therefore warmly welcomed where they have been set up, and eagerly awaited in the areas where they are as yet projects only. Thus, whatever the fundamental economic weaknesses of M. Menderes's policy may be, it is unlikely to turn the main voting tide against him.

5. Nevertheless, the National Protections Law has struck home even in the remotest areas of Turkey. The indiscriminate application of fixed prices to nearly all commodities has undoubtedly caused considerable discontent; even the Democrat Mayors in certain provinces admit that the price fixing is unfair and detrimental to local interests; and there have been many reports of peasants refusing to bring their goods to the local towns for sale since they can no longer produce them at a reasonable profit. Everyone admits that the National Protections Law was necessary in the large cities where black marketeering was rampant, but there is a wide feeling that it should not have been applied in the rural areas, where there is a lack of balance between the price fixed for agricultural produce and certain commodities which the peasant requires to buy in order to maintain his output.

6. There is little doubt therefore that Democrat popularity must have sunk over a wide area owing to this measure and there are signs that the Government have realised this and are about to relax certain provisions of the law. It is, however, possible that some damage may have been done through this law to the Democrat Party cause in the next elections, although this is probably offset by the greatest Democrat Party asset of all—the hopelessly weak and confused state of the Opposition, partly resulting from unremitting pressure by M. Menderes and partly due to endemic causes.

7. Although it is still generally regarded as the main Opposition Party in Turkey, the People's Republican Party is unquestionably in a state of decline. Internally it has long been divided between the supporters of the ageing ex-President Inönü and the supporters of the colourful, intelligent but unstable Secretary-General, M. Kasim Gülek; and a further split within the party has apparently been caused by M. Inönü's action in initiating a reconciliation with M. Menderes, which has been condemned by the more militant element in the P.R.P. as pathetic toadying to gain personal ends by M. Inönü himself.

8. The Freedom Party, which started with such high hopes in late 1955, has so far failed to fulfil its early promise. Its parliamentary numbers have steadily swelled as a result of resignations or expulsions from the Democrat Party, and it now has provincial organisations in forty-five provinces, but it does not appear to have captured public opinion (except among the intellectuals), possibly because its programme is based too much on high ideals and opposition to M. Menderes, and strikes no popular or constructive note which would appeal to the agricultural population. In addition, there are now faint signs of dissension within the ranks of the party itself.

9. The Republican National Party only maintains a certain illusion of prominence owing to the flamboyant personality of its leader, M. Bölükbaşi, reputed to be the best orator in Turkey. Its parliamentary representation is restricted to one province only and, although it has local organisations in nearly all provinces, it is generally regarded more or less as a joke and also with some suspicion due to its lineal descent from the proscribed National Party.

10. The Peasants' Party falls into a similar but even lower category to the Republican National Party. At present it has no parliamentary representative and even its leaders hold out no hopes of great gains in the next elections—the most that they hope for is a few seats in the National Assembly.

11. As regards the attitude of the provincial electorate towards the Opposition, this was perhaps best summed up by the leader of the Freedom Party himself in a recent conversation with members of my staff. M. Karaosmanoğlu admitted that support for the Opposition in the country had fallen off over the last year. The trouble was that the people were confused and did not know which Opposition Party to choose for their vote. The peasants dreaded the return to power of the People's Republican Party with its long tradition of autocracy and high-handed methods. The Republican National Party was not seriously considered by anyone, and the Freedom Party was as yet untried. Consequently, the main body of the electorate had no acceptable focus on which to concentrate their discontent (if any) with the Government; and the answer to this lay, in M. Karaosmanoğlu's opinion, in co-operation between the Opposition Parties at least up to the end of the next elections.

12. Nevertheless, this idea of co-operation, which was originally launched last

summer by the Freedom Party, has steadily receded in the background. The original initiative failed totally, mainly owing to the individual jealousies of the other party leaders and their fear of being engulfed by the Freedom Party. Any further initiative in this direction has for the moment been frustrated by the reconciliation between M. Inönü and M. Menderes, which has undoubtedly been directed deliberately against the Freedom Party, possibly with a view to stultifying any further moves towards Opposition co-operation.

13. Another factor which militates strongly against Opposition chances is the lack of any constructive and dynamic alternative programme in any of their parties. The fact, of course, is that in the framework of the Kemalist precepts on which the new Turkey was founded, and which remain the guiding principles of Turkish political life, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any Opposition Party to produce a programme of a nature to galvanise the electorate, particularly at the present moment when the governing party are engaged on an extravagant programme of development which at least the agricultural elements of the country, who form some 75 per cent. of the population, confidently expect to bring them eternal riches. It is not surprising therefore that the differences between the P.R.P. and Democrat Party programmes should be small. The Freedom Party programme is full of high ideals, but has little constructive to offer which differs from the existing Democrat Party programme, while the recently published programme of the Republican National Party is merely a rehash of the Democrat Party and Freedom Party programmes with a slightly more marked accent on the position of Islam in political life. Generally speaking, until the dawn of the recent honeymoon between M. Inönü and M. Menderes the only single factor which united the Opposition Parties was opposition to M. Menderes himself. This bitterness has in recent years so clouded the minds of Opposition leaders that they have more or less abandoned attempts to attract the electorate by constructive suggestions, in favour of violent polemics against the Prime Minister himself.

14. My conclusions are therefore much the same as they have been in previous reports. M. Menderes still dominates the Democrat Party and the Democrat Party still dominates the political scene. Unless a strong focus of discontent emerges within this party, and unless the Government fail to take palliative measures in time against the evils of the National Protections Law, the Democrat Party would seem to have little to fear from the Opposition, either now or at the time of the next elections. In spite of this, however, the final attitude of the Turkish voter remains unpredictable, assuming that the elections are as free as they were at the time of the original P.R.P. landslide in 1950. M. Karaosmanoğlu, the leader of the Freedom Party, who as a large farmer in South-West Turkey has wide experience of the Turkish peasant mentality, summed up their state of mind in the following terms. The Turkish peasant is acutely aware of his new-found power to replace one régime by another through the medium of free elections. Nevertheless, he is also a man of fudamental conservative outlook and is basically averse to upsetting the existing order of things. With these two opposing factors in mind, it is impossible accurately to predict his attitude when elections come.

15. Whatever the outcome of the party struggle may be, perhaps the brightest spot in the current development of Turkish democracy was expressed by M. Bölükbaşi in conversation recently with members of my staff. He said that multi-party democracy had been established in Turkey for twelve years only. During these twelve years the inter-party struggle had reached an extreme stage of violence and competition. Nevertheless, the Turkish people—especially the peasants—although they were all extremely interested in politics and alive to current events, had not indulged in one single political "incident" of the kind so familiar in other Middle East countries. This was a remarkable tribute to their patriotism, their stability and the speed with which they have become acclimatised to the cut and thrust of inter-party politics in spite of the fact that they had been deprived of all free expression for hundreds of years under the Ottoman Sultans and subsequently for nearly two decades under the single party régime of Atatürk and Inönü.

16. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RGC 10344/43 No. 7

TURKISH REACTIONS TO RELEASE OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 15)

(No. 71. Confidential)
Sir, *Ankara, April 12, 1957.*

I have the honour, with reference to paragraph 6 of my telegram No. 368 to send you the accompanying copy of the memorandum(1) on Cyprus which was handed to me by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also communicated to the United States Chargé d'Affaires, on the 9th of April. In my interview with the Prime Minister the following day, as reported in my telegram under reference, I explained that I was in some doubt about how to deal with the memorandum in view of the fact that it contained references to points, such as the recent relaxation of some of the emergency regulations in Cyprus, which I thought had now been covered by what I had just been able to tell the Prime Minister on instructions from Her Majesty's Government, and general statements such as the one in paragraph 3 to the effect that negotiations between the three Governments which should have followed from the United Nations Resolution, were being "practically set aside," which, in view of Her Majesty's Government's known desire to follow up Lord Ismay's offer of conciliation, I thought Her Majesty's Government would find it hard to understand. As I reported, this led to a long and somewhat confused discussion in which the Prime Minister, prompted by M. Zorlu and the Secretary-General, who were both present at the interview, tried to show that the release of Archbishop Makarios had now concentrated attention on the prospects of talks with him and that the Greeks would use this as a pretext for blocking or delaying any talks between the three Governments. He also argued that the encouragement that had been given to the Enotists by Archbishop Makarios's release and the further exacerbation of relations between the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus which had ensued, and now destroyed any chances there might have been of reaching agreement on the Radcliffe proposals, and that therefore the only solution was an agreement now, between the three Governments if possible, and if not between the Turkish Government and Her Majesty's Government, on partition.

2. I pointed out that any progress with the Greeks on the Radcliffe proposals had been impossible while Archbishop Makarios was in the Seychelles and though his statements since his release had shown how difficult it was likely to be to have any profitable exchanges with him, the Greek Government would now no longer be able to refuse to discuss any settlement on the pretext that the Archbishop was in detention. I could not see therefore that the Archbishop's release in itself had put an end to any hope of agreement on Her Majesty's Government's December proposals.

3. At this stage M. Zorlu asked how the Turkish Government were to know whether Her Majesty's Government did not intend to negotiate with Archbishop Makarios a settlement of Cyprus. This enabled me to point out, with a show of considerable indignation, that Her Majesty's Government had repeatedly made it plain that they had no intention of conducting any negotiations with the Archbishop and had merely reiterated the fact that they would be ready to hear his views, as one of the representatives of the Greek Cypriots, on the Radcliffe Report.

4. The explanations which, on your instructions, I had been able to give the Prime Minister on Her Majesty's Government's continued stand on the December statement and the reasons which had led them to decide on Archbishop Makarios's release, together with Mr. Macmillan's message, did I think in the end go some way to removing the idea that there had been a change in Her Majesty's Government's policy or a radical change in the Cyprus situation, and it was, I hope, a favourable sign that the Prime Minister decided—as it seemed to me as the result of our conversation—to communicate to Her Majesty's Government, for their comments, the statement he proposed to make in Parliament

(1) Not printed.

on the 16th of April. M. Birgi told me to-day that the Prime Minister having rejected several drafts, was now drafting his statement himself, and intended to give me a summary of the main points. I emphasised the importance of giving Her Majesty's Government enough time to make their comments.

5. I am sure, nevertheless, that however unjustified the present excitement over Archbishop Makarios's release may be, there is a genuine anxiety here about future developments. In the course of my conversation with the Prime Minister, I tried to get him to define more particularly in what respect he wanted a clarification of Her Majesty's Government's policy. The answer, after discussion between him, M. Zorlu and M. Birgi, was that the Turkish Government would like to know what were Her Majesty's Government's ideas of a basis for discussion or conciliation in the event of Greece after all accepting Lord Ismay's offer, and what action Her Majesty's Government would propose if Greece finally rejected the offer and also if Greece rejected it but Archbishop Makarios accepted the offer of talks with Her Majesty's Government. While therefore I think that as a result of my conversation with the Prime Minister it is not necessary to give a direct reply to the enclosed memorandum, nevertheless I have no doubt that the Turkish Government will continue to ask for, and will warmly welcome, as clear an indication as possible of Her Majesty's Government's proposed policy in the three contingencies referred to above.

6. As you will have seen from my reports, the Archbishop's release has produced a minor crisis in Anglo-Turkish relations. The crisis took a little time to develop. As I reported, the first response of the Turkish Government was comparatively mild. They were greatly relieved that Her Majesty's Government had dropped their earlier idea of a London conference with Archbishop Makarios and other representatives of the Cypriots. They were equally relieved that Her Majesty's Government's announcement of their decision to release the Archbishop contained no reference to a relaxation of the emergency measures beyond the offer of a free conduct for Grivas and his associates, and though the actual terms of the Archbishop's statement containing his conditional appeal to EOKA came as a considerable shock, even then the Turkish Government at first concentrated their comment on the necessity of continuing to refuse the Archbishop admission to Cyprus and of publicly disavowing any connexion between his release and the question of initiating talks with him. For a day or so after the news was out there was little, if any, official comment. It seems that then excitement began to develop spontaneously among sections of the Democrat Party and the public, which led to hostile comment in the Press, and that the Turkish Government, afraid of being accused of remaining passive in the face of what was being presented as a British betrayal of Turkish interests, themselves took up the cry of disaster and made the urgent representations reported in my telegrams No. 351 and No. 355. At the same time, while refraining from giving any calming advice on the lines which I suggested to the Secretary-General (my telegram No. 351), their spokesman cannot, I think, be altogether absolved from implying some Government sympathy for such current accusations in the Press as that of constant changes of British policy—a point to which I called the attention of the Acting Foreign Minister on the 9th of April. Moreover the Turkish Press Bureau in Ankara chose this moment to release to all newspapers a Turkish translation of the official pamphlet (Terrorism in Cyprus) containing extracts from Grivas's diaries, which has since been serialised or referred to by several papers.

7. I should not be surprised if M. Zorlu has been to some extent responsible for the more aggressive tone adopted by the Turkish Government towards Her Majesty's Government in the last week. I believe he was partly responsible for drafting the enclosed memorandum and it was significant that he, and not the Acting Foreign Minister, was present at my interview with the Prime Minister. It was a particular satisfaction to be able to indicate what I thought of the memorandum in his presence, and also to deal with his reference to the possibility of Her Majesty's Government having negotiations with Archbishop Makarios.

8. From what the Counsellor has been told by the Head of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the President of the Republic, the latter, who is a staunch exponent of Anglo-Turkish friendship, has been sincerely worried by the recent hostile criticisms of Britain and British policy which have appeared in the Press and which are met in conversation with representative Turks. No doubt his influence will continue to be exercised on the side of moderation. It is to be

hoped that, armed with the material which I was able to give him on the 10th of April, the Prime Minister will now feel able and willing to deal firmly with the critical questioning which he will have to face in the Parliamentary Group of the Democrat Party on the 16th of April before he makes his statement in Parliament on the following day. Meanwhile I and senior members of my staff are taking every opportunity of explaining the true facts of the situation in appropriate quarters.

9. The excitement over Archbishop Makarios has unfortunately coincided with the British Cultural Week arranged at great pains by the British Council representative, Mr. Tomlin. The visit of a British military band from Cyprus, which was to have marked the opening of the week, was cancelled at the express request of the Prime Minister, as I have already reported, and hopes that the Minister of Education would personally open the Educational and Nuclear Energy Exhibition were disappointed. Nevertheless, the special lectures have been well attended, the two performances given at the opera by Nadia Nerina and Alexis Rassine from Covent Garden together with the Turkish National Ballet drew packed and enthusiastic audiences and the Government newspaper *Zafer*, apart from ceasing its hostile editorials during the last few days, has continued to give the various features of the Cultural Week good and friendly publicity.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Athens and Washington, the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at Paris and New York and to the Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RGC 10344/55 No. 8

DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKEY FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF ARCHBISHOP MAKARIOS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received April 23)

(No. 79. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *April 18, 1957.*

I have reported by telegram the developments in the situation here resulting from the release of Archbishop Makarios following on those described in my despatch No. 71. The situation two days ago was becoming disquieting. In the absence of any guidance from the Government or any attempt to correct the misrepresentations which continued to pour from all sections of the Press about Her Majesty's Government's policy and intentions, public excitement was steadily growing and with it resentment against Britain. As a result the Prime Minister found himself in a mounting dilemma resulting from the difficulty of reconciling a reasoned and moderate presentation of the situation with the growing tendency among both the supporters and his critics to reproach him for complacency at a moment when, according to them, British policy was threatening Turkey's vital interests. The firm lead required to pull the situation together was becoming each day more difficult to give. The Prime Minister's draft of the remarks which he proposed to make on Cyprus in his statement to Parliament showed in what a wholly unsatisfactory manner he was intending to deal with the situation. It was a welcome sign of goodwill that he decided to submit the draft to Her Majesty's Government. His decision, however, to postpone his statement in order to have more time to study Her Majesty's Government's comments, though welcome in itself, meant that the public was to be left without a lead over the specially delicate moment of Archbishop Makarios' arrival in Athens.

2. It was with this consideration particularly in mind that I thought it necessary to speak yesterday morning to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the lines reported in my telegram No. 398. In view, moreover, of the indications already received, as reported in paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 71, of the personal concern felt by the President of the Republic over the effect of recent developments on Anglo-Turkish relations, I thought it as well to give the Secretary-General of the Presidency, on whom I called yesterday afternoon, an account of recent exchanges between Her Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government and of my conversation with M. Esenbel in the morning. M. Belbez told me later in the day that he had passed on to the President all that I had said to him and that the President had listened attentively and taken some notes. I have also in the last two days spoken to the Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party and the owner-editor of one of the Opposition newspapers explaining the facts of the situation and suggesting that they should use their influence to have them more accurately presented.

3. Meanwhile the United States Chargé d'Affaires has over the last few days delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs more than one message from the United States Government exhorting restraint in the clearest terms.

4. In this atmosphere of general uneasiness it was a relief when the Prime Minister took me aside at his reception last night for the Afghan Prime Minister to give me the information reported in my telegram No. 400. His statement is now, I understand, to be issued this evening so I have not yet been able to report the final text. Nor do I know whether the Prime Minister finally incorporated my suggested amendments as a result of which, instead of saying that Her Majesty's Government's decision to release Makarios was a mistake and that events had proved it to be so, he would say that Her Majesty's Government's decision to release Makarios was in his opinion a mistake and that events would prove which was right. In view of the delay in issuing the statement it may well have been redrafted.

5. The Prime Minister's assurance that permission would not be given for the holding of public meetings and the assurance given me by the Director-General of Public Security that effective measures had been taken in Istanbul to prevent any trouble there, give ground for reasonable confidence that the Government have decided to try to keep things quiet. I have since confirmed from Istanbul this morning that all public meetings, including football matches, have been cancelled

there. Archbishop Makarios' reception in Athens and his speech on arrival have not so far produced the sharp reaction here that might have been feared. The Prime Minister was inclined to agree when I told him last night that I was sure that the Archbishop would prove a much greater embarrassment to M. Karamanlis than to him, and there seems to be a tendency at last to accept the point which I have been making all along that the recent excitement here about the Archbishop's release has merely been serving to increase his importance. It remains to be seen how the Prime Minister finally decides to deal with the matter in Parliament. At least he is now giving serious attention to Her Majesty's Government's suggestions.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Athens and Washington, the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation at Paris and New York, the Governor of Cyprus and to Her Majesty's Consul-General at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RGC 10344/73 No. 9

THE IMPACT OF CYPRUS ON ANGLO-TURKISH RELATIONS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 13)

(No. 96. Confidential) *Ankara.*
Sir, *May 10, 1957.*

The further phases of the storm in Anglo-Turkish relations over Cyprus since I wrote my despatch No. 79 of the 18th of April have been reported by telegram and letter. It may be convenient to complete the story in a further despatch.

2. The Turkish Prime Minister's statement to the Press referred to in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 79 turned out, in the event, to be rather longer than the two paragraphs which he had shown me the night before. However, the friendly reference to Anglo-Turkish relations remained very much the same and the Prime Minister made it clear that, in criticising Her Majesty's Government's decision to release Archbishop Makarios, he was expressing his own opinion.

3. This statement had a certain calming effect, but not for long, and the Press was soon back on its note of hostile misrepresentation of British policy. Having spoken again on the subject to the Secretary-General on the 25th of April, I was received the following evening by the Prime Minister, to whom I once more expressed my growing concern over the effect which the systematic campaign of hostility and misrepresentation was bound to have on Anglo-Turkish relations. I pointed out that in the absence of any authoritative directive the public would necessarily conclude that the views published in the Press were shared by the Turkish Government, and I urged that the latter should take steps to correct the misunderstanding over British policy now gaining general currency by using the abundant explanations and assurances which had been given them by Her Majesty's Government and which I went over once again. M. Menderes admitted that the situation called for guidance and, after telling me that he had been having a continuous series of meetings with Ministers and representatives of the Democrat Party in order to convince them of Britain's good faith, said that, since Parliament was shortly to rise for the holiday following Ramadan, he would take the occasion of the holiday to give a big Press Conference in Istanbul at which he would explain the facts of the situation. Having said this he produced his accusations against the Cyprus Broadcasting System which, as I told him I expected would be the case, I was able to demolish effectively a few days later thanks to the detailed information promptly furnished by the Governor of Cyprus. In communicating this information to M. Menderes I expressed the hope that in future such accusations would not be accepted uncritically in authoritative Turkish quarters until I was given the opportunity of ascertaining the true facts.

4. In the event M. Menderes's long-awaited statement to the public was made in the course of a speech at Boursa, which, with the President, he visited during the Bayram and where the crowds greeted their visitors with cries of "We want Cyprus." The passages in the speech relating to Anglo-Turkish relations and Cyprus were reported by telegram, as also (my telegram No. 458) the explanation of the character of the speech and the circumstances in which it was made, as given to me later by the Secretary-General on the Prime Minister's instructions. Confirmation of good relations between Turkey and Britain was unreserved. British policy, so far from being criticised, was vindicated, though to the embarrassing point of declaring that it "favoured" partition. M. Esenbel's explanation of the meaning of the Turkish word when I took up this point with him was hardly convincing and there is no doubt that the general impression made on the public was that there had been a change of British policy in this respect in favour of the Turkish thesis. On the other hand the cryptic passage later in the speech suggesting that Turkish policy had moved from M. Menderes's statement of the 21st of December in which he accepted Her Majesty's Government's statement of the 19th of December as a basis of discussions, was, according to M. Esenbel's explanation, intended to mean that, while "technically" the Turkish Government continued to stand on M. Menderes's statement of the 21st of December, nevertheless they were becoming more and more convinced that the two communities in Cyprus would never be able to live together under the same constitution and that partition had become the only possible solution.

5. Since then the Minister of the Interior has given me, in the course of a long interview and on the Prime Minister's instructions, an assurance that the Turkish Government are resolved to do their utmost —by guidance, he was careful to explain, and not by pressure—to prevent the Press from publishing misrepresentations of British policy over Cyprus calculated to harm Anglo-Turkish relations.

6. The Prime Minister's speech has had its effect and the tone of the Press has improved. The Turkish Government seem to have come to the conclusion that the campaign of hostility to Britain has gone far enough. The President of the Republic at the Reception given to the German President, and later the Minister of the Interior at my interview with him, both went out of their way to express warm thanks for the help given by the Royal Navy to the victims of the earthquake at Fetiye. Formal approval has been given for the proposed summer visits of ships of the Royal Navy to Turkish ports, including, somewhat surprisingly, visits to three ports on the Black Sea, which will be the first visits paid by any foreign warships to Turkish ports on the Black Sea since the war. For the moment the heavy cloud that has lain over Anglo-Turkish relations since the release of Archbishop Makarios from the Seychelles seems to have been dispelled. But as long as the present uncertainties over developments in the Cyprus issue remain, Turkey's relations with Britain will continue to be delicate. Turkish public opinion remains acutely sensitive on the subject of Archbishop Makarios, and there is a general distrust about Her Majesty's Government's future intentions. Any decision in present circumstances to invite him to London is bound to cause a violent outburst here. Moreover, it would be vain to expect that the Turkish Government will ever agree to representatives of the Turkish Cypriots sitting at a conference table with the Archbishop. Apart from the issues of principle and emotion involved, there would be little inclination to leave the Turkish case to be defended by Dr. Kuçuk.

7. As things are at present, though there has been no official departure from M. Menderes's statement of the 21st of December, the Turkish Government, in their memorandum of the 27th of April addressed to the Americans, of which a copy was given to us, have stated that they regard partition as the only possible solution of the Cyprus problem. They have also expressed orally to us the wish to start discussing its practical implementation (paragraph 8 of my telegram No. 327). In their same memorandum to the Americans, the Turkish Government have expressed their rejection of any solution based on the idea of an "independent" Cyprus. On the other hand, at the Ministerial meeting of the NATO Council at Bonn, M. Nuri Birgi confirmed the Turkish Government's readiness to accept the Secretary-General's offer of good offices. The extent to which the eventual exercise of that offer is likely to lead to an agreement will, as far as the Turks are concerned, depend on the extent to which the Greeks cease aiming at a settlement which can be used as a stepping-stone to Enosis and abandon their present course of subjecting the determination of their policy to dictation by Archbishop Makarios.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Governor of Cyprus, Her Majesty's Representatives at Athens and Washington, the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at Paris and at New York, the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces and Her Majesty's Consul-General at Istanbul.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 10318/1 No. 10

VISIT OF PRESIDENT HEUSS TO TURKEY, MAY 5–13, 1957

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received May 21)

(No. 99. Confidential) *Ankara, May 17, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to report that the President of the Federal German Republic, his Excellency Dr. Theodor Heuss, paid a State visit to Ankara from the 5th to the 8th of May. This was followed by what was described as a private visit to Istanbul between the 9th and 13th of May.

2. President Heuss and his suite arrived by aeroplane in Ankara on the evening of Sunday, the 5th of May. He was received with appropriate ceremony at the airport by the President of the Turkish Republic, the Turkish Prime Minister, together with numerous civil and military dignitaries and was then escorted in procession to the house reserved for distinguished visitors at Çankaya. The drive lasted about one and a half hours through flag-bedecked streets lined with soldiers and organised parties of school children who had been placed in position some five hours beforehand.

3. During the following three days he carried out an impressive and well-arranged programme which included a State banquet given by the Turkish President (who was later President Heuss's guest at a return banquet held in the German Embassy, a luncheon at the Grand National Assembly and a reception given by the Prime Minister. President Heuss also attended ceremonies at which he was made an Honorary Citizen of Ankara and an Honorary Doctor of Law of Ankara University.

4. He left for Istanbul, by special train, on the evening of the 8th of May, accompanied by President Bayar. At Istanbul there was a further exchange of formal entertainment between the two Presidents.

5. The Foreign Minister of the Federal German Republic, Herr von Brentano, accompanied President Heuss until the 8th of May, when he returned by air to Bonn. I have been assured by the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no formal political discussions took place.

6. The Turkish Government's preparaparations for the visit were on a lavish scale. Triumphal arches and illuminated street decorations were specially built, and the flag of the Federal Republic was everywhere to be seen. Considerable stretches of tarmac were laid with unusual speed just before the visit, while during it the police control of the traffic for President Heuss's journeys through Ankara at times made other movement by motor-car extremely difficult. In Istanbul, also, elaborate preparations were made for the reception and entertainment of the President and these were on a larger scale than has been accorded to any other visiting Head of State in recent years. On his departure, the whole road to the airport was lined with troops and spectators, while the traffic arrangements of the Turkish police at the reception given by the German Ambassador at the Consulate-General were handled with ruthless efficiency.

7. There is little doubt that the natural sympathy of the Turks for the Germans and the informal charm and dignity of the President made the visit a considerable success. This is not to say, however, that the welcome given by the public was, though undoubtedly genuine, entirely spontaneous. The spectators included many organised parties of school children and other groups. The police authorities, both in Ankara and Istanbul, encouraged the display of flags along the routes traversed, and distributed paper flags to the school children.

8. The visitors on their side made a number of well-timed and graceful gestures. President Heuss made a gift of 20,000 marks to the victims of the earthquake at Fethiye and distributed a large number of decorations to Ministers, officials and private persons associated with the development of Turco-German relations since the end of the war. The most important and effective gesture was his announcement of the 8th of May that Germany would grant 150 scholarships of one year's duration to Turkish students for the study of industrial and technical subjects. I have been told by the director of the Iş Bank that these will be mainly in the field of light engineering (*e.g.*, electrical trades) and not heavy industry. On the same day the two Foreign Ministers signed a Cultural Agreement, valid for five years, between Turkey and Germany.

9. Both Government and Opposition newspapers devoted a considerable amount of space to the visit and, encouraged no doubt by the presence of many German journalists, vied with each other in friendly and sometimes extravagant praise of the achievements of the two countries. The public statements of President Heuss and of the Turkish President stressed the historical nature of Turco-German friendship which President Bayar described as having by a happy coincidence survived the stress of recent history and both Turks and Germans spoke of the potential value for their countries, and the free world, of closer economic and cultural ties. While all this may be true to-day it is for a foreign observer one of the curiosities of the Turkish character that the Turks with only the rarest exceptions are quite unaware of, or if they are aware do not resent, the appalling damage that Turkey suffered as a result of her association with Germany before and during the first World War. The Turks quite simply love the Germans and I have little doubt that, had Germany the resources to do for Turkey what the Americans are doing for her to-day, she would be a much more welcome partner.

10. President Heuss's visit may then justly be regarded as marking an important stage in the development of Turco-German relations, particularly in the economic sphere. The Turks are undoubtedly impressed by the German economic recovery, and have greeted with much satisfaction the final approval on the 8th of May by the Defence Committee of the Bundestag of the Agreement initialled on the 29th of August last by which Turkey will supply munitions to Germany. This is regarded as a striking proof of Turkish industrial maturity and a very welcome alleviation of Turkey's acute difficulties over the foreign exchange. It will enable all Turkish debts to Germany to be cleared up, and leave the way open for new business. The German Embassy have, in private, denied that economic matters were discussed during the visit. While this may be true in a formal sense, some economic experts are believed to have been included in the President's entourage. The Germans evidently expect the 150 scholarships to do much to strengthen the economic links between the two countries, and I have no doubt that they are right. The Turkish Acting Foreign Minister pointed out at the signing of the Turco-German Cultural Agreement that there are already 1,600 Turkish students at Federal German universities. (This compares with about 150 in the United Kingdom.) It was noticeable also during the visit that the Istanbul hotels were full of German business men and journalists anxious to take advantage of the atmosphere created by the visit.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Bonn and Washington and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RGC 10344/85 No. 11

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE NEW TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON JUNE 12, 1957

Turkish Views on Cyprus

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir James Bowker (Ankara)

(No. 129. Secret) *Foreign Office, June 14, 1957.*

Sir,

M. Nuri Birgi paid his first call on me as Turkish Ambassador on June 12. After he had conveyed to me a complimentary message from his Prime Minister about the success of the Karachi meeting of the Bagdad Pact Council, we went on to discuss Cyprus.

2. In reply to my enquiry about the purpose of M. Menderes's suggestion that Her Majesty's Government should invite the Greek and Turkish Governments to a new conference, M. Birgi said that the Turkish Government felt that the time was approaching, if it had not already arrived, when the Greek Government must be placed *au pied du mur*. For the present it suited the Greek Government, while exploiting the Cyprus question to our disadvantage as opportunity offered, to side-track the main question of the future of the island until conditions were more propitious for Greece to prosecute its claims. But the Turkish Government did not think that it was in their interest or in ours to allow the question thus to remain in abeyance. M. Birgi thought it might be appropriate to allow Makarios a further period of say six weeks in which to change his attitude, provided that at the end of that time we were ready to make a new move. His instructions were to discuss the whole question with us rather than to put forward any specific proposal at this stage.

3. I said that I welcomed the opportunity to think aloud together. It seemed to me that the present position was not unsatisfactory, in that the release of Makarios had produced very much the results that we had expected. Neither the Greek Government nor Makarios seemed to know what to do next. The Greek Government had put themselves in the wrong by their refusal of the good offices of the Secretary-General of NATO. Meanwhile opinion in this country had hardened somewhat against the Greeks, and our sharp rejoinder to Makarios's latest letter had had a reasonably good press here.

4. None the less I agreed that it was important to think of our next step. It seemed to me that there were a number of possible contingencies of which we must take account. The first was the possibility that Makarios might ask to come to London. We had said that we were willing to hear the views of any Cypriots on our proposals. Other Cypriots besides Makarios would of course have the right to be heard, including the Turkish Cypriots. The resulting exchange of views would be unlikely to lead to agreement and would therefore probably be unprofitable. Another possible, even probable, contingency was a new outbreak of terrorism. This would revive the pressures on Her Majesty's Government to get a Cyprus settlement with the Greeks, and would be a bad prelude to any debate at the United Nations. If, on the other hand, terrorism had not recommenced by the time of the next Assembly debate, our position at the United Nations should be reasonably good. Finally, there was the possibility of some new initiative either by the Greek Government or by an outside party (such as the Indians) who might announce some plausible plan—for instance that the future of Cyprus should be governed by an Austrian type treaty, providing for independence but excluding Enosis, with provision for British defence interests. Our inclination would be to reject such a plan, because of its inherent unsoundness, because of its political result (*i.e.*, that Cyprus would be governed either by Makarios or by the Communists) and because of Turkish objections which we should consider well founded.

5. I asked M. Birgi what were his ideas, in the light of the considerations outlined above, on the possible timing and agenda for a Three-Power Conference on Cyprus. I said that he might be right in thinking that the Greeks would refuse. But we had to consider the possibility that they would accept for tactical reasons and then put forward some such plan as that for an independent Cyprus which I had mentioned. We and the Turks might have to reject the Greek proposal, and

our resulting posture might not be a happy one. Apart from this, I wondered whether it would be better to propose a Three-Power Conference in the immediate future, or wait until after the United Nations Assembly had met.

6. M. Birgi said that if we delayed too long, any proposal for a conference would appear to be a mere manoeuvre. The Greek Government were certain to reinscribe their item, and had in fact been maintaining a flow of letters to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the purpose of which was to keep the Cyprus question in the public eye. He agreed that the British position was theoretically good; but so it had been at the last Assembly. The crux would be the atmosphere at the time of the debate. Last time we had been lucky that Cyprus had found a convenient place in the order of items on the agenda, between Kashmir and Algeria. We might not be so lucky again.

7. M. Birgi, however, emphasised that the Turkish Government were not so much preoccupied with questions of immediate tactics either before or at the United Nations as with the need to arrive at a definite solution. Recent events had revealed how strong was the feeling of nervousness in Turkey over the Cyprus question. The Turkish Government had handled the situation firmly and had kept it under control. But this had not prevented the appearance of disquieting evidence of mistrust of British intentions. Britain, as the legal sovereign power in Cyprus, had the opportunity to make a decisive move towards a solution.

8. I asked whether M. Birgi had it in mind that a plan for partition should be put forward at the suggested tripartite conference. He replied that the Turkish Government had formed no definite view about this, which was one of the questions to be discussed in confidence between our two Governments. For Turkey, the ideal would be to proceed straight to partition, omitting the intermediate phase of self-government altogether. The Turkish Government held that self-government was now a thing of the past, since the conditions in which it could be successful no longer existed. In accepting the Radcliffe proposals as a basis for a settlement, the Turkish Government were acting on the assumptions that these proposals were part of a "package," the other part of which was partition; that the Greek Government would prove reasonably conciliatory; and that the relationship between the two communities in Cyprus would evolve satisfactorily. These assumptions had not been fulfilled. Meanwhile the Greek Government had made it crystal clear that they wanted Enosis. The Turkish Government therefore felt that the advantage of the Radcliffe Constitution had largely disappeared and only its drawbacks remained.

9. M. Birgi went on to emphasise that, in the Turkish Government's view, British and Turkish interests in Cyprus coincided. The Turkish Government was willing to give base facilities in Cyprus to Her Majesty's Government in such a form as to comply with what they understood to be our need, namely access to and use of facilities throughout the island. Unlike the Greeks, they saw the Cyprus question in perspective and realised the importance of the British role in the Middle East.

10. I said that I would like to put in one word of caution. I hoped that the Turkish Government and the Turkish Cypriots would not come out with any statement that they no longer accepted the Radcliffe Constitution. It would be wiser to abstain from comment, and to leave denunciation to the Greeks. The Ambassador said that the Turkish Government was often under pressure from public opinion to state its position. But he accepted the tactical merit of my advice. He thought that the less emphasis Her Majesty's Government found it necessary to place on the Radcliffe Report, the easier the Turkish Government would find it to keep quiet.

11. I then referred to partition, and observed that it bristled with practical difficulties. M. Birgi agreed that partition was a disagreeable prospect. On the other hand, he thought that the difficulties had probably been exaggerated. We were dealing with a population of only just over half a million, and the problems, such as compensation for persons transferred, should prove quite manageable. The Turkish Government had had previous experience in more difficult cases on their boundaries in Thrace and Syria. Moreover it was important to remember that, although the upheaval in Thrace had been great, it was on the resulting settlement that Greek-Turkish relations had been re-established on a sound and friendly basis in the Treaty of Lausanne. Finally, Turkish motives in pressing for partition were not purely selfish. Great Britain likewise had a strong interest in bringing the present unsatisfactory situation to an end.

12. It was left that the Ambassador would pursue these questions, and in particular expand on the Turkish Government's views on the practical implications of partition, with Sir William Hayter or another member of my Department. Meanwhile he would report to his Government, and I would discuss what he had told me with my colleagues.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens and Washington, to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, to the United Kingdom Representative on the North Atlantic Council, to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations and to the Governor of Cyprus.

I am, &c.
SELWYN LLOYD.

RK 1016/1 No. 12

REVIEW OF COMMUNISM IN TURKEY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received June 25)

(No. 117 S. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *June 18, 1957.*

The last comprehensive survey of Communism from this post was my despatch No. 240 of the 16th of November, 1954. Since that date there have been no striking changes in the position of Communism in Turkey. Sufficient time has, however, now elapsed for some attempt to be made to assess the long-term results of the mass arrests of 1951, and accordingly I have the honour to submit a further review of Communism in this country.

2. Communist activity continues to be punishable by death in Turkey and a legal Communist Party does not exist. As a result the outward manifestations of Party activity, which in most countries give a good indication of the vitality of the Party and of the popular support which it enjoys, are absent. Vague charges of Communism made against certain individuals or groups do occasionally appear in the Press, but with little concrete evidence to support them. Very occasionally, too, the Press reports the arrest of some individual for some minor manifestation of Communist sympathy such as chalking up a hammer and sickle on a wall. The fact that such items of news are thought worth printing is a tribute to the effectiveness of the legal ban on Communist activities and it is difficult to judge the motive behind such isolated incidents; they sometimes appear to be merely individual expressions of bravado taking the form of a nibble at the forbidden fruit of Communism.

3. The Turkish authorities are very reticent about the extent of their knowledge of Communist organisation and activities. In their eyes Communists are vermin to be destroyed and their technique is to watch until they have sufficient evidence for action, and then to pounce ruthlessly, as they did in 1951. Until they are ready to act they are careful not to divulge their knowledge in case their prey should take alarm and escape. Thus some time after the mass arrests of 1951 and shortly before knowledge of them was made public an informed Turkish official gave assurances to a member of my staff that there were no Communists in the country.

4. The tendency of the Party in power to make accusations of Communism for political purposes further complicates the task of assessing the degree of genuine Communist influence in Turkey. After the riots of September 1955, "Communists" were made the partial scapegoats for what had happened. When this fiction had served its purpose, it was allowed to fall into oblivion. There is no reference to it in the Turkish memorandum prepared for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation—see paragraph 5 below. Communism is so generally feared and disliked in Turkey that an accusation of Communism, however ill-founded, is a powerful weapon for internal political use, and the Government cannot resist so using it on occasion against individuals. Some university teachers, for example, have been subjected to a hostile campaign in both the Press and in the Grand National Assembly on these lines. In private Turkish officials show scepticism of the accusations of Communism that appear in the Press, and a senior security official has gone so far as to say that 90 per cent. of what appears in the Turkish Press on Communism is untrue. This is probably fair comment; but it further complicates the task of the observer.

5. In April 1956, the Turkish delegation to NATO answered a NATO questionnaire on the state of Communism in Turkey. According to the Turkish authorities there has been no change since this Memorandum was written. Its chief conclusions are therefore worth summarising. The Memorandum stated in effect:—

(i) that the entire leadership of the Communist Party had been arrested (except for not more than twenty members who escaped abroad);

(ii) that no subsequent attempt to re-establish the Party could be traced;

(iii) that there was no evidence of Communist penetration of the trades unions (with a slight note of doubt about certain labour agitators), public services, armed forces or police;

(iv) that there was no evidence of Communist activity among aliens in Turkey; and

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(v) that the clandestine propaganda activities of a few Communists—including some 300 intellectuals of Communist sympathy, mainly writers, artists and actors—were the most serious menace confronting the authorities.

6. For the reasons already explained in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 above, there are few hard facts on Communism in Turkey with which the conclusions of the authorities can be tested. What little is known suggests that the Memorandum gives a reasonably accurate picture of the situation, but is slightly (and understandably) over-sanguine.

7. There is no clear evidence that any form of organised Communist Party exists. The Memorandum itself, however, states that the Fatherland (VATAN) Party, founded in October 1954, " is suspected to be a Communist Party in reality " and that its secret programme is unknown. In April last year its numbers were given as about thirty, and the authorities have since given various estimates of its size, the largest being two hundred. Small as this figure is, it is still of the same order of magnitude as the peak numbers of the Communist Party in the past. VATAN is ostensibly a Socialist party and the authorities may be speaking carelessly in referring to it as " a Communist party " in disguise, if the phrase is read as meaning a fully organised and active party. But, whatever his present beliefs, Dr. Hikmet Kivilcimli, the founder of VATAN, is known to have been a Communist for many years. He has indeed at one time served a prison sentence for Communist activities. The authorities are likely to have good reasons for suspecting that the party is a means to selecting and proselytising possible recruits to Communism. In any case its present significance is certainly small, and it is no doubt kept under close scrutiny.

8. There is little evidence on Communist ideas in the armed forces. But it is of interest that the Memorandum itself admits the existence of a special unit to which officers suspected of Communist sympathies are posted and where they are watched. This fact suggests that the armed forces are not totally immune from Communist influence, however small it may be.

9. It is particularly difficult to assess the extent of Communist penetration among labour and the Trades Unions. Accusations of Communism in the unions, particularly those of the tobacco and textile trades, have been made by some Government writers and deputies. For example, as reported in my Chancery's letter 2182/15 of the 28th of March to Southern Department, the Minister of Labour made a statement on the 19th of March in which he implied that politics were being introduced into the Trades Unions both to attack the party in power and as a means of propagating Communism. This statement directed public attention to the question of Communists in the Trades Unions and produced denials and requests for proof from Trade Unionists and from the Opposition parties. So far the Minister has not obliged by complying.

10. The authorities admit that Communism had made some progress among tobacco workers before 1953. The official explanation is that the 1937 exchange of populations brought into Turkey a number of Communist tobacco workers from Thrace, who were the source of the trouble. The Turkish Memorandum of April 1956 was non-committal on whether Communist organisation or agitators still existed among the tobacco labourers, which may be taken to imply that the Turkish authorities have some suspicions. At least one of the four Maritime Workers' Unions has also come under suspicion of Communist influence and it seems reasonable to assume that there are in fact some Communists in the unions. But there is little doubt that the authorities keep a close watch on such a classical target of Communist penetration as the Trade Unions, although they may at times be confused by the difficulty of distinguishing between legitimate labour aspirations and genuine Communism in a country where authoritarianism is an old tradition and trades unionism a new and unfamiliar one.

11. The Press and some Government Party Deputies have made charges of Communism among the teaching staff of the Universities. These charges are almost certainly ill-founded, and there is reason to believe that the security authorities are genuinely satisfied that the staff are free from Communist influence. Among the student body, however, the authorities believe there is some Communist activity. The Faculties of Literature and Medicine in Istanbul have been mentioned as particularly affected. (It may be recalled that there were thirteen medical students among those arrested in 1951.) A German student of Istanbul University who was arrested last year on a charge of spying for the Soviet

Union confessed that he had been instructed to draw up a list of students in the University who were suitable for Communist indoctrination. Such Communists as there are in the University are said to be sharply divided into two groups, the " old " Communists (favouring Stalinist policies) and the " new " (supporting a more national and flexible interpretation of Communism). The latter group is of some interest, for in a country where Communism is identified with Russian imperialism, only some form of national Communism on Titoist lines is likely to have a popular appeal.

12. The Turkish authorities say that no school-teacher (or other Government officer) has been dismissed for holding Communist views " for a very long time," and they do not think that any hold such views now. This is probably an over-optimistic estimate. At least one case is known of a teacher and school inspector accused in 1955 of indoctrinating a workman found drawing a hammer and sickle (the result of the trial is still awaited). Moreover, on the admission of the Turkish Memorandum for NATO there are 300 intellectuals in the country who are considered " Communist," and even allowing for careful screening it is hard to believe that there may not be some in the teaching profession. Foreign Communists have also made the teachers a target. Among addressees in Turkey chosen by the World Peace Council for the despatch of propaganda were a large number of school-teachers, although their names were almost certainly chosen at random. Again, the German student referred to in paragraph 11 was impressed in his instructions with the importance of using the intellectuals to prepare the groundwork of the revolution all over Turkey; the provincial schoolmaster is clearly a key figure in the Communist plan. The degree of success that these efforts have achieved cannot be judged, but it seems improbable that the position is quite so roseate as in the official view.

13. Turkey remains a country where Communism is synonymous in the public mind with Russia, her overmighty and feared neighbour. In this atmosphere Communism is not likely to spread rapidly. There are no clear signs that the Party has thrown up new leaders to replace those in jail, or rebuilt any party organisation. Communist ideas are confined to a number of scattered individuals and groups, who can only work in conditions of secrecy and great difficulty. These groups may make limited progress, but, in the foreseeable future and so long as the Turkish Government's repressive measures retain their present efficacy, Communism is not likely to become a serious political threat in Turkey.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1015/21 No. 13

PROSPECTS OF A GENERAL ELECTION IN TURKEY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 22)

(No. 129. Confidential) *Istanbul, July 19, 1957.*

Sir,

When the Turkish Grand National Assembly began its summer session at the end of March, the main political question was whether the good relations between the People's Republican Party and the Democrat Party would last or whether they would be swamped by the wave of bitterness which is normally released by the violent and emotional debating methods of Turkish politicians.

2. In the event the " honeymoon period " still continues although on a decreasing scale and with negligible results for the general national interest. In fact it has become clear that M. Inönü has failed to carry his party with him in this initiative to promote better relations between Government and Opposition and that his action has only served to widen the existing gap between him and his ageing followers on the one hand and the followers of the Secretary-General of the party, M. Kasim Gülek, on the other. Not only has M. Inönü succeeded in alienating a section of his own party but he has also earned the contempt of other Opposition parties for toadying to the Prime Minister and, as they allege, generally betraying the cause of the Opposition.

3. On the credit side may be recorded an improvement in the atmosphere in the Grand National Assembly at least between the two parties concerned and the elimination of some of the rather childish bitterness with which debates have been carried on in the past. M. Menderes has also fulfilled one promise made to M. Inönü at the outset of the " honeymoon," namely, the restoration to the district of Kirşehir of " vilayet " status. Kirşehir is the Republican National Party stronghold and if it had been merged, for electoral purposes, with surrounding vilayets this would have reduced the Republican National Party's chances of effectively rallying their supporters at the next elections. Unfortunately this apparently generous action by the Prime Minister has had certain distressing repercussions which I describe in paragraphs 10–12 below.

4. As the Assembly's session wore on interest in the " honeymoon " between the two parties decreased and rumours of an early general election in the autumn grew. When the Assembly rose on the 24th of June, there was already much speculation and it is now generally assumed that an announcement about the election will be made when the Assembly meets again. It is due to reassemble on the 2nd of September—though it does not normally meet again until the opening of the new session in November.

5. At present opinions about the probable date of the election are divided. The Minister of Education announced recently that it would not be held before its due date next year and the ex-Foreign Minister, Professor Fuat Köprülü, recently expressed a similar opinion in private conversation. Certain pro-Government journalists have also predicted that there will not be an early election. On the other hand all Opposition followers seem to be convinced that an election will come probably in October and their view is shared by certain people close to the President. It has equally been reported that the Prime Minister favours an early election and that the President is opposed to it.

6. Some say that it depends on the harvest prospects; others that M. Menderes must go to the country now before the economic situation becomes worse or before the Freedom Party becomes too strong or before the discontent which it is alleged is mounting in the Democrat Party breaks out. My guess is that the Prime Minister, on whom the decision rests, has not yet made up his mind. I have the impression that some two months ago he was inclined to have the election this autumn, and, as my Chancery has reported, a decision appears to have been taken in principle by the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group in favour of advancing the date. Later developments seem to have made him doubtful and he is probably awaiting the reports of the Democrat Party Deputies now touring the provinces and probably, also, the result of the harvest. If these are unfavourable it is not impossible that he may decide to avail himself of the latitude provided in the Constitution and postpone the election beyond its due date in the spring. Indeed, at one time it was generally thought that this was more probable than that the date would be advanced.

7. Speculation about the possible date of the election has led inevitably to further speculation about its prospects. From all accounts the Prime Minister is nervous and anxious about his party's chances. Stories are current that the economic situation and recent increases in prices will sway opinion in the big towns away from the Democrat Party, and that in Istanbul in particular the ruthlessness with which expropriations have been carried out in the course of the Prime Minister's ambitious town-planning scheme will lose it many votes; but these views are mainly advanced by Opposition journalists and politicians or by personal opponents of M. Menderes. Moreover, the Opposition fear that, even if the actual balloting is free, the Press will be muzzled as effectively as possible throughout the election campaign; that the Government will use all facilities, particularly the radio and the services of the local Governors, to the detriment of the Opposition election campaign; and that the Opposition will generally be unable to put their case clearly to the country owing to the pressures exerted against them by the Government even within the framework of the Constitution and the law. This kind of pressure was already evident at the 1954 elections and the main theme of internal politics since that date has been the successive " undemocratic " measures passed by the Government into law, in order to consolidate their own chances and destroy the opportunities of the Opposition to campaign on equal terms when next the country goes to the polls.

8. In consequence some Opposition representatives have already considered the possibility of abstention at the next elections; but the parties are unlikely to abstain because no one of them would trust the others not to take advantage of such quixotry. Co-operation between the Opposition parties is in fact hard to realise. Even if it should be agreed in principle it will be very difficult in practice. Electoral law now forbids the presentation of " mixed " electoral lists. The only possibility open to the Opposition seems to be to share out the electoral districts between them so that in any one district all Opposition parties agree to support only one party list. There have been rumours that the Freedom Party and the Republican National Party might unite for election purposes. These have, however, been categorically denied by a Freedom Party supporter and his most optimistic forecast for the elections was that the country might be divided equally between the three main parties (Democrat, People's Republican and Freedom) with none of the three holding a clear majority. More recently there have been renewed discussions on co-operation between the People's Republican Party and the Freedom Party. Similar talks last autumn came to nothing but I have been told that those now taking place have made more progress than is generally known, those concerned being said to be keeping their plans a close secret for fear that if they become known to the Government legislation will be introduced forthwith to frustrate them.

9. It seems, therefore, to sum up, that in spite of reports (mainly originating from its own members) that the Freedom Party has started to gain ground after its sterile beginning, there is (justifiably) a spirit of general pessimism among the Opposition in regard to their chances should M. Menderes decide to go to the polls this year.

10. One recent factor which might possibly influence the Prime Minister against an early election and which might well lose the Democrat Party votes is the effect of his high-handed treatment of the leader of the Republican National Party, M. Osman Bölükbaşi. M. Bölükbaşi comes from Kirşehir and he and the other three Parliamentary representatives of his party all represented Kirşehir in the 1954 elections before it was demoted from vilayet status. When this status was restored this year M. Bölükbaşi's own district was excluded from the new vilayet boundary. Thoroughly incensed by what he clearly considered a personal slight he spoke out in the strongest terms in the National Assembly (he is incidentally the most noted orator in Turkey). As a result, his parliamentary immunity was withdrawn by a majority vote of the Assembly at the end of June, he was arrested on the 1st of July, and committed to trial for making derogatory statements in the Assembly and in its lobby.

11. This impulsive action by the Government, which is attributed to a characteristic outburst of emotionalism on the part of the Prime Minister, has already had wide effects and has elevated M. Bölükbaşi from being the leader of an obscure and generally somewhat unpopular political party into something of a national hero. When he was taken to the court for committal to trial a large crowd gathered outside, larger, in the view of one eye-witness, than he had ever seen in Ankara before, all demonstrating loudly in his favour. M. Bölükbaşi, an expert demagogue, made the most of this,

and ugly scenes developed during the five hours while the crowd waited outside the court. Tempers were lost, police batons were brought into play and some journalists are now in hospital as a result. The particular significance of this incident was that M. Bölükbaşi is in no sense a local man and that the crowd did not consist merely of his party followers and groups of intellectuals and journalists, but of a cross section of the Ankara populace who have no particular interest normally in such affairs. Needless to say the Opposition Press has made the most of this incident, and the Government have already reacted by closing down temporarily the Istanbul branch of the Journalists' Union.

12. This violent public outburst may have made the Government hesitate and no date has yet been fixed for M. Bölükbaşi's trial. Some believe that M. Menderes has gone so far in this case that he cannot retract and must get M. Bölükbaşi sentenced to imprisonment. Others think that the Government has had a fright and that he will not be tried until after the election, when he will be acquitted with minimum publicity. In any case it is a fairly general view that this incident would harm the Democrat cause in an early election and that this may influence M. Menderes' decision.

13. There remains, as always, an unknown factor in the personality of M. Menderes himself. Besides the incident referred to above, there have been other recent manifestations of his unpredictability and arbitrary methods not connected with internal affairs, and it is reliably reported that the President of the Republic is much disturbed. As I have reported on several occasions, M. Menderes' undoubted ability, drive and clarity of view which make him a valuable asset in the field of foreign affairs, and have given an impressive impulse to Turkey's material development, are marred by an extreme sensitiveness to opposition or criticism. One of the harmful effects of this sensitiveness is that he tends to avoid contact with antagonistic elements and to surround himself with persons on whom he can rely to give him congenial advice. Speaking to me the other day about M. Menderes, a Turkish acquaintance of mine suggested that this trait in his character was in some ways the modern equivalent of Sultan Abdul Hamid's obsessive fear of assassination. In M. Menderes' case the fear is of political assassination and the triple walls with which Sultan Abdul Hamid surrounded his Palace of Yildiz and the drastic measures he took to remove persons suspected of designs on his life find their counterpart in the solid phalanx of comfortable counsellors which M. Menderes keeps around him and his sudden savage attacks on his political critics. He has been known to say that he has no intention of being an ex-Prime Minister. Moreover, I am sure that the present wholesale demolition which is now going on in Istanbul in order to open the way for his plans for the city's embellishment make him acutely anxious to complete his grandiose schemes in order to be remembered by posterity as a builder rather than a razer. Another feature of his character which does not alleviate the work of his staff, nor, incidentally, please the queue of newly-arrived Ambassadors who are at present waiting to pay him the formal visit required by the Turkish Protocol, is his rooted dislike of committing himself to any engagement, of whatever nature, until the last possible moment. Here there may be some unconscious element of the basic Asiatic fear of tempting Providence. No doubt this particular trait is partly responsible for the present uncertainty about the date of the elections. Though these personal peculiarities of M. Menderes are well known, they are disturbing. So far they do not appear to have affected his judgment on really important questions, and certainly not on the main lines of foreign policy. But there is always the possibility that at any time his tendency to take sudden and unexpected decisions from some personal or emotional motive may affect more important issues. Moreover, they give cause to fear that when the election is held M. Menderes may not be over scrupulous in the choice of measures designed to ensure that it produces the desired results.

14. The country is therefore waiting expectantly for the next move over the general election; and it is unlikely that it will be put out of suspense until the Grand National Assembly meets again on the 2nd of September. Meanwhile it would be idle to speculate over the possible results of an early election. Nevertheless, in spite of the factors mentioned above which may have damaged M. Menderes' chances, nothing has emerged to alter fundamentally the conclusions which I drew in paragraph 14 of my despatch No. 62 of the 27th of March.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

GA 344/65 No. 14

PROVISION OF VISCOUNT AIRCRAFT BY B.O.A.C. FOR THE TURKISH AIRLINES

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received July 30)

(No. 138. Confidential—Guard) *Istanbul,*
Sir, *July 26, 1957.*

With reference to my telegram No. 701 of the 24th of July, I have the honour to enclose herein a copy of the agreement(1) signed on the 24th of July between the British Overseas Airways Corporation (B.O.A.C.) and the Turkish Airlines (T.H.Y.), providing for stock participation by B.O.A.C. in T.H.Y., and for the granting of a credit by B.O.A.C. to enable T.H.Y. to purchase five Viscount aircraft.

2. The contract was signed on behalf of B.O.A.C. by Sir George Cribbett, B.O.A.C. Deputy Chairman, who arrived in Ankara on the 21st of July accompanied by Mr. S. Broad of B.O.A.C. and by officials of Vickers, the manufacturers of the Viscount aircraft. I saw Sir George Cribbett in Istanbul on the morning of the 21st of July before he went to Ankara, and again in Ankara on the 25th of July. He told me that the agreement with T.H.Y. had been concluded with speed because there was strong evidence that United States interests (Pan-American Airways and Lockheed Aircraft Corporation) were trying to thwart it by making more attractive offers to Turkey. Her Majesty's Government having approved B.O.A.C.'s venture with T.H.Y., despite considerable misgivings about Turkey's capacity to repay the credit within the stipulated period, it was essential to conclude the agreement rapidly in order to take full advantage of the resulting goodwill and in order not to allow the competing American interests further time to win over the Turks with other offers. I understand that the Pan-American offer involved a credit of U.S.$12 million to buy aeroplanes, and that this sum would be payable in Turkish lira, which could be used inside Turkey by Pan-American's associate (Inter-Continental Hotels Corporation) to build hotels in Turkey.

3. The agreement with B.O.A.C. provided for the investment by B.O.A.C. of £500,000 in T.H.Y. The shares purchased with this sum will represent £T.3,920,000, which is approximately one-third of the £T.20 million capital of T.H.Y. This sum will come under the provisions of the Turkish Foreign Investment Encouragement Law, and will give B.O.A.C. one seat on the Board of Directors of T.H.Y. The £500,000 will be used by T.H.Y. towards the purchase of five Viscount-700 aircraft and their spares.

4. The remainder of the purchase price of the aircraft will be met by a credit of £1,500,000 which will be repaid over a period of ten years.

5. During Sir George Cribbett's negotiations leading up to the signature of the agreement three particular points of difficulty arose. The first was that B.O.A.C.'s total investment of £2 million is about £200,000 short of the cost of five Viscounts with necessary spares at to-day's prices. Sir George made it quite clear to the Turks that £2 million was the absolute maximum that B.O.A.C. could offer and that in the light of this it was up to T.H.Y. to arrange their procurement programme accordingly.

6. The second relates to the servicing of the Viscount aircraft. There is a danger that if Lockheed set up a maintenance base in Istanbul, as is possible, the Viscount aircraft may be sent there rather than to the maintenance base which B.O.A.C. have set up in Beirut. Sir George Cribbett explained that B.O.A.C. would see serious objection to such a procedure, and made it clear that Vickers should have the right to approve the service facilities; he also indicated that there was a security aspect to this in regard to the Rolls-Royce part engines. It was agreed that no decision on servicing should be taken without previous discussion by the Board, and Sir George Cribbett told me that he had had to be satisfied with this for the present.

(1) Not printed

7. The other main point relates to action which B.O.A.C. might take in the event of delays or non-payment of the credit by T.H.Y. The Note of Understanding initialled in London on the 25th of March, 1957, between B.O.A.C. and T.H.Y. covered this point by stating that the loan of £1,500,000 would be " charged upon the undertaking and specifically upon the Viscount aircraft." It was difficult to provide that B.O.A.C. could take back the aircraft in the event of non-payment without affronting Turkish pride. Ultimately a form of words was devised, in Article 6 (*g*) of the Agreement, which gives B.O.A.C. a " right of access to T.H.Y.'s property, and in particular to the aircraft ordered by Vickers, in compliance with the current Turkish legislation." This form of words is similar to an arrangement by the United States Government in respect of ships supplied to Turkey on credit. Theoretically in the event of non-payment B.O.A.C. could apply to a Turkish Court and the Turkish Court could dispose that the aircraft be removed from T.H.Y.'s control. It would have been difficult to obtain anything more definite than this; and in any case, should a situation arise where Turkey did not pay, recovery of the aircraft would become a highly political matter.

8. I understand that Sir George Cribbett is to be the B.O.A.C. representative on the Board of T.H.Y. and that as Turkish law does not allow the appointment of an alternate, he will attend meetings once a quarter and on any other occasions when discussions are to take place affecting B.O.A.C.'s interests.

9. During his stay in Ankara Sir George Cribbett received a most friendly welcome from the Turkish authorities. He was received by the Minister of Communications, M. Arif Demirer, who also gave a dinner party for him which at the last moment he was unable to attend himself having been summoned to a Cabinet meeting. On the 25th of July Sir George Cribbett was received by the Prime Minister, who expressed to me his satisfaction at the conclusion of the Agreement when I saw him later in the evening. My presence in Ankara on that day enabled me to attend a small luncheon that the Minister of Communications arranged for Sir George Cribbett to compensate for the fact that he had had to be absent himself from the dinner the evening before.

10. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Communications had long ago set their hearts on acquiring Viscount aircraft, and it is a matter for congratulation that B.O.A.C. have finally concluded this Agreement, virtually under the noses of the Americans. On this aspect B.O.A.C.'s association with T.H.Y. should undoubtedly strengthen their position in this area as against American, and particularly Pan-American Airways, airline competition.

11. On the financial implications, it cannot be denied that B.O.A.C., in staking £2 million in T.H.Y. is taking a gamble. With regard to the Turkish overall indebtedness to the United Kingdom, the deal definitely involves acceptance of increased financial risks. I consider nevertheless that these risks are at least balanced, and possibly outweighed, by the wider implications of this association.

12. The fact that the Agreement was concluded so rapidly was due in great part to the skill with which Sir George Cribbett conducted the negotiations and the relations of friendly confidence which he established with the Turkish authorities on his arrival and maintained throughout his visit. The Agreement has certainly, as a result, been concluded under the best auspices for the future.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Civil Air Attaché at Beirut and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 10316/3

No. 15

TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT WITH EGYPT

(1)

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir James Bowker (Istanbul)

(No. 68. Confidential) *Foreign Office, August 1, 1957.*

Sir,

I am somewhat concerned by the number of reports from your Excellency suggesting that the Turkish Government have embarked on, and have publicly committed themselves to, a policy of reconciliation with Egypt. Although, when questioned by your Excellency, M. Menderes maintained that there had been no sensational change in Turco-Egyptian relations, and although he was evidently under no illusions about Colonel Nasser's equivocal attitude to the Bagdad Pact, the recent Turkish moves can hardly be said to accord with our policy of going very slowly with Nasser and of giving him as little help as possible. As seen from here, it is particularly disconcerting that:

(*a*) the alignment of Turkish policy with our own towards Nasser should apparently have depended so much on M. Birgi while he was at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

(*b*) the pro-Arab lobby in that Ministry should have achieved the present re-orientation of Turkish policy towards Egypt so soon after M. Birgi's departure;

(*c*) so far M. Menderes does not seem to have exerted himself to impose any restraint on this new policy, or to qualify the extravagant statements made in public, for example, by his Minister of Commerce;

(*d*) although I note from your Commercial Department's letter 11265/5 of the 24th of July that Turkey has probably gained more from the extension of credit facilities to Egypt than has Egypt herself, nevertheless, many of the goods from third countries which Egypt may offer as repayment for her imports from Turkey may well come from Communist *bloc* sources.

2. Your Excellency may also like to know that the Quai d'Orsay have noted a change in the Turkish attitude towards Egypt. A delegation of officials from the Quai, led by the Directeur Afrique-Levant, M. Sébilleau, who came over on the 24th of July to review events in the Middle East with my department, asked in the course of the discussion whether these recent moves betokened any cooling in the Turkish attitude towards the Bagdad Pact. They were told that, so far as Her Majesty's Government were aware, there was no reason to suppose so: the Pact was in part a creation of Turkey, and the Turks could be expected to continue to give it their fullest support.

3. I realise that, preoccupied as he is with internal affairs, the Turkish Prime Minister can only concern himself with major issues of foreign policy; and I find it difficult to believe that he, who is so staunch in his loyalty to the Bagdad Pact, would allow things to go too far. I should nevertheless be glad to receive your Excellency's further assessment of the seriousness of this trend in Turkish policy, and of the extent to which, if at all, it has M. Menderes' deliberate approval. That he has at least given it his tacit blessing would seem to be indicated by the fact that he informed his colleagues at the recent meeting of the Bagdad Pact Council in Karachi of the apparent desire of the Egyptian Government for more friendly relations, and invited us to comment.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

(2)

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received August 26*)

British Embassy Residence,
(No. 157. Confidential) *Istanbul,*
Sir, *August 24, 1957.*

In your despatch No. 68 of the 1st of August you commented on a number of reports which I have lately sent your department on the recent manifestations by the Turkish Government of friendliness towards Egypt, and invited my observations on the seriousness of this trend and the extent to which it can be considered to have the Turkish Prime Minister's deliberate approval.

2. I will answer the second question first. Though there is a Turkish Acting Foreign Minister and a number of more or less competent officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkish foreign policy is personally directed and controlled, even in matters of detail and more particularly since M. Birgi's departure for London, by M. Menderes, and the case of Egypt is certainly no exception. Moreover, though the reasons for this new policy towards Egypt may not be very obvious, M. Menderes identified himself with it at an early stage. He attended, for instance, the Turco-Egyptian football match in Istanbul last May and shortly after was present at the reception given on the Egyptian National Day by the Egyptian Chargé d'Affaires in Ankara; a mark of attention which so far as I know is unique in my experience of 3½ years at this post. The other recent manifestations of the Turkish Government's friendliness towards the present régime in Egypt have been reported as they have occurred and are known to the department. To them should be added the mutual suspension of attacks on the radio broadcasting systems of both countries.

3. My United States colleague was, like myself, told by the Turkish Prime Minister in reply to his enquiries on the subject that Turco-Egyptian relations were going through a process of normalisation. M. Menderes added, however, that he was still ready to meet Colonel Nasser at any time and anywhere. Mr. Warren was subsequently instructed to tell M. Menderes that a visit by him to Colonel Nasser at this juncture would be bound to have a very unfortunate effect in Saudi-Arabia, Jordan and Iraq. To this M. Menderes replied that Nasser had not changed and would not dare to suggest such a visit. He went on to say that if Colonel Nasser were to issue such an invitation it would indicate a significant change of heart and Turkey, with her responsibilities towards the Arab countries, was obliged to keep a careful watch on possibilities of improving her relations with them. According to what the counsellor was told by his United States colleague, M. Menderes, on the same occasion, assured Mr. Warren that Turkey wished to keep in step with the United States as regards Egypt. She could not, however, expose herself in relation to the rest of the Arab world to the argument that she was rebutting friendly Egyptian overtures. But M. Menderes wished Mr. Warren to know that he was approaching the problem of re-establishing normal relations with Egypt with his eyes open and would not allow things to get out of hand.

4. It is a fact, therefore, that there has recently been a new trend in Turco-Egyptian relations and that it has M. Menderes' deliberate approval. While views may differ about its causes, I think the main explanation is to be found in what M. Menderes said to Mr. Warren as reported above. As I have often had occasion to remark, Turkey regards herself as specially designated, by her geographical position and her past associations, to play a special and leading part in the Middle East. I do not believe that this move fundamentally affects her resolution, implanted by Atatürk and of which the first full flowering took place with her admission to NATO, to advance as a Western Power closely bound to the Western family of nations; though the extent to which Turkey's Western orientation may be effected, involuntarily by her developing commitments under the Bagdad Pact, and voluntarily by the increasingly Turkish-Muslim outlook of some of M. Menderes' influential friends, or by a characteristic Turkish desire to demonstrate that her friendship must not be taken for granted, may well be a fitting subject for further study. But the point to be borne in mind is that alongside Turkey's consciousness of her destiny as a Western Power she remains acutely aware of her position in the Middle East. The Bagdad Pact, though in many ways a success for Turkish diplomacy, tended to estrange Turkey from other Arab States, particularly Egypt, in spite of

M. Menderes' special efforts to remain on good terms with the latter. Her hopes that other Arab States would before long be attracted to the Bagdad Pact's orbit were disappointed with the failure to secure the adherence of Jordan. Her recent overtures to Saudi Arabia have not, so far, had a very warm reception. There is no reason for special surprise that she should not have wished to turn down the recent advances from Egypt. If the way in which these advances has been met has seemed somewhat exaggerated, it must be remembered that foreign policy is decided by M. Menderes, who himself is apt to be impulsive. He may also very possibly have thought that improved relations with Egypt and the prospect of some Egyptian consumer goods might help him in the elections. But the initiative came from the Egyptians and there are as yet no real grounds for disbelieving M. Menderes' assurance to my American colleague that he was continuing to deal with Egypt with his eyes open.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Bagdad, Tehran and Karachi.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1213/45 No. 46

WARSHIPS FOR TURKEY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received August 26)

(No. 156. Secret) *Istanbul,*
Sir, *August 23, 1957.*

I have the honour to inform you, with reference to your despatch No. 69 of the 6th of August, that Notes constituting an agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Turkish Republic, concerning the purchase by the Turkish Government of four "M" Class destroyers of the British Reserve Fleet, were exchanged at Istanbul on the 16th of August. At the same time a confidential Record of Understanding, regarding the maintenance of the vessels after their transfer to the Turkish Navy, was also concluded.

2. I enclose the certified copies(1) of my Notes to the Secretary-General of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, M. Melih Esenbel, together with his replies(1), in original, setting out (*a*) the terms of the agreement on the purchase of the vessels, and (*b*) the Record of Understanding regarding their maintenance.

3. As I have reported in my telegram No. 161 from Istanbul of the 16th of August, the Turkish Government have agreed that the Exchange of Notes should be registered at the United Nations by Her Majesty's Government and by the Turkish Government. The confidential Record of Understanding will not be registered, but the Turkish Government have agreed that copies of the confidential Record of Understanding, as well as of the Exchange of Notes, may be communicated to the United States Government. The Turkish Government have also agreed that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation may be informed of the fact of the sale through the Defence Production Committee and the United Kingdom Military Representative at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe.

4. The conclusion of this agreement is the culmination of negotiations which began in the summer of 1956 during a visit to London of the Turkish Deputy Commander of Naval Forces, Admiral Arnom, who sought to enlist British support for an ambitious programme for the replacement of existing units of the Turkish Navy. These, according to Admiral Arnom, had become so obsolete as to be virtually useless. The Turkish requirements were given as one cruiser, eight destroyers and eight escorts. The Turkish approach seems to have been stimulated by the belief that Her Majesty's Government had already decided in principle to make available, on loan or otherwise, to their allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation certain ships from the Reserve Fleet which would be released by reductions contemplated in the Royal Navy. The Turkish Prime Minister early showed intense personal interest in obtaining new vessels for the Turkish Navy and shortly after Admiral Arnom's conversations in London he assured me that he expected that the Turkish Government, provided that they were given "certain facilities," would be able to pay the large sum, estimated at some £12 millions, which would be required to purchase the hulls and to pay for the refit of the vessels.

5. The importance on political grounds of helping Turkey, as a loyal ally in the Middle East, and the importance also of continuing the beneficial association of the British and Turkish Navies, was of course fully recognised by Her Majesty's Government. It was not, however, to be expected that the ambitious proposal originally put forward by the Turkish authorities could be accepted as it stood by Her Majesty's Government. There were two major difficulties. The first was the existing high level of unpaid Turkish commercial debts to the United Kingdom and the virtual certainty that even if Turkey were able to pay the cost of her naval requirements it could only be at the expense of her existing commercial obligations. The second difficulty was the probable attitude of the United States Government which had already for some time been pressed by the Turks to provide new ships, but had refused to do so principally on the grounds that such vessels—and particularly the cruiser—would be a liability for maintenance for which in the long run the United States Government would be required to pay.

(1) Not printed.

6. When the Turkish Government were asked to explain more fully their proposals for financing the purchase of the British warships, it transpired that they hoped for some arrangement under which the payments would be deferred until a time when the Turkish economy would have emerged from the present period of stress caused by the hectic tempo of development. In October 1956, the Turkish ideas were put forward on a formal basis. Briefly they consisted of a proposal that the vessels should be supplied, together with equipment and spares sufficient for five years, after completion of the work necessary "to raise them to M-day standards," on a ten-year credit basis. Repayment should begin two years after the date of the transfer of the last ship to the Turkish Navy and the loan would be liquidated in ten equal yearly instalments. In the meantime the Turkish authorities had reduced their bid to one cruiser, four destroyers and eight escorts.

7. At this stage it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that although it was impossible on financial grounds to meet in full the Turkish requirements of ships, a special effort should nevertheless be made, on political grounds, to help the Turkish Government as far as possible to satisfy their reasonable requirements. It was hoped that it would prove possible to offer them on extended credit terms four "M" Class destroyers and possibly one cruiser. It had already become clear that it was above all on the acquisition of a cruiser that the Turkish Government had set their hearts. It had become equally clear, however, that there were no sound military grounds for satisfying their desire for a cruiser which they required mainly for purposes of prestige. It was evident, too, that even if Her Majesty's Government were to ignore the financial arguments against supplying a cruiser, they would be likely to cause considerable concern, and indeed offence, to the United States Government.

8. It was, however, hoped that the United States Government might agree to treat the question of aid for the Turkish Navy as a combined Anglo-American operation by financing the cost of the refit of the necessary vessels if Her Majesty's Government supplied the hulls and the stores. The United States Government were approached accordingly. At the same time the Turkish Government were informed that Her Majesty's Government were prepared to offer one "Dido" Class cruiser and four "M" Class destroyers, together with their refit and stores, provided that United States financial assistance could be obtained to cover the cost of refitting the warships in the United Kingdom. Alternatively, if the United States Government were not prepared to offer financial assistance in this way, Her Majesty's Government would be willing to offer the Turkish Government a loan of £3 millions to cover the cost of the four "M" Class destroyers together with the initial stores and spares and of their refit in British yards. In this case Her Majesty's Government would require the Turkish Government to make an initial payment of, say, £100,000, and would agree to the deferment of the repayment of the balance for a period of ten years. This offer was warmly welcomed by the Turkish Government.

9. The American response to this proposal was unfavourable. It was briefly to the effect that if the Americans were to help in furnishing ships for the Turkish Navy they would prefer to provide American ships rather than help to finance the provision of British. In any case, no funds were available in the current fiscal year for either project. The United States Government would, however, see no objection to Her Majesty's Government's providing four destroyers if these were replacements and not additions. They would however deprecate the provision of a cruiser since this would inevitably become an additional commitment for the Turks to maintain.

10. One purpose of the approach to the Americans had of course been to make it clear to the Turkish Government that their desire for a cruiser could not be met from British resources alone, although the requirements for the destroyers could. It was thereafter agreed that the negotiations for the transfer of the destroyers should proceed, but the Turkish Government still did not give up their hope of obtaining a cruiser by some means or other. Throughout the subsequent negotiations for the transfer of the destroyers they reverted to the question of the cruiser at all possible opportunities. Nevertheless, at Her Majesty's Government's insistence, they agreed that the destroyer transaction had, following the American refusal to be associated with it, to be treated as a quite separate subject.

11. Her Majesty's Government's detailed proposals for the transfer of the destroyers were embodied in a draft Exchange of Notes which was presented to the Turkish Government for their concurrence in

March 1957, in accordance with instructions contained in your despatch No. 21 of the 1st of March, 1957. Her Majesty's Government's original draft proposed that interest on the loan of £2,900,000 should be at the rate of 6 per cent. In deference, however, to further Turkish pressure and in order to maintain the maximum amount of goodwill, it was decided to reduce to 5 per cent. the rate of interest, and it was further agreed that the interest should cease to accumulate after the expiry of the first ten years of the loan. Appropriate amendments were made to the text of the Exchange of Notes.

12. The concessions made by Her Majesty's Government were, I think, generally appreciated by the Turkish authorities who, throughout the negotiations, showed themselves to be, as usual, pertinacious bargainers. Unfortunately, however, I cannot say that these concessions have made the full impression which they deserved owing to the continued Turkish preoccupation over the question of acquiring a cruiser. About this, as you will know, the Turkish Government have submitted fresh proposals which are the subject of current correspondence with your Department; and it is clear that they will continue to press us hard, on political grounds, to satisfy their ambition to obtain the vessel on which they have set their hearts.

13. Viewed against the background of recent developments in this area my Naval Attaché believes that the destroyers will provide a welcome stiffening to the naval forces of Turkey. It is true to say that the ex-British destroyers at present in the Turkish fleet are approaching the end of their useful life. More could have been done to maintain and keep them serviceable had the officers on the British Naval Training Staff been allowed to go on board and advise on their upkeep. I therefore regard the Confidential Record of Understanding as a useful attempt to ensure better attention to maintenance, though I suspect that the Turkish authorities will require pressure to comply fully with its spirit.

14. As reported in my telegram No. 751, after the signature of the agreement, the Government of Turkey issued a friendly (if in detail somewhat exaggerated) Press statement about the transfer of the destroyers. This statement was well reported in the Turkish Press, and has inspired some favourable comment in certain newspapers about the value of Anglo-Turkish friendship. One commentator indeed has pointed to the transaction over the warships as further proof that Britain is Turkey's one reliable friend in the Middle East and Southern Europe and that criticisms of her Cyprus policy which have appeared in other sections of the Press are unjustified and harmful. On the same day the Prime Minister sent for me specially to express his warm thanks to Her Majesty's Government for the help and understanding which they had shown in meeting Turkey's requirements over the destroyers. He said that he regarded the agreement now signed as a symbol of Anglo-Turkish co-operation and as opening a new era in Anglo-Turkish relations.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington, the United Kingdom Representative on the North Atlantic Council, Paris, and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces. I enclose two extra copies for the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RY 1051/29 No. 17

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON SEPTEMBER 13, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Stewart (Ankara)

(No. 192. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *September 13, 1957.*

The Turkish Ambassador called on me to-day for a general talk and for the particular purpose of hearing my impressions of my visit to Yugoslavia.

2. I told M. Birgi that I was impressed by the warmth and cordiality of my reception, which had all the appearance of sincerity. My discussions with President Tito, M. Kardelj and M. Popovic had been frank and useful. I thought that as a result of these talks they now understood our position on disarmament better. I was of course particularly interested in the current Yugoslav attitude to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav leaders all emphasised that they had not gone over completely into the Soviet camp but intended to make up their own minds on current matters and to pursue an independent foreign policy. I said I believed that the underlying thought behind this policy, although it was not directly expressed in our talks, was that the process by which the other countries of Eastern Europe could attain the same sort of status as Yugoslavia would continue and could be helped by better Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union. While it was clear that the Yugoslav Government would side with the Russians on many current issues, I thought that Tito and Kardelj in particular had too bitter memories of Stalin to be carried along too far.

3. I asked M. Birgi to comment on a remark which Tito made to me, to the effect that the Balkan Pact served a purely economic purpose now that the military threat under which it had been formed was no longer so actual. M. Birgi said that the Turkish Government had always denied the thesis, which the Yugoslavs had put forward before, that the Pact was transformed into an economic instrument.

4. Turning to the Middle East, M. Birgi said that his Government was not keeping him currently informed on the situation in Syria. His own view was that Syria was well on the way to Satellite status and that the process would not stop there. Jordan would be the next to be threatened, and then perhaps the Lebanon and the Sheikhdoms. He thought that the attitude of King Saud was satisfactory and that we could not expect him to do more for the time being. The King of Jordan had received a good reception on his return and seemed in a determined mood. Nuri Said was going to Istanbul on September 20 and would meet the Turkish Prime Minister.

5. M. Birgi thanked me for our *tour d'horizon*, and I asked him to send my good wishes to his Prime Minister.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Amman, Athens, Bagdad, Bahrain, Beirut and Belgrade.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

RK 1015/28 No. 18

THE OPENING OF THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 16)

(No. 162. Confidential) *Ankara, September 13, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 821 and to inform you that the Grand National Assembly was dissolved on the 11th of September after deciding unanimously to hold general elections on the 27th of October. The election campaign has therefore officially begun.

2. During the same session a law was passed amending certain provisions of the Electoral Law in such a way as to inhibit co-operation during the election campaign between the Opposition parties. The main provisions of these amendments were as follows: —

(i) No person who has applied to any party for designation as a candidate will be allowed to become an independent candidate or a candidate for any other party in any constituency for the election concerned.

(ii) A political party which participates in the general elections has to do so independently and must participate in elections where it has organisations in provinces and districts. Moreover it must designate as many candidates as the number of seats allocated to each constituency. Political parties which do not abide by this article will lose the right to participate in the general elections in any constituency.

(iii) Persons who resign from their parties two months before or two months after the date of the decision of the Grand National Assembly for a general election cannot be designated as independent candidates.

(iv) Joint lists may not be submitted in any form.

3. On the face of it this law has effectively prevented the Opposition parties either from presenting joint lists in certain constituencies or from allocating certain constituencies to certain parties or from resigning *en masse* from their parties and standing as independents. They will therefore either have to fight the elections independently in strict accordance with the Electoral Law or come to an agreement (which is unlikely) for the Opposition to be represented by one of the Opposition parties only throughout the country. The third possibility is that they might boycott the general elections entirely although this appears unlikely at present.

4. These amendments to the Electoral Law were debated throughout the day in the National Assembly on the 11th of September. To begin with tempers ran high and the atmosphere was electric. One Deputy of the People's Republican Party had to be expelled from the Assembly for the session for refusing to sit down when ordered to do so by the chairman; and soon afterwards, during a speech by ex-President Inönü, a fight started between Opposition and Democrat Party Deputies and the Assembly was adjourned for some minutes until tempers had cooled. On resumption it appeared that the sting had gone out of the debate and the remainder of the session was conducted in an orderly fashion with reasonably sane and moderate statements on all sides. The Law was, of course, passed by an overwhelming majority and there was no evidence of abstainers in the Democrat Party ranks. The Democrat Party element in the Assembly were clearly full of confidence throughout while the Opposition steadily contested every point and preserved an air of resolution and unity amongst themselves until the end. In spite of the bitterness evident in the opening stages the Opposition did not appear to be cast down by the course of events (they expected it), and there was even evidence as the Assembly dissolved of perfectly friendly personal relations between Opposition and Democrat Deputies. There was no atmosphere of potential boycott or other violent action by the Opposition parties.

5. It had been widely rumoured for some days before the final session of the Assembly that the Government were in fact preparing legislation designed to torpedo Opposition collaboration. The General Congress of the People's Republican Party met in Ankara early this week and publicly approved the principle of co-operation between the various Opposition parties and authorised M. Inönü to decide whether the party should in fact participate in the general elections. In his main speech to the Congress M. Inönü dealt almost entirely with

the illiberal legislation passed by the Government and the efforts he had made during the last few months to influence the Prime Minister to solve "the problems of the régime."

6. There was a small crop of resignations from various political parties some days before the Assembly was dissolved, the most notable being the resignation of the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Professor Fuat Köprülü, from the Democrat Party. Three apparently insignificant Democrat Party Deputies also resigned on the same day. One former Freedom Party Deputy joined the Democrat Party and another Freedom Party Deputy resigned and became an Independent. Only one of the resignees from the Democrat Party has since joined the Freedom Party and Professor Köprülü's position is still obscure. Nevertheless it is doubtful whether these resignations will cause any form of landslide at this stage owing to the relevant provision of the amendment to the Electoral Law mentioned above.

7. I am commenting in a separate despatch on the positions of the various political parties at the outset of the election campaign.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Athens and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL STEWART.

RK 1015/29 No. 19

THE PROSPECTS OF THE PARTIES IN THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTION

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received September 16)

(No. 163. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *September 13, 1957.*

I have the honour to refer to my despatch No. 162 of the 13th of September and to offer some observations on the present positions of the Democrat and Opposition parties at the outset of the election campaign. I am assuming at this stage that the Opposition parties will not boycott the general elections and that they will fight the campaign in as close co-operation as is possible within the framework of the now stringent Electoral Law—also that the elections will be free.

2. The Democrat Party will probably fight the elections on the basis of their record of achievement over the last seven years after finding the country in a state of stagnation in 1950. They will no doubt stress the immense benefits that have accrued to the country and will make full play with mention of agricultural subsidies, advances in the field of education, new communications, factories, power stations, town planning schemes, general industrialisation, &c., and will point to the golden future which will be secured for Turkey if they are returned to power, and the undesirability of changing horses in midstream.

3. The Opposition on the other hand will be obliged to fight from more negative platforms. They will undoubtedly concentrate on the rising cost of living, the acute shortages and the generally disastrous economic policy of the Government and equally on the illiberality of Democrat Party "political" legislation, the autocratic methods of the Prime Minister and the need for constitutional reform.

4. I have found little evidence so far that foreign affairs are likely to be an issue. Members of both the Democrat Party and the Opposition parties have said in conversation that there is little dissension between the parties on foreign affairs except over points of application and that no party wishes to rock the boat over such ticklish questions as Cyprus and Syria at a time like this. I believe that this analysis is at present correct and that the Government are unlikely to go further than to point out how they have put Turkey on the international map during the past seven years without referring specifically to any single aspect of foreign affairs. The Opposition probably also intend to maintain national solidarity on this subject. Nevertheless, there is the chance that, if the election campaign becomes really bitter and if the wells of invective on domestic subjects run dry, the Opposition might turn and attack the Government for, say, weakness and changing ground over the Cyprus issue and inertia in the face of the Syrian danger.

5. There are certain factors which have affected the positions of the various parties in relation to the electorate since Sir James Bowker last made a full analysis of this question in his despatch No. 62 of the 27th of March.

6. First, the cost of living has continued to rise and the shortages of consumer goods have become increasingly acute. The existence for example of coffee has almost been forgotten and recently certain shortages have arisen which affect the rural peasant as well as the town-dweller. The view has been widely expressed that there is not a business man in any large town in Turkey who is not thoroughly dissatisfied with the régime.

7. Secondly, there is little doubt that the arrest and imprisonment (so far without trial) of the leader of the Republican National Party, M. Osman Bölükbaşi, in July, had a damaging effect on the Democrat Party cause in a wider context than M. Bölükbaşi's own constituency. Nevertheless the Turkish peasant is used to and indeed expects autocratic methods from his Government; his memory of such incidents is comparatively short; and the echoes of this affair seem to have, at least temporarily, died away.

8. Thirdly, the widespread and apparently haphazard demolitions especially in Ankara and Istanbul in the cause of town planning have become a political factor. Some say that the hardships caused by the mass expropriations of small shopkeepers and business men will have lost substantial quantities of votes for the Democrat Party. On the other hand, the demolition work has temporarily solved any unemployment problem there might have been at the lowest level; the demand for manual labourers on the demolitions now greatly exceeds the supply; and wages for construction (or destruction) work have risen. Moreover, psychologically the ruthless process of demolition would be interpreted by many Turks as a sign of the strength and power which they instinctively respect.

9. Fourthly, the resignation of Professor Köprülü from the Democrat Party (he was one of the four founders of the party) may have some adverse effect on the party's cause although it has not been followed by any mass resignations or even any overt signs of dissidence within the party. Although Professor Köprülü's personal ability is doubtful he is a national figure, and the electorate might consider that the party was beginning to break up when one of its founder-members abandoned it so soon before an election.

10. Fifthly, the agreement between the Opposition parties to co-operate during the period of elections was evidently regarded by the Government as a serious threat; otherwise the legislation mentioned in my despatch No. 162 (which may have a fundamental effect on the progress of Turkey towards true democracy) would not have been passed. Although this legislation has probably effectively inhibited the type of co-operation aimed at by the Opposition parties the fact of their willingness to co-operate may in the event influence hesitant voters to vote for the Opposition since it must to a certain extent have resolved their doubts as to which Opposition party to choose.

11. Nevertheless the essential strength of the Democrat Party as described in Sir James Bowker's despatch of the 27th of March and the essential weakness of each individual Opposition party still remains; and the advantages accruing to the Government during the election campaign from their powerful organisation, and control of the radio and to a certain extent of the local authorities cannot be overlooked.

12. It would, therefore, be logical to conclude that the Democrat Party stands an excellent chance of being returned to office for a third term although probably with a reduced majority resulting from losses in the big towns; and a slight fall off of votes from the rural area. However, the total unpredictability of the Turkish voter as demonstrated in the 1950 and 1954 elections (when the Democrat Party was expected to be returned with a *reduced* majority) must nevertheless be borne in mind. An Opposition victory is highly unlikely, but it would not be entirely surprising if, in spite of prophesies to the contrary, the Democrat Party was returned to power with an even greater majority, most probably caused by the disappearance from the political scene of the Freedom Party Deputies who were originally elected on the Democrat Party ticket.

13. I shall continue to report from time to time any important developments during the election campaign.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Athens and to the Political Officer with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.
MICHAEL STEWART.

RK 10338/4 No. 20

A CHAPTER IN TURCO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 15*)

(No. 176. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *October 9, 1957.*

In the Chancery's letter (1034/61/56)(1) of the 14th of December, 1956, it was reported that Soviet overtures to Turkey, which had been going on since early in 1955, suddenly stopped on the 27th of November last and attacks on Turkey and her foreign policy were resumed. Even at their height, it was notable that the Turkish Government treated these overtures with scepticism and reserve. Early this year, however, a fresh Soviet drive to improve relations with Turkey began, as in other Western countries, and it was combined with fresh Soviet attempts at cultural and economic penetration which were reported in the Chancery's letter (10325/7)(1) of the 3rd of May to the Northern Department. Notwithstanding the marked change in Soviet-Turkish relations that has occurred since the beginning of September as a result of recent developments in Syria, the Soviet campaign to improve relations played on certain factors in the current Turkish situation which have not themselves changed, and I have the honour, therefore, to offer the following account of this campaign, which may well be repeated if conditions again appear favourable.

2. To begin with the Soviet drive gained little evident success. Nevertheless it was not entirely met with the normal Turkish implacable hostility to such Russian advances. Such pointers as there were throughout the summer to any realignment of Turkish policy towards the Soviet Union bore a certain resemblance to those recently reported in Turkish-Egyptian relations (Sir James Bowker's despatch No. 157 of the 24th of August) and they were not without their disquieting side. As over Egypt, there was no official or open reappraisal of Turkish policy and indeed, again as in the case of Egypt, official circles from the Prime Minister downwards played down the significance of any incident, and would have it believed that there had been no change at all. Since 1953 Soviet-Turkish relations have been characterised by a cycle of alternate threats and smiles but the evidence earlier this year of a slight weakening of the firm Turkish stand against all forms of Soviet penetration could not be denied. This was the first time that such a thing happened, and it may have been and may yet be itself a reflection of a possible change in Turkish thinking about the Soviet Union.

3. A marked increase in Soviet activity dated from an interview which the Soviet Ambassador had with the Turkish Prime Minister in early July. When asked about this conversation at the time, the responsible officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that it must have been purely formal, as they had not even received a report on it. M. Menderes told the American Ambassador that M. Rizhov had left with him an aide-mémoire suggesting that Turkey and the Soviet Union should get down to studying all the problems outstanding between them; M. Menderes was replying that the only problems to be discussed were those of commercial and other relations, and these were best handled at the departmental level. Confirmation that such subsequent talks took place was given to the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires by the Assistant Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a conversation several weeks later, and he also described more fully the original interview. According to M. Kuneralp's account M. Rizhov expressed the desire of the Soviet Union for better political relations with Turkey, closer economic relations, and a programme of cultural exchanges. This no doubt is a line which has been taken by the Soviet Union with all the countries of the West at some time or other in the last eight months, in an attempt to recover lost ground. On this occasion, however, it was perhaps significant that the Ambassador's approach to the Turkish Prime Minister was supposed to have followed some three or four days after a broadcast by the Soviet radio, which attributed responsibility for bad Turco-Soviet relations in the past to M. Molotov and his associates and prophesied an improvement now that they had been removed. It will be recalled that in 1955, Khrushchev claimed that the villain was Beria (see paragraph 5 of Sir W. Hayter's letter 10316/6/55 to Earl Jellicoe of the 17th of November)(1). M. Rizhov did not himself apparently refer to the dismissal of Molotov but he did offer Soviet help to Turkey over oil supplies, at that period a critical problem, and suggested various cultural exchanges, in particular visits by a Soviet ballet company, and an exchange of visits between the mayors of Ankara and Moscow.

4. Cultural exchanges of the kind proposed are, of course, in the well-worn tradition of attempted Soviet cultural penetration of the West. M. Kuneralp told the Canadian Chargé d'Affaires that the Turks were embarrassed by the proposed exchange of mayors, which had been followed up by the Soviet Embassy in subsequent discussions, and they would stall on it indefinitely, but the visit by a ballet company was likely to take place. It was not at first sight surprising that the Turks should have been considering following the example of most other NATO Governments by permitting at least some cultural exchanges; but it will be remembered that when others were co-operating with the Russians in this field in 1955 and 1956, the Turks took a consistently tough line.

5. According to the Turkish Press a group of Soviet artists arrived at Istanbul on the 27th of August on their way to perform at the Izmir Trade Fair. The group included dancers and actors from the Bolshoi Theatre and musicians, including the ubiquitous David Oistrakh. The leader of the group was one Mustafa Ihsan Azerbaycanli, described as an announcer of Moscow radio, presumably in their Turkish service. In an interview he said that the group would perform in Istanbul after Izmir, and that Soviet artists were very glad to be back once more in the country of Atatürk. A group from the Bolshoi Theatre had been invited to Turkey by Atatürk in 1935, and the artists still treasured the presents they had received on that occasion. "We want Turkish-Soviet cultural relations to develop, and we shall be happy if Turkish artists visit the Soviet Union."

6. Sir James Bowker reported on recent developments in Turkish-Soviet commercial relations in his letter to Mr. Addis (11255/5)(1) of the 23rd of August. The present Soviet offer to build two factories with long-term credits, which presumably still stands, represents the first Soviet economic aid since 1935, when a Russian-equipped textile factory was erected at Kayseri. As in the case of the proposed cultural exchanges, it was in many ways understandable and natural that Turkey should be willing to accept foreign aid from any source at present. She is desperately short of foreign exchange, and has exhausted most sources of credit available in Western countries. The only contract so far signed is for a window-glass factory, of which there is a critical shortage in Turkey. The contract for a caustic soda plant has yet to be negotiated. A Soviet delegation attended the opening of the Izmir Trade Fair in August, where the Russian pavilion vied with that of the United States. But members of the group applied for Turkish visas as individuals, and were pointedly not treated by the Turkish Government as an official commercial mission, although the Turkish Press gave them useful publicity. There were rumours, but nothing definite, about further Russian offers to supply complete factories on credit terms. In general it seemed that the Turks might accept some offers of this nature, because of their inability to obtain their requirements in any other way or from any other source. They could have justified this by arguing that the United Kingdom, for example, was trading fairly extensively with the Soviet Union, and that there was therefore nothing abnormal in Turkey doing so too. However, as reported in Sir James Bowker's recent annual report (his despatch No. 154 E. of the 21st of August)(1) on economic relations with the Soviet *bloc*, trade with the *bloc* in fact decreased during the past year. There is no reason to expect any great expansion in trade with the Soviet Union, because Turkey's export capabilities are so extremely limited. There may, however, be some increase this year if difficulties are experienced in disposing of Turkey's high-priced exports to her normal trade partners in the West.

7. As regards personal contacts the Soviet Embassy staff in Ankara had been continuing their line of jovial co-existence,

(1) Not printed.

(1) Not printed

and, as last year, a party of Soviet tourists recently visited Istanbul in a Russian ship, which appears to be making more frequent calls at that port.

8. Such was the concrete evidence of recent Soviet efforts. It must be admitted that all these developments were in themselves on a small scale, or of trivial importance, and that the pressure for improved relations had come wholly from the Soviet side. (The Turkish Press was unanimous and robust in pointing to the potential dangers of subversion and penetration inherent in entering into closer relations with the Soviet Union in any field.) The significant thing, however, was that for the first time the Turkish Government did not make a rigid stand on principle but responded to some extent to the Soviet pressure; and that where before Soviet activity had been forbidden, now it was permitted. Had they so wished, the Turks could have maintained their opposition to official cultural exchanges. They are much more vulnerable on the economic front, and, though both the public and the Government appeared awake to the possible dangers, the principle of accepting Soviet help was conceded. As far as it could be discerned, any new direction in Turkish policy towards the Soviet Union could have been called opportunist, whereas before it was implacably hostile. It could be assumed that Turkey's opposition to internal Communism would certainly remain as strong as ever, but it appeared that she was considering a more flexible policy towards the Soviet Union, primarily to suit her economic needs.

9. In her present economic straits, Turkey could understandably be willing to obtain foreign capital wherever she could, providing the political or economic terms did not appear disadvantageous, and in appearing to flirt with the Russians there may have been a desire to "blackmail" the Americans, whose policy on granting aid to Turkey is more realistic than the Turks would wish. In a speech to an American delegation of business men at Konya on the 8th of August the local Democrat Party Deputy is reported to have said: "I would like to stress that the Turkish people need dollars and not advice. The Turkish people are determined to go ahead with their reconstruction effort . . . . We believe and we are waiting to see that the United States will not compel Turkey to go looking for new friends and new possibilities in foreign lands." I believe this to have been the view, in all its crudity, of many Turks, including other Deputies, and the American Ambassador has mentioned to me that he has himself noticed this note of blackmail.

10. Some Americans were inclined to see behind any change in Turkish-Soviet policy the sinister influence of M. Zorlu, recently appointed Minister of State and hence once again openly the Prime Minister's only main adviser on foreign policy. It is true that M. Zorlu's father-in-law was Foreign Minister at the time of Atatürk's "honeymoon" with the Soviet Union, but this seems hardly enough in itself to warrant the deep suspicions which the American Embassy hold of him as a pro-Soviet influence on the Prime Minister. At the same time, it was rumoured in Istanbul that the real reason behind M. Köprülü's resignation from the Democrat Party on the 7th of September, though not that publicly announced, was his disagreement with the Government's current policy towards the Soviet Union. M. Köprülü's record whilst in office (*cf.* a speech by M. Köprülü reported in paragraph 11 of the Ambassador's letter to Mr. Ward, 1061/9, of the 14th of January, 1955)(1) would support this.

11. There were no signs that Turkish loyalty to NATO or to the Baghdad Pact was weakening, and it is certain that even for the sake of economic aid Turkey would not wittingly have jeopardised either her external or her internal security. But certain Turks may well have been feeling that they could take some advantage of the present Soviet wooing of the West without imperilling their country. They were probably right, but a Turkish move towards closer relations with the Soviet Union could well have more serious effects, I suggest, on other countries, especially in the Middle East, who have not the same fundamental grounds for fearing the Russians which will always restrain Turkey from going too far. These countries might well be demoralised, or encouraged to take risks by any apparent weakening in the self-professed bastion of the West against Soviet ambitions.

12. Since the events which I have described took place, the Middle East has

(1) Not printed.

once more been disturbed by the deterioration of the situation in Syria and the temporary easing of Turco-Russian relations has not survived the anti-Turkish propaganda campaign from Moscow, not to mention M. Bulganin's recent minatory letter to the Turkish Prime Minister. What I have recorded has therefore turned out to be not the beginning of a new story, but a chapter in itself. Whilst Turkey's present economic difficulties exist, however, the opportunities will still be there for the Russians to attempt to exploit, and, as I have reported in my letter of the 27th of September from Istanbul to Mr. Riches, the Soviet Ambassador continues his efforts, although by indirect means, to cultivate good relations with the Turkish Government, despite the thunder of Messrs. Gromyko and Khrushchev.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Moscow, Baghdad, Tehran and Karachi, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to NATO at Paris and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL STEWART.

RK 1015/37 No. 21

THE FINAL PHASE OF THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received October 21)

(No. 183. Confidential) *Ankara, October 17, 1957.*

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to my despatches Nos. 162 and 163 of the 13th of September and to offer some final observations on the state of the election campaign in Turkey, together with a very tentative forecast of the possible result of the elections which are now imminent.

2. Although the campaign is in full swing and all parties are working up to their maximum effort, outward manifestations of electioneering are still curiously lacking. A casual visitor could well pass through Turkey and be unaware of the fact that elections were pending provided he did not actually encounter a public meeting. Such devices as radio cars, posters and written slogans are seldom seen and even at public meetings it is often difficult to deduce from the impassive demeanour of the audience whether they are interested or bored, favourable or unfavourable to the speakers or whether they have simply attended (as they do in large numbers at all party meetings) out of sheer curiosity. Nevertheless under the surface there is very considerable interest and speculation at all levels and few other topics of conversation are discussed. Equally the national (Ankara and Istanbul) Press of all parties has whipped up a campaign of abuse and counter abuse worthy of the *Eatanswill Gazette and Independent*. Although the tempo of the campaign is definitely increasing and although there are signs that it may become more violent and more bitter, time is now against the extremists since the law provides for a three-day " armistice " before the day of polling: and there are, therefore, only six more days of campaigning to run.

3. The parties are conducting their campaigns on expected lines. The Democrat Party is relying as far as possible on campaigning by performance—opening new factories, schools, &c., with appropriate speeches by the Prime Minister, President or some other Cabinet Minister—and is concentrating mainly on extolling past achievements and pointing to a glorious future under their continued rule. They have not issued an election manifesto but have recently published a brochure illustrating pictorially and with figures their manifold achievements during the past seven years. (The mention in this brochure of mosque building statistics has already drawn the fire of the Freedom Party with a complaint to the Electoral Committee that this is in contravention of the law.) The Opposition parties on the other hand have all issued manifestos mainly dwelling on the constitutional reforms and other legislation they would put into effect to redress the illiberal Democrat Party laws and to ensure a truly democratic régime in the future. They have also stressed the need for a new and balanced economic policy. Their public campaigning methods have followed these lines but, although the economic situation, the high cost of living and the shortages are always mentioned, the main burden of Opposition speeches has been on the degeneration of Democrat Party rule into a totalitarian régime.

4. Foreign affairs have not yet, and seem unlikely to, become a major issue. There is no mention of them in any of the Opposition Party manifestos while the Democrat Party brochure referred to above devotes half a page only to foreign affairs, mentioning Korea, NATO and the Baghdad Pact and, in a slightly more sinister vein, the Cyprus " cause " illustrated by a map of the island with a Turkish flag in the middle of it. However, the silence of the People's Republican Party on the subject and the nature of the brief statements (mainly evoked by questions from the audience) by Democrat Party leaders, which I have reported by telegram, indicate that the two main parties intend at present at least, to play the Cyprus issue down as far as possible during the campaign. Equally the vexed subject of Islam has seldom been aired in public except in the context of the Democrat Party brochure.

5. At this stage it has become generally evident that the election will be virtually a straight fight between the Democrat Party and the People's Republican Party. Most

people seem convinced that the Freedom Party and the Republican National Party have no chance of gaining many seats and that their role will be confined to splitting the vote probably to the disadvantage of the Democrat Party. The People's Republican Party appears to have taken advantage of the focus brought to bear on it at the time of the unsuccessful attempt to establish a joint Opposition and there is further evidence that the party, which touched its lowest ebb in 1956, is undergoing a renaissance. For example, their list of candidates consist mainly of young local men in each province as opposed to the discredited old guard who have been so prominent on previous occasions. The Democrat Party candidate list is much the same as it was in 1954 with the addition of the late Chief of the Turkish General Staff and the late Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Navy, Land and Air Forces (an imposing display of " top brass " for the electors), and of a number of senior Government officials. They have, moreover, put up six candidates from the minorities in Istanbul and have gratifyingly excluded two of the most rabid Islamic fanatics in the party both of whom were Deputies in the last Assembly. The Freedom Party list reflects the view that the party consists of inteligent individuals with little public support and the main bulk of the Republican National Party candidates are unknowns.

6. Before attempting to comment on the general feeling in the country towards the two main antagonists (Democrat Party and People's Republican Party) it is appropriate at this point to review briefly the atmosphere immediately before the 1954 elections as seen from this embassy. At that time the Democrat Party appeared to have just passed the peak of its extreme popularity and there were rumours of discontent mainly in the urban areas directed against the economic situation and to a lesser extent against governmental illiberality. Nevertheless even the most optimistic supporters of the People's Republican Party did not expect to win the elections outright but hoped at best to get, say, 200 seats in the Assembly. Democrat Party supporters were confident to a man and many prophesied that their party would be returned with an increased majority. In the event this prophecy came true.

7. Now there appears to be a rather different atmosphere. Members of the Embassy staff and the staff of Her Majesty's Consulates-General at Istanbul and Izmir who have been touring the provinces in recent weeks have reported that there seems to be widespread discontent throughout the country especially in urban areas. This also appears to be the case in Ankara and Istanbul. This discontent is mainly caused by the high and ever-rising cost of living and the acute shortages of consumer goods; and to some extent by the illiberal legislation and measures carried out in recent years by the Democrat Party, and also by the alleged corruption within the party itself. Even certain devoted Democrat Party supporters and party members appear to be slightly lacking in confidence. Many have admitted that they expect to lose the great majority of votes in the towns (as distinct from villages) and that the party is resigned to this. Moreover there is a widespread feeling that Istanbul (which provides thirty-nine seats for the Assembly) and Ankara (which provides twenty-six) may well go over to the People's Republican Party. Many reports have been received that the minorities in Istanbul who form a good percentage of the electorate will abstain from voting. In the previous election they supported the Democrats. Nevertheless Democrat supporters generally allege that they can rely on the peasant vote which forms 80 per cent. of the Turkish electorate and that losses in the towns will not fundamentally affect their position. Even on this score, however, they usually add a word of warning that the peasants are entirely unpredictable; that many villages are sharply divided between Democrat Party and People's Republican Party supporters; and that it is impossible to say in advance how a peasant will vote. A number of provincial governors (who at times like this are regarded more or less as Democrat Party agents) have expressed similar views and have appeared surprisingly lukewarm about the chances of a Democrat Party victory. On the other hand, the People's Republican Party appear more confident than they were before the previous elections and even M. Inönü, who is normally not over-optimistic, is said to have high hopes. Democrat Party supporters admit that the People's Republican Party has produced a strong list of candidates, in some cases stronger than their own (except in Istanbul), and that the Freedom Party and Republican National Party will serve as useful allies to the People's Republican Party by way of splitting the vote against them.

8. Another factor which must be taken into account is that the local provincial Press as opposed to the Ankara and Istanbul newspapers, is in many areas being cautious. There are practically no provincial Opposition papers—they cannot exist since newsprint and advertising space are distributed by the local representatives of the Central Government who invariably act on the side of the Democrat Party; but independent papers are being strictly independent and even Democrat Party organs are being careful in their allotment of praise and blame. The editors are local men and they may well feel that it would be unwise for them to be committed too deeply to the Democrat Party at this stage.

9. In spite of all these portents, however, the strength of the Democrat Party position cannot be denied. The party has plenty of money (and is unscrupulous in obtaining more as shown by the fact that they are even levying contributions for party funds from foreign business firms in Istanbul), powerful organisations in all provinces, virtual control of the local Press and complete control over broadcasting; the almost universal support of the local authorities and, as mentioned in paragraph 3 above, the ability to campaign by performance as well as by words. Moreover, recent legislation has seriously restricted the efforts of the Opposition and the very real advantages accruing to the peasants from the Democrat Party régime cannot be denied. The peasants have benefited materially from such things as piped water in the villages, electricity, schools, communications, new factories, agricultural subsidies, &c., and the probability is that they will, in the main, show their gratitude by supporting the Democrat Party once more. Their interest in political democracy is marginal and all may depend on how hard the shortages have hit them. It seems on the face of it that they, with their simple needs, have suffered far less than the town dwellers although even Democrat supporters have hinted darkly that the peasants too are feeling the pinch. Very recent evidence indicates, however, that in the recognised Democrat Party strongholds the peasants seem to be still loyal to the régime. Finally M. Menderes is in the strong position of being able to advise the people against changing horses in mid-stream with the great work of national reconstruction half complete. This may well weigh heavily with the electorate since it is in the tradition of Turkish politics for a new party coming to power to undo the work of its predecessor and many might feel that the present reconstruction scheme might never be finished if they voted the People's Republican Party into power.

10. The People's Republican Party have, by comparison, little positive to offer except for the " new look " in the party itself and the firm promise of constitutional reform, the redress of undemocratic legislation and of further elections under a proportional representation system in May 1958 designed to establish a truly democratic régime in Turkey. Their campaign is, however, really based on negative criticism of the Government and they have moreover to contend with evil memories of their repressive conduct during the final years of the single party régime.

11. An attempt to forecast the results of a general election in Turkey is fraught with pitfalls. Everyone admits that the peasants who form the main body of voters are utterly incalculable. Like most peasant people they are secretive and suspicious and tend to tell their interlocutors what they think the latter wish to hear and then to make up their own minds independently. They are also said, even by Democrat Party supporters, to be impervious to propaganda. Moreover, the fact that there is no substantial doctrinaire difference between the declared policies of any of the parties contesting the elections, makes it impossible to predict with confidence that such and such a section of the population is bound to vote for the Democrat Party and another section for the Opposition. It is very much a question of each person voting for the party which he thinks will best be able to carry out the policy which is virtually shared by all sides. My conclusions must, therefore, be tentative and may well prove inaccurate.

12. In the light of the evidence of the past few weeks, as recorded briefly above, I am, however, inclined to modify slightly the conclusions drawn in paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 163. I still believe that the most likely outcome of the elections will be a Democrat Party victory, thanks to peasant support, but that they will probably be returned with a reduced majority in the votes cast if not in the seats obtained in the National Assembly (or even an overall minority in the votes cast). They have only to gain a simple majority over any single Opposition party in a province in order to secure all the seats for that province; the relationship between votes lost and seats lost

is not necessarily balanced. I would, however, put the chances of an outright victory by the People's Republican Party slightly higher at this stage than my original second choice of a Democrat Party victory with an increased majority. The most unlikely possibility is a victory by either the Freedom Party or the Republican National Party but I do believe that there is a sporting outsider's chance of a People's Republican Party victory provided the balloting is free and not tampered with.

13. This final point may be the crux of the affair. There is little doubt that M. Menderes is not approaching these elections in the same spirit of disinterested statesmanship shown by M. Inönü in 1950. He appears determined to remain in power to finish his mission: there have been widespread rumours in all quarters for some weeks that the Democrat Party will stop at nothing to win and most private forecasts have been qualified by the phrase " if the elections are free." Stories are widely current of unfair pressures against the Opposition, preparations to bribe the peasants on a massive scale, threats being issued against Opposition supporters, and the atmosphere has been compared frequently to that prevailing before the 1946 elections when M. Inönü rigged the elections against the rising tide of Democrat popularity. If M. Menderes feels that the Democrat Party's position is indeed desperate in the final days of the campaign, I believe that he may resort to some form of manipulation of the results. This adds an extra imponderable to the unpredictability of the peasant majority.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Athens, to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces and to the Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL STEWART.

RK 1015/39

No. 22

TURKISH ELECTION RESULTS

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received October 31*)

(No. 1025)
(Telegraphic)

Ankara,
October 31, 1957.

My telegram No. 1023: Turkish elections.

Final results have been published in an official communiqué by the Ministry of Justice. Following is distribution of seats:

Democrat Party	424
People's Republican Party	178
Freedom Party...	4
Republican National Party	4
Total	610

Foreign Office please pass to Governor Cyprus and Washington as my telegrams Nos. 100 and 124 respectively.

RK 1015/41

No. 23

THE RESULTS OF THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTION

Mr. Stewart to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received November 4*)

(No. 192. Confidential)

Ankara,
November 1, 1957.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to recent correspondence about the Turkish General Elections, which rests with my telegram No. 1025, and to offer some observations on the results and their implications.

2. As reported in my telegram under reference, the official results have now been published, although there still appears to be a faint shadow of doubt about their finality. The Democrat Party has won 44 provinces outright including the important provinces of Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa and Konya, and has shared three provinces with the People's Republican Party (a rare occurrence under the Turkish Electoral System caused by a majority of voters submitting mixed handwritten lists as opposed to the orthodox method of voting on one of the printed party lists). The Democrat Party total of seats in the new Grand National Assembly will be 424. The People's Republican Party has won 18 provinces outright including Ankara and Adana and has shared three with the Democrat Party, a total of 178 seats. The Republican National Party and Freedom Party have each won 1 insignificant province, giving each 4 seats in the Assembly. No final figures of voting are yet available and it is impossible to say whether the polling was light or heavy, although it is alleged that only about 60 per cent. of the total electorate in Istanbul used their votes. From the incomplete and unofficial figures at present available it appears that the combined votes of all Opposition parties outnumbered those cast for the Democrat Party by a few hundred thousand, and that the percentage of votes cast for the Democrat Party fell by some 7 per cent. or 8 per cent. compared to their 1954 figure, whereas the People's Republican Party gained a roughly corresponding percentage increase. Most of the leading personalities in the two main parties were elected including M. Inönü and the Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party, M. Kasim Gülek. The only important Democrat Party figures who failed to be elected were the Minister of Labour, M. Tarhan, the Minister of Justice, M. Göktürk, and one of the Ministers of State, M. Bengü.

3. Although the Democrat Party has won with a comfortable majority of 238 seats, the People's Republican Party has made a considerable inroad into the previous overwhelming Democrat majority (in 1954 the Democrat Party gained 503 seats to the People's Republican Party total of 31 only). This development represents a new phase in Turkish internal politics which may prove in the long run to have significance comparable to the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946. It is the first time that a single Opposition party has held more than about 60 seats and the Opposition will therefore represent something more than a small but vocal minority in the Grand National Assembly.

4. The causes of this wane in Democrat Party popularity are not difficult to find, and were briefly summarised in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 183 of the 17th of October—the high and ever-rising cost of living and the acute shortages of consumer goods and, to a lesser extent, the illiberal legislation carried out by the Democrat Party régime. It is significant that most of the provinces won by the People's Republican Party are in the poorer and more neglected areas of Turkey where the peasants produce little and are high consumers, whereas the Democrat Party scored its most notable victories in the rich agricultural areas of Western Turkey where the peasants have been less hard hit by the shortages.

5. M. Menderes and his party cannot be over-satisfied with the results. Apart from any irregularities during the counting of the votes (which I discuss further below) they had done everything possible to prepare the ground in advance for an overwhelming Democrat Party victory; and had restricted the activities of the Opposition parties to the maximum extent only just compatible with constitutional practice. The law on public meetings passed in 1956 severely inhibited the Opposition for a year before the election campaign was launched; their attempt to co-operate and present a joint

front against the Democrat Party in the elections was torpedoed by governmental legislation on the eve of the election campaign; the leader of the Republican National Party was incarcerated in Ankara jail on the 1st of July where he still remains; the Democrat Party made full use of the State Radio as an organ of party propaganda during the campaign and are widely alleged to have requisitioned Government transport and other facilities for campaigning purposes. They had virtual control over the local authorities and, moreover, were in a position to campaign by performance by means of opening new factories, hospitals, schools, &c., during the campaign (they even continued to do this during the three-day propaganda truce immediately preceding polling day). It is also reliably reported that large sums of money were expended by the party on direct or indirect bribes to the peasants to vote in their favour. These are only some examples of Democrat Party methods and there was no doubt that a maximum effort was made. Nevertheless, in spite of everything the main Opposition party, struggling against the most adverse circumstances, succeeded in reducing substantially the Democrat majority, both in seats in the Assembly and in votes cast. It appears in fact from the incomplete figures received so far that if the Democrat Party had been faced with a combined Opposition they would have been soundly defeated.

6. The People's Republican Party have therefore reason for a fair amount of satisfaction with the results, although they are loudly complaining of Democrat Party irregularities and alleging that if the elections had been fair they would have won an outright victory. Although they have little constructive to offer the country, their popularity has undoubtedly increased, as the popularity of the Democrats has waned. This is probably due both to the renaissance in the party since the black days of 1954 and to the apparent change in M. Ismet Inönü's character. In 1949 he was regarded as a somewhat inefficient dictator who had kept the country for many years in a state of political and economic stagnation. Now he appears to many people more in the role of a political progressive who intends to introduce true democracy into the country after the failure of the Democrat Party to fulfil their early promise, and his personal popularity appears to have increased in proportion. As an intelligent Turk of the older generation said to a member of this Embassy recently: "The greatest achievement of the Democrat Party in the last seven years has been the improvement in the character of Ismet Pasha."

7. As regards the smaller parties, the Republican National Party appears at least to have held its own. It won for the third time in its stronghold of Kirşehir and the indomitable M. Bölükbaşi will probably have to be released from prison as on re-election he should regain Parliamentary immunity. The party may have made small gains in votes cast throughout the country in proportion to its performance in 1954, but its only significant role in the elections seems to have been to split the vote and probably to prevent victories by the People's Republican Party in many provinces.

8. As expected the Freedom Party has suffered almost total extinction. The leader of the party, M. Karaosmanoğlu, was defeated in the alleged Freedom Party stronghold of Manisa and all their prominent Deputies have disappeared from the scene with the exception of the redoubtable M. Fethi Çelikbaş, one of M. Menderes' most formidable opponents, who was re-elected in the small province of Burdur. As far as can be seen, the total votes cast for the Freedom Party in many provinces were pathetically small and amounted only to tens or hundreds where the main parties were polling well over 50,000. This proves, anyway for the moment, that a party of intelligent intellectuals who have little to offer but high ideals have no great attraction for the Turkish electorate.

9. As regards the actual conduct of the elections, polling was conducted in a remarkably calm and orderly atmosphere throughout the country. It was only when the counting of votes began that the trouble started, as reported in my telegram No. 1023. It is unlikely that the truth of the many allegations by the People's Republican Party of irregularities in compiling the electoral lists and in the actual count of the votes will ever emerge, although the Opposition are still seething with indignation and threatening to reopen the whole subject in the Grand National Assembly. No one is impartial in Turkey at present and an unbiased view is almost impossible to obtain. Nevertheless one thing is clear. The Democrat Party undoubtedly infringed the Electoral Law and brought unfair influence to bear on the voters by announcing interim results in certain provinces, always highly in favour of their own party, before polling was complete. The Turkish peasant would

most probably feel, if he heard a result such as "Bursa: D.P.—600, P.R.P.—0", that there was little point in voting for any party other than the Democrat Party. M. Inönü's complaint on this count was upheld by the Supreme Electoral Committee, but only five minutes before the polls were closed.

10. Even if the whole affair blows over, this election will go down in Turkish history as having been far less fairly conducted than the previous two, and it is significant that the incidents which have taken place throughout the country are apparently unprecedented in other post-election periods. The fact that disturbances have happened, and an air of unrest prevails, casts for the first time for many years a shadow of doubt on the internal stability of Turkey, which has previously been regarded as absolute. It is too early to draw conclusions but this aspect will from now on have to be watched.

11. If the alleged irregularities did take place, and they probably did, their effect on the results must, however, be judged against the full perspective of events. As I pointed out in paragraph 5 above, the Democrat Party had in effect rigged the elections as far as possible in their own favour before polling began. Their various preparatory actions probably had far more effect on the results than any minor irregularities in the count and falsification of the electoral lists, and there is a general feeling that, if the elections and the pre-electoral period had been entirely free and unfettered, the Democrat Party might now be out of power.

12. It is rather early to say what the future will bring. On the face of it the results appear satisfactory. M. Menderes is probably the best man to govern Turkey in spite of his failings, and the fact that there is now a strong Opposition should act as a curb on his more immoderate tendencies and force him to take into account the views of his own party before launching out into any new and drastic steps. Nevertheless, Turkish politicians like to be on the winning side, and the cold wind of waning popularity may now be blowing through the rank and file of the Democrat Party. All may therefore depend on the tactics of the Opposition. If they are moderate, the whole government of the country should be improved as a result of these elections. They may, however, concentrate (as they have often done in the past against far more formidable odds) remorselessly and unremittingly on goading M. Menderes into rash and unpopular acts with the intention of subverting the loyalty of the Parliamentary rank and file of his own party. There have been a number of defections in the past from the Democrat Party and a fresh wave could now reduce M. Menderes' majority to a point where he could no longer count on general support from his own party. M. Menderes may therefore find it necessary to develop the virtues of patience and forbearance in the face of Opposition attacks, characteristics for which he has not been conspicuous in the past, if he is to remain in office for another full term.

13. In conclusion, however, it may be said that this election, however it was conducted, represents a further step forward in the development of Turkish democracy. In 1950 the great decision to have free elections was made and the Democrat Party was returned to power with an overwhelming majority, which was reinforced in 1954. Now, for the first time, the Turkish Grand National Assembly is more evenly balanced and it may be said that in the parliamentary sense the two party system has for the first time come into being. It remains to be seen if Turkish parliamentarians are capable of handling this situation in the best interests of the country. It is also gratifying to note that at no time during the election campaign or during the uneasy post-election period has foreign affairs become an issue; and all parties have generally maintained national solidarity on important aspects of foreign policy.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens and Washington, to the Governor of Cyprus, and to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

MICHAEL STEWART.

RK 1051/13 No. 24

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON NOVEMBER 1, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Mr. Stewart (Ankara)

(No. 231. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
November 4, 1957.

Sir,

The Turkish Ambassador called on me on the 1st of November at his own request. Sir James Bowker was present.

2. M. Birgi invited me to comment on the Washington declaration and the discussions leading up to it. I said that I felt that there had been a change of mind in the United States brought on by four factors. The *Sputnik* had caused a strong emotional reaction in the American public; the Americans were concerned at their unpopularity despite such generous measures as the Eisenhower doctrine; they were worried at having to carry so much power and responsibility; and our own hydrogen bomb had made a difference. These factors were working towards a reorientation of American policy and towards a sharing of responsibility.

3. I said that I thought the purpose of the forthcoming NATO meeting would be threefold: to get the other members of the alliance to support the closer co-operation which had been worked out in Washington; to strengthen President Eisenhower's hand with Congress, and to discuss ways and means of putting the closer co-operation into effect. Detailed plans would have to wait until action had been taken by Congress, and some time for thought would have to be allowed to other members of the alliance, but meanwhile ideas for pooling resources could be investigated. It was possible that the United States Government might take the opportunity to make a statement on the conditions on which nuclear weapons could be made available to the Allies.

4. I said that the atmosphere of the talks in Washington had been very good. The President was active and in better health than at Bermuda.

5. M. Birgi asked me whether Cyprus had been discussed. I said that there had been some discussion but that it did not amount to much. There would be the opportunity for further exchanges before the debate in the United Nations. No new ideas had been put forward at Washington. I felt that the Syrian crisis had made the United States more conscious of the importance of Cyprus to ourselves, to Turkey and to NATO, and less inclined to press for any solution which might be unacceptable to one side or the other. For our part we still wanted to get Turkey and Greece round a table to discuss frankly all possible solutions in order to ascertain what course might be acceptable to all three Governments. I had put this to the Greek Foreign Minister in New York, but he had maintained that it would be impossible for any side to speak frankly so that rigid positions would be taken up, and the Conference would be a failure.

6. M. Birgi asked if there was any present intention of allowing Makarios to return to Cyprus. I replied that there had been no discussion of this possibility of which I was aware. His eventual return was not, of course, ruled out. At the moment Makarios was an embarrassment to the Greek Government and was not having a success in New York. The time might come when it would be a good tactical move to let him return. But at present this idea had not even been mooted here. I said that we would certainly give the Turkish Government the opportunity to express their views before any decision was taken.

7. M. Birgi asked me what I thought of Yugoslavia's present position. I said that I had seen M. Popovic two days before and had found him rather subdued. He had not been able to answer my questions about Zhukov but was clearly uneasy. He had tried to maintain that there was no significance in Yugoslav recognition of the East German Government, but I had told him frankly that I thought their action was a mistake and that the Yugoslavs should be more cautious in their attitude to the Russians. I had told M. Popovic that the Syrian situation had made quite clear Russia's aims of driving towards the Red Sea, and M. Popovic had replied that while he did not accept my definition of Russian aims, the Yugoslavs nevertheless had no illusions about them. I told M. Birgi that I felt sure that

the dismissal of Zhukov must have had a profound effect on the Yugoslavs. M. Birgi recalled that at the time of Malenkov's fall M. Popovic had forecast the rise of Zhukov. M. Birgi said that he had no doubt that Zhukov was being eliminated but that he did not expect his fall to have great repercussions.

8. M. Birgi said that, as he had already explained to the Minister of State, he was under instructions to follow up in a general way the Turkish request for a cruiser, while leaving the detailed discussions to be carried on in Ankara. He said that morally and psychologically the provision of a cruiser would have a very great effect. If it were possible to meet the Turkish request, the present would be the best possible moment. I said that I was anxious to let the Turkish Government have the cruiser but that we were faced with a very difficult financial problem. Our own internal situation made it very difficult for us to give the Turks any more credit, and the assumption of further obligations by Turkey would mean that there would be less to go round for the service of existing debts. M. Birgi pointed out that the amount in question was not large but said that he would make it clear to his Government that the settlement of Turkey's outstanding obligations was a factor which must be taken into consideration.

9. I asked M. Birgi about the result of the elections in Turkey. He said that the two-thirds majority would give the country the stability which was required. He did not expect party strife to be more acute than before, and it was significant that it was after and not before the elections that disturbances had occurred.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Athens and Belgrade, and to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at Paris and New York.

I am, &c.

SELWYN LLOYD.

RK 1781/19 No. 25

THE PART PLAYED BY RELIGION IN THE TURKISH GENERAL ELECTIONS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 19)

(No. 200. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *November 13, 1957.*

With reference to Mr. Stewart's despatch No. 192 of the 1st of November, I have the honour to offer some observations on the part played by religion in the Turkish General Elections.

2. Although the attitude of each individual political party towards Islam did not become a major public issue during the election campaign there is no doubt that it did play a significant part in the calculations of the two main antagonists.

3. The Democrat Party behaved generally as expected. A full page of the illustrated brochure published by the party in lieu of an election manifesto (cf. paragraph 3 of Mr. Stewart's despatch No. 183 of the 17th of October) was devoted to a record of mosque-building statistics during the last seven years, including figures of governmental financial aid. According to these statistics the total sum spent by the Government on mosques during the past seven years was £T.36,827,550. This represented an expenditure of £T.19,259,040 on mosques built or repaired by the Government ; and £T.17,568,510 on Government aid for the repair and building of mosques sponsored by private individuals. The total number of mosques either repaired or newly built during this period was 14,015 ; and it was pointed out that between 1923 and 1949 only £T.6,790,000 of government money had been spent on this cause. Apart from this specific mention of religious activity, pictures of mosques were conspicuous on the front page of the brochure and on many other pages ostensibly devoted to unconnected subjects.

4. It has also been reliably reported that the Democrat Party made a point of exploiting the religious sentiments of the Turkish people during the election campaign in other ways. Copies of a religious magazine extolling Democrat Party achievements were on sale outside a great number of mosques and Democrat Party speakers, especially in villages, were alleged to have dwelt on the Party's pro-Islamic views. One village Imam told a member of the staff of Her Majesty's Consulate-General at Istanbul that he had been instructed by his immediate superior to preach the Democrat Party gospel in the mosques ; and a former Democrat candidate told a member of this Embassy that the village Imams were equivalent to political agents for the Democrat Party and that they were the first people with whom candidates got into touch on election tours. He went so far as to allege that this was the greatest weakness of the Democrat Party because the party was allowing the Imams to exercise an influence as evil in its own reactionary way as the influence of Communists in their different way in certain Western European countries.

5. These activities of the Democrat Party came, however, as no surprise ; and the attitude of the People's Republican Party was perhaps more interesting. In most of the important speeches by party members, and probably in speeches to villagers as well, the point was made clear that the Democrat Party did not have the monopoly of Islam in Turkey and that People's Republican Party members were good Moslems too. Even in Ankara, the Secretary-General of the party, M. Kasim Gülek (a far from " Islamic " figure) felt it necessary to begin a catalogue of the People's Republican Party's articles of faith with " belief in God and the Moslem religion."

6. The People's Republican Party had evidently decided that opposition to Islam and propagation of Kemalist doctrine on this subject would be highly undesirable (cf. paragraph 3 of Mr. Stewart's despatch No. 174 of the 17th of September, 1956) from the point of view of vote catching in the present state of feeling in the country.

7. As regards the smaller parties, the Freedom Party was the only one to criticise publicly the accent on religion in the Democrat Party brochure (the People's Republican Party was silent on this score) and it may be that this apparently anti-Islamic attitude constituted one of the many factors contributing to its virtual extinction in the elections. The Republican National Party, whose candidates seem to have avoided the subject of religion in their electioneering but which is generally considered to stand for Islamic reaction in an extreme form, held its own and may even have improved its position slightly. Nevertheless no firm conclusions can be drawn from this as the party's improved organisation over the past three years probably contributed as much as its Islamic appeal, to the number of votes it gained.

8. It would be as unwise now to draw wide conclusions about the implications of the Islamic revival in Turkey as when my despatch No. 11 of the 28th January, 1955, was written. Nevertheless one thing has emerged clearly. The activities of the Democrat Party during the last seven years in the context of Islam have brought into the open the extent and depth of religious feeling, especially among the peasants, which had lain dormant during the single party régime of Ataturk and Inönü. No political party in Turkey to-day would risk open opposition to Islam on Kemalist principles if it entertained serious hopes of winning an election. For the time being at any rate, Islam has come to stay as a factor in the internal political life of Turkey and is likely to remain one so long as the majority of the electorate is drawn from the agricultural peasantry.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces and to the Acting Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.,

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1102/1 No. 26

TURKISH ECONOMIC PROSPECTS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received November 18)

(No. 203 E. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *November 15, 1957*

In Mr. Stewart's despatch No. 192 of November 1, 1957, some of the implications of the re-election of the Democrat Party on October 27 were discussed. In this despatch I have the honour to deal with the economic prospects for Turkey in the light of the Democrat Party victory. This necessarily involves a large measure of guess work since there has, so far, been no declaration of policy by the Government, and M. Menderes has still to announce his list of Ministers.

2. In considering the likelihood of any change in the Turkish Government's economic policy certain psychological considerations have to be taken into account. The principal of these is M. Menderes' own intolerance of criticism, and his conviction that it is his mission to make Turkey into a modern industrialised State in the shortest possible time. Further, there is the fact that M. Menderes has tended to surround himself by "yes" men who are ready to carry out the policies he desires. He has shown himself to be faithful to his friends even when they have proved to be bad influences. The most important of these friends is M. Fatin Rüstü Zorlu, who had to resign in 1955 because of suspicion that he and several other Ministers were involved in corruption. Early this year M. Menderes brought him back into the Government. Evidence of corruption in high places is helping to lower the general morality of officials throughout Turkey. And this general loosening of standards, aggravated by the steady rise in the cost of living, is helping to make the economic crisis still worse.

3. Whatever the new Government may announce as its future economic policy, it will be hag-ridden from the start by the situation that eight years of living beyond its means have created. Turkey to-day finds herself in a most serious economic situation. She is heavily indebted to nearly all her principal trading partners. (Total foreign indebtedness is put at about U.S.$1,200 millions.) She has virtually exhausted her credit abroad, and at home there is a steady and growing inflation, marked by acute shortages of almost all imported goods. These shortages not only include less essential consumer goods such as coffee and chinaware, but also essentials such as spare parts for machinery and vehicles, tyres and industrial raw materials for many of the new light industries set up in recent years. It was the realisation that in six months' time the situation will be even worse that led to the decision to hold the elections ahead of time on October 27, instead of in May next year.

4. Before attempting to foretell how the Democrat Party will deal with its problems, it is necessary to describe briefly the present economic and financial situation.

5. On the positive side the Democrat Party can point to a considerable number of achievements since it came into power in 1950. The country as a whole has made great strides in production and in supplying herself with the basic equipment to ensure an even more rapid progress. A vast programme of new roads is making spectacular head-way, opening up districts hitherto isolated, and speeding up communications. New ports are being built. Electric power production has doubled in the past seven years, and is running this year at about 15 per cent. over 1956. Many new cement works have been built, and cement production is almost sufficient for the country's needs. Capacity is now 1,700,000 tons against 395,000 tons in 1950. Sugar production has increased enormously, making Turkey not only self-supporting, but even giving a surplus for export. The iron and steel industry has expanded and total steel production is now about 220,000 tons per annum as against 90,000 tons in 1951. There has been a steep rise in the production of lignite from 918,000 tons in 1951 to over 3,000,000 tons in 1956. Textile production has increased enormously and is now almost sufficient for Turkey's present needs, though production of woollen textiles is hampered by lack of exchange for wool imports.

6. Agricultural production has also expanded greatly, thanks to increased use of tractors and farm machinery. Cereals production was 11·8 million tons in 1956 against an average of just over 7 million tons annually 1946–50. Cotton is another

important crop which has increased greatly and tobacco production is also up. The Government have undoubtedly helped the peasants greatly by giving higher prices for their products and by exempting them from many taxes.

7. Despite the steadily rising cost of living it cannot be denied that the average Turk, both townsman and peasant, enjoys a higher standard of living than in 1950 before the Democrat Party came into power.

8. The positive advantages which M. Menderes's Government have brought to the country have, however, been offset by the difficulties created from trying to go too fast. Much of the progress achieved has been won by mortgaging Turkey's future. The national budget has more than doubled in the past five years, although the Government pride themselves on the fact that over 30 per cent. of the budget is devoted to investment. Much of this investment is ill-directed, and a large part relates to imports for which Turkey cannot in fact produce the necessary foreign exchange. The creation of extra money by increasing the note issue and by a disproportionately large expansion of credit has led to a constantly rising spiral of inflation. The note issue rose from £T.1,240 millions in January 1953 to £T.2,455 millions in January 1957. It has since risen over 37 per cent. to £T.3,323 millions at the end of October. The Turkish lira is steadily losing its value and is quoted on the black market at more than 5 times the official rate of exchange. The price of gold reflects the fall of the lira, gold now (November 14) being quoted at 153 liras for the gold coin (Reşad) as against 117 liras in January 1956 and 55 liras in January 1954.

9. Meanwhile Turkey's capacity to pay for her imports has been steadily decreasing. On the one hand the enormous demand for imports, principally for large capital projects, has exhausted available exchange; and on the other hand rising demand in the country has decreased the amount available for exports. At one time Turkey entertained the notion that she was going to become a great wheat exporting country. This was because in 1953 an exceptional combination of good weather conditions led to a bumper harvest, which could not be stored and consumed locally. This may only occur once every ten years or so. On balance Turkey is still a net importer of wheat. Moreover, internal consumption of wheat is growing rapidly. Cotton is an interesting illustration of the way local consumption is destroying export possibilities. In 1953 cotton exports totalled 101,000 tons, whereas in 1956 they were only 55–60,000 tons. This year Turkey will be lucky if she can find 30,000 tons for export. The same is true of many other of the staple export products such as oil-seeds and even tobacco, where increased local demand is reducing the amount available for export.

10. So far the Turkish Government have concentrated their efforts on the internal market and done little to increase production specifically for export. This is true not only of agricultural commodities but also of minerals. In chrome and copper Turkey has products which are in constant demand in world markets. Nevertheless little money has been spent on expanding production of her mineral wealth, and at present, owing to lack of mining equipment, and of transport to carry products from the mines to the ports of export, mineral production is more or less stationary.

11. Turkish exports have progressively declined since 1954. Repayment of foreign debts and obligations takes up about one quarter of her export earnings. The high Turkish prices, caused by internal inflation, have played havoc with her foreign trade. Normal trade with Turkey is increasingly difficult, and it can be said that to-day the major part of Turkish trade is conducted on the basis of "special deals." This involves either selling goods on a compensation basis through bilateral arrangements, the high Turkish prices being compensated by higher prices for the imports; or through arrangements whereby part of the export earnings are utilised to pay off commercial arrears. In these latter arrangements the high Turkish prices are compensated by a premium represented by a sacrifice which the creditor makes in order to receive his debt earlier. In the case of the United Kingdom, debts four or five years old are now being settled by means of these "special deals" at up to 40 per cent. discount. A certain number of specialised Turkish products, such as mohair, are sold through the *déblocage* system at rates equivalent to nearly twice the official rate.

12. The foregoing describes the present position of Turkey, with a heavy burden of foreign debts, internal inflation, and decreasing export availabilities. Owing to unfavourable weather conditions export prospects this season are considerably worse

than last year. Looking to the immediate future it is quite clear that the coming six months can only lead to a further serious deterioration in Turkey's balance of payments position. There is little likelihood of further credit from her Western trading partners. From the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain countries a certain amount of credit may be possible, but this is limited. Turkey is quite capable of accepting credit from the Communist countries, but is unlikely to give anything in return. The only possibility of major economic aid is from the United States. This aid during the past seven years has been on a bountiful scale, but it has been insufficient to close the gap between demand and supply of imported goods and materials. United States economic aid, including the Defense Support Program, is running at about U.S.$100 millions annually.

13. Naturally one of the questions asked is whether Turkey will seek to improve her position by devaluation. In the absence of any Government statement of policy it is impossible to say whether they will devalue. There are many rumours to the effect that devaluation is contemplated two or three months after the new Government have been in office, and have settled down. However, devaluation seems unlikely for several reasons. In the first place export prospects are so limited that devaluation by itself would not immediately lead to any greater volume of exports. Secondly, devaluation would be useless and would merely lead to another upsurge of inflation if it could not be accompanied by fairly massive imports of goods in scarce supply, which could help to keep down prices. Devaluation now would merely mean that there would be a further rush to buy, and increased shortages all round. In my view the present Government is unlikely to take this step, unless it was assured of very considerable financial support from the United States and from the International Bank.

14. Help from either of these two sources is unlikely unless they can be fully satisfied that M. Menderes seriously intends to take measures to put his house in order. These measures would necessarily include restriction of credit, an extensive cutting down of the investment programme and the abandonment of the deficit financing of State controlled economic enterprises. In some quarters the view is held that the Government may go a little more slowly, because they are aware of the discontent in the country and they may feel that with a larger Opposition in Parliament they will have to listen to the views of the other side. I am, however, rather inclined to doubt whether M. Menderes himself will be much moved by these considerations. Opposition is inclined to have the result of making him more obstinate than ever. During the election campaign the Government Party took the line that criticism of the programme of economic development was disloyalty to the country. I am afraid that there is little sign at present that the Government will appreciably slow down their headlong rush. In his speech after taking the oath as President on November 1, M. Celal Bayer said that the Government would continue its "vital tasks such as the continuation of its economic development, while keeping its impetus on the one hand . . . ." M. Menderes is too deeply committed to carrying out the role of the builder of the new modern Turkey. His natural inclination is to accelerate the rate of progress.

15. If this is so, and if there is no sign of slowing down, then I can only foresee a very bleak situation arising before next summer. There is no possibility at all of Turkey meeting all her foreign obligations in the next six months. In the past three or four months Turkey has been defaulting on major capital projects under construction. She has had to beg the I.C.A. and the foreign oil companies to give credit to finance basic P.O.L. imports until the end of this year. In 1958 and the next few years her payments on account of capital contracts will increase. The mounting total of her debts and obligations does not appear to have stopped M. Menderes and his colleagues from contemplating even more extravagant and ambitious projects such as a Bosporus Bridge. Although no definite contract has been signed, it seems that if any foreign firm were rash enough to extend credit for it the Turks would only too happily be ready to start on this project right away. Turks are hopeful that besides their NATO friends and allies, whom they expect to stand by them, help will come in the form of some miracle such as the discovery of oil in Turkey in substantial quantities. There is so far no cause to be over hopeful of major oil finds. If rich deposits were to be found the immediate effect would naturally be to raise Turkey's chances of getting credit, but I believe that another result would be to whet Turkey's appetite, by expectation of huge wealth, and lead to an even greater spending spree.

16. It may be possible to give a more balanced estimate of Turkey's economic prospects when the names of the new Ministers have been announced and when M. Menderes formally announces his new Government's programme to the Grand National Assembly. Even if, surprisingly, M. Menderes were to apply the brakes, and to show resolution in setting his house in order by serious measures of control and self-discipline, there is no doubt that Turkey is in for an extremely difficult and penurious period. As far as the United Kingdom is concerned I can only foresee that we will meet with even greater difficulty than before in obtaining payment of the commercial debts due to us. I do not exclude the possibility of a state being reached, by next summer, when Turkey will be forced to ask for consolidation of her foreign debts, with a virtual stoppage of payments.

17. I am copying this letter to the Commercial Relations and Exports Department, Board of Trade, Her Majesty's Treasury and Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

M 613/641 No. 27

THE TURKISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE PROPOSALS

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 3)

(No. 211 E. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir, *November 29, 1957.*

It was with great interest that on my return to Ankara I read Sir Roger Allen's despatch No. 202 E. of the 7th of October regarding the Greek attitude towards Her Majesty's Government's proposals for the establishment of an industrial Free Trade Area in Europe. It it still difficult to speak with any certainty of the Turkish Government's attitude towards the proposals as it seems unlikely that they have yet received proper consideration by Turkish Ministers. At the meeting in Paris on the 15th of October (and again last week) Turkey was represented by an official who had just taken over responsibility for this matter in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Turkish Ministers were completely taken up with the preparations for the general election which took place on the 27th of October and since then they have been involved in the jockeying within the Democrat Party preceding the formation of M. Menderes' fifth Cabinet which has only just been presented to the Grand National Assembly.

2. No pronouncement of government policy has yet been made but I consider it doubtful whether the Turkish attitude towards the F.T.A. proposals will even be mentioned. As far as I am aware, there has so far only been one article on the F.T.A. proposals in the Turkish Press and although my Information Officer has tried to stimulate interest in them he has not so far evoked any practical response. Nevertheless business men have naturally shown a certain interest in the proposals and the Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry has submitted to the Government a statement of its views on the subject.

3. The immediate, if superficial, inclination of most Turkish business men and officials is to regard the F.T.A. as " liberalisation " in another guise and in their view it is " liberalisation " forced upon an unready Turkey by O.E.E.C., which is responsible for many of the country's present economic ills. As they see it, if Turkey were to join the F.T.A. without any protective privileges, the country would be flooded with the manufactured goods of Western Europe, Turkey's exports would receive no corresponding stimulus and it would be 1952 all over again. Indeed, it would be worse because the light industries which have been established here in recent years and which have considerable prestige value would be swamped and die.

4. Turkey's present financial difficulties (which all good Turks maintain are transient) are such that this country cannot pay for unrestricted imports. Therefore the F.T.A. will only begin to make sense to the Turks if it enables them to increase their exports. And here is the second big difficulty. 87 per cent. of Turkey's exports are agricultural (although it should not prove difficult to increase exports of minerals if this problem were tackled the right way) and if agricultural products are excluded from the F.T.A. proposals the whole scheme becomes so one-sided from the Turkish point of view as to be impossibly dangerous.

5. The foregoing are arguments of Turkey's self-interest which is natural enough. To this natural self-interest however is added the conviction, manifestations of which I have reported to you on numerous occasions in the past, that for political and strategic reasons the Western world owes Turkey a living. It will therefore have been no surprise when at the meeting in Paris on the 15th of October the Turkish Representative asked not only that agricultural products should be included and that a period of 10–25 years protection should be granted to Turkey, but also that an investment fund should be established in the context of the F.T.A. to help the less-developed member countries. The need for economic help to the under-developed countries of South-Eastern Europe (Southern Italy, Greece and Turkey) has of course long been a hobby-horse of Turkish Representatives in the O.E.E.C. and the Council of Europe and there is no doubt

that the average articulate Turk does consider that there is a moral obligation on the richer Western Powers (which include the United States) to help Turkey over her present difficult time even if not on a permanent basis.

6. For political reasons Turkey does not want to be left out of the F.T.A.—she is always keen to show that she is as good a European as the next State (particularly when that State happens to be Greece) and there is always the chance that the scheme may be amended so that positive benefit to Turkey may ensue. She will not however join the F.T.A. if she thinks that by so doing she will do herself positive harm. She will therefore need to be assured that by joining the F.T.A. she will not be opening her frontiers to a flood of manufactured goods for which she cannot pay and which will kill the indigenous industries; that she will be enabled to increase her own exports (and it is difficult to see how this can be done without some capital outlay); and that the other member countries have Turkey's interests (and not only their own) at heart. If it is not possible to find some assurances to give Turkey on these scores I fear that the negotiators will be faced with a Turkish colleague who cannot say " yes " but who will not say " no " and who will draw out the negotiations either by being without instructions or by putting forward impossible counter-proposals designed to protect Turkey's interests.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Athens, to the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation, the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, C.R.E.D., Her Majesty's Treasury and to the E.C.G.D.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RK 1015/44C No. 28

M. MENDERES' FIFTH CABINET

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 3)

(No. 212. Confidential) *Ankara,*
Sir. *November 29, 1957.*

With reference to my telegrams No. 1090 and No. 1093, I have the honour to submit some further observations on the composition of M. Menderes' Fifth Cabinet.

2. As I indicated in my telegram No. 1093, the composition of the new Cabinet in itself gives no reason to expect any basic change in the Prime Minister's domestic, economic or foreign policies. One Minister of State (M. Kalafat) and the Ministers of National Defence, Interior, Finance, Public Works, Economy and Commerce, Customs and Monopolies, and Industries remain in the appointments they held at the dissolution of the Fourth Cabinet. Moreover, the reshuffle of other members of the Fourth Cabinet has put known supporters and protégés of the Prime Minister in even stronger positions. M. Ileri, one of the most influential members of the Democrat Party, has been given the important post of Deputy Prime Minister; M. Yardimci has risen from a comparatively unimportant Ministry of State to be Minister of Education; the unpopular and servile M. Göktürk, who lost his seat in his home province in the General Elections, has been replaced at the Ministry of Justice by another nonentity, M. Budakoglu; and, finally, M. Fatin Ruştü Zorlu has at last been confirmed in the appointment of Minister for Foreign Affairs after being in the background as M. Menderes' principal and only Ministerial adviser on foreign policy for some years.

3. As regards the newcomers to the Cabinet, M. Yircali (Minister of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism) is a well-known crony of the Prime Minister and M. Erkmen (Minister of Labour) has the reputation of being a good and faithful servant in the Prime Minister's cause. M. Kurbanoglu (Minister of State) is said to be a political nonentity and although M. Kirdar (Minister of Health) and M. Berk (Minister of Construction) are unknown quantities, the latter has worked closely with M. Menderes in the past over the extensive town planning operations in Istanbul and Ankara and the former is old and unlikely to take an independent line. General Uçaner, the former Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish air force and now Minister of Communications is a solid, rather than a dynamic, character and it is alleged that he was introduced into the Cabinet in fulfilment of a promise by M. Menderes of some substantial reward to compensate him for his early retirement from the armed forces. From the British point of view it seems a pity that he was brought in to the exclusion of the previous Minister of Communications, M. Demirer, who was decidedly friendly to us and who was to a great extent responsible for pushing through the Participation Agreement between the British Overseas Airways Corporation and Turkish Airlines in July this year. Apparently, however, M. Menderes had developed an acute personal dislike for M. Demirer and was determined to exclude him from his new Cabinet.

4. The only possible dissident among the newcomers is M. Nedim Ökmen, the Minister of Agriculture. M. Ökmen was Minister of Agriculture in the Third Menderes Cabinet and Minister of Finance in the Fourth Cabinet until his resignation in August 1956. At the time he was said to be the only possible successor in the Democrat Party to M. Menderes as Prime Minister, but in the event he sank into into temporary obscurity after his resignation. His appointment probably represents M. Menderes' sole concession to the more moderate elements within the party, but M. Ökmen does not appear to be a sufficiently powerful character to offer any serious opposition to the Prime Minister. He is more likely to give up the struggle and resign rather than fight out a point of principle to the bitter end.

5. As regards the two new Ministries, the creation of a Ministry of Construction is clearly designed exclusively to facilitate the execution of the extensive town planning operations now in progress in Istanbul and Ankara and scheduled to begin shortly in other large towns, such as Izmir, Bursa and Adana.

So far the actual work has been the responsibility of the municipalities concerned, although the Prime Minister has spent an inordinate amount of time in personal supervision of the plans and of the work itself. M. Berk has, however, been associated with M. Menderes in this operation for some months and the existence of the new Ministry headed by him will facilitate the Prime Minister's self-appointed task of carrying through the town planning operations in which he takes so much personal interest.

6. The creation of the new Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism is an indication of the Government's increased interest in the value of propaganda and no doubt arose partly from the widespread complaints from the Democrat Party itself that their indifferent propaganda machine cost them many votes and seats during the elections. The existence of the new Ministry will also provide the Prime Minister with better and more extensive machinery for restricting the activities of the Opposition Press. It is significant that two new restrictive decrees have already been published, one providing for an immediate assessment of the stocks of newsprint held throughout the country and its subsequent allocation and distribution to individual newspapers by the Government, and the other announcing that all advertisements will in future be channelled through the Official Advertisements Company (a thinly disguised governmental body) which will be responsible for the allocation of advertisements of all types to individual newspapers. Since all newspapers in Turkey are heavily dependent for their circulation both on the amount of newsprint received and on advertisements, these new powers assumed by the Government augur ill for the freedom of the Press in the future; and the Opposition newspapers in Istanbul and Ankara are already indulging in a storm of criticism of these measures.

7. The real point of interest, however, about the new Cabinet is not so much its composition as the time taken in its formation. Even after the serious Cabinet crisis of November 1955 M. Menderes was able to produce his new Cabinet only eleven days later. This time it has taken him all but a month from the General Elections and 25 days from the dissolution of his previous Cabinet. There is no doubt that he ran into heavy opposition from dissident factions within his own party and even possibly from the President himself. It is believed that the main opposition was to the inclusion of M. Zorlu, who is not only highly unpopular among the rank and file of the Democrat Party but also with President Bayar; and it is even said that the President was holding out against M. Zorlu's appointment until the afternoon of the 25th of November. It appears from the final composition of the Cabinet that M. Menderes has for the moment won the battle but it must have cost him heavily in prestige within his own party and throughout the country. He can ill afford such a loss of prestige at a moment when the Opposition is stronger in the Grand National Assembly than it has ever been before and is evidently determined to use all the means within its power to disturb the solidarity of the Democrat Party and unseat the Prime Minister. There is every likelihood of a bitter parliamentary struggle ahead and M. Menderes is in the awkward position that if he makes concessions to the more moderate elements within the Democrat Party they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness while if he adopts an even more dictatorial and authoritarian policy towards his own party and continues relentlessly to harass and repress the Opposition, he will run the danger of alienating the parliamentary rank and file of the Democrat Party to a dangerous extent. With an Opposition of over 180 in the National Assembly he can ill afford to risk further defections from his own party (cf. paragraph 12 of Mr. Stewart's despatch No. 192 of the 1st of November).

8. It is unwise at this stage to forecast what line M. Menderes will take. There are, however, no signs that the People's Republican Party are considering any form of reconciliation with the Government and it is likely therefore that M. Menderes will continue with the high-handed methods which have increasingly been the feature of his Government. Where these will lead him I cannot say. M. Menderes no doubt has instinctive dictatorial tendencies, but he was forced two years ago, to make concessions to the moderate elements in his own party and it may not be long before he has again to face similar pressure. If he does, I should judge that he will give way, at any rate for the time being; but for the reasons given above, the extent to which he can go will be a matter for delicate calculation.

9. I am enclosing biographies of the new Ministers who do not appear in my report on Leading Personalities in Turkey for 1956.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens, Washington, Baghdad and Tehran, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi, the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, the Head of the United Kingdom Delegation to the North Atlantic Council at Paris and to the Acting Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

Enclosure

Berk, Medeni

Born in Aksaray in 1913. A graduate of the Economics Faculty of Istanbul University. Has served in the Department of Monopolies and was for some time a Branch Manager in the Agricultural Bank. In 1950 he joined the General Directorate of Agricultural Co-operatives and from 1951 until 1957 was Director-General of the Real Estate and Credit Bank.

Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Nigde in the October 1957 elections when he was the only Democrat out of the seven Deputies returned for that province. Appointed Minister of Construction (a new Ministry created to deal with the extensive town planning operations) in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Berk has a reputation for honesty and industry. He is said to be a close friend of the Prime Minister and to have worked with him during the early part of 1957 on the various town planning schemes. He is married and speaks French.

Kurbanoglu, Muzaffer

Born in 1913 in Manisa. A lawyer by profession. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Manisa in 1950 and re-elected in 1954 and 1957. Appointed a Minister of State in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

Before his appointment to the Cabinet M. Kurbanoglu was an inconspicuous back bencher in the Democrat Party; and is alleged to be a devoted follower of M. Menderes and a personal friend of the other Minister of State, M. Kalafat (*q.v.*). He is married and speaks French.

Kirdar, Lütfi

Born in 1888 at Kirkuk, he studied medicine in Germany and subsequently joined the Government Medical Service. Elected P.R.P. Deputy for Kutahya in 1935 but resigned his seat for financial reasons in 1936 and became Vali of Manisa. Appointed Vali of Istanbul in 1938 where he remained until replaced by Professor Gökay (*q.v.*) in 1949. He visited the United Kingdom in 1947.

In September 1949 he was appointed Turkish Minister at Stockholm, but the appointment was cancelled and he was elected P.R.P. Deputy for Manisa in October of the same year. Lost his seat in the general elections of 1950 but subsequently joined the Democrat Party and was elected on the D.P. list for Istanbul in 1954. Re-elected in October 1957 and appointed Minister of Health in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

As Vali of Istanbul Dr. Kirdar gained a reputation for honesty and for being an earnest moderniser. He has, however, been politically in obscurity since 1950.

He is married to a Circassian wife of an influential family.

RK 1015/46

No. 29

THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAMME AND ITS RECEPTION BY THE GRAND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 10)

(No. 215. Confidential) *Ankara, December 6, 1957.*

Sir,

With reference to my telegram No. 1123(1) I have the honour to send you a full summary(1) of the Turkish Prime Minister's speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 4th of December and to offer some comments on the new Government's programme and on the debate which followed its announcement by the Prime Minister.

2. As regards economic and financial policy, it will be seen that there is little new in the programme and that no significant changes in M. Menderes's policies in these fields may be expected. The only modifications of previous programmes are contained in the vague suggestions of curbing the rate of new investments; and in the more conservative budget increase. There are also signs that the Government intend to exercise even more rigid control over prices through the unrealistic National Safeguards Law and that half-hearted measures may be adopted to restrict bank credits.

3. The references to defending and increasing the value of the currency are signs that M. Menderes has no intention of adopting any measures of devaluation; and there is in fact no guarantee that even the more cautious elements in the programme will be adhered to. From the economic and financial point of view the programme has a striking resemblance to the programme of the Fourth Menderes Cabinet (*cf.* my despatch No. 246 of the 20th of December, 1955) and in the event M. Menderes continued headlong with his reckless economic policy.

4. My Commercial Counsellor will meanwhile be considering the more detailed implications of the economic and financial aspects of the new programme for a further report.

5. As regards foreign policy, there are again no significant changes. M. Menderes made the now familiar critical reference to neutralism and praised the United Nations, NATO and the Baghdad Pact in well-known and reassuring terms. His remarks on the Middle East were firm but unprovocative and it is interesting that he paid a public tribute to King Saud. No mention was made of Turco-Egyptian relations. The Prime Minister's remarks about Turco-Soviet relations were as usual firm and uncompromising.

6. The reference to partition as being Turkey's final concession over Cyprus has now become familiar; and it was significant that the Prime Minister's reiteration of this principle was greeted by prolonged applause from all sides of the National Assembly, whereas the remainder of the statement on foreign policy was, as usual, received in silence.

7. The Prime Minister's opening remarks about the measures which would have to be taken to restore internal tranquillity in the country have a sinister ring and probably augur further repressive legislation against the Press and the Opposition political parties. It is significant in this context that the police have already raided People's Republican Party local organisations in Istanbul and have seized certain papers; that the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group has decided to set up a Parliamentary investigation into the conduct of the Opposition during the election campaign; and that the Governor of Ankara spoke openly to me in private conversation recently of Communist penetration of the People's Republican Party and even mentioned a Deputy by name as being a known and active Communist. The Prime Minister has not yet shown his hand in regard to the measures he intends to take, but it is more than likely that they will be harsh and will further embitter inter-party relations.

8. The debate that followed the Prime Minister's announcement of the new programme provided a striking illustration of the present state of relations between the parties. The Opposition began by asking in moderate terms for an adjournment for two days to give them time to study the programme which they had only received the

(1) Not printed.

same day. This request was offensively refused by the Acting Chairman of the Assembly; the Opposition reacted strongly and the first of many fights broke out. As a result of this preliminary skirmish one Opposition Deputy was expelled from the Assembly for the remainder of the session.

9. M. Ismet Inönü then spoke on behalf of the People's Republican Party. After dwelling very briefly on the new programme he proceeded to read out for the next two hours an immensely long and detailed catalogue of irregularities alleged to have been committed by the Democrat Party during the electoral period. His speech was punctuated by uproar from both sides of the Assembly and he ignored frequent attempts by the Acting Chairman to force him to stick to the point. As his speech continued the Assembly degenerated into total confusion; and at one stage two Cabinet Ministers emerged from the Cabinet benches in hysterical rage and almost attempted a physical attack on M. Inönü. In spite of the many interruptions he continued imperturbably to the end of his long catalogue, and it was interesting that at one point a number of Democrat Party Deputies voted with the Opposition against a proposed resolution by the Acting Chairman designed to prevent M. Inönü from continuing his speech.

10. After a brief and statesmanlike speech by M. Fethi Celikbaş (the leader of the Freedom Party) during which he criticised the Government programme constructively and in moderate terms and commanded full attention from all sides of the Assembly, the situation again deteriorated. M. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu defended himself ineptly against charges of misuse of the State Radio during the electoral period and received a very rough handling from the Opposition. By this time everyone had forgotten about the Government programme and the speeches had degenerated into attack and counter-attack on the subject of the elections.

11. The most violent incident occurred when Dr. Turhan Feyzioglu (P.R.P. Ankara) ended a long, discursive and highly emotional speech by warning the Democrat Party against restricting the independence of the judiciary, the freedom of the Press and of Government officials, with reference to the fact that Communist administrations invariably adopted such restrictive practices. This reference to Communism aroused the Democrat Party ranks to uncontrollable fury; chairs were thrown, the rostrum was almost stormed and Dr. Feyzioğlu was for some seconds in a certain amount of physical danger.

12. When the uproar had more or less subsided the Minister of the Interior made a long and blustering speech accusing the Opposition in detail of creating incidents all over the country. Most of his speech was, however, inaudible as it was regularly punctuated by minor fights and disturbances on the floor of the Assembly.

13. Eventually, after the so-called debate had continued with hardly a reference to the Government programme for nearly eight hours, the Acting Chairman decided that a halt must be called. There were still over twenty speakers on the order paper, but he said with some justice that nobody was discussing the point at issue and that the debate could go on for days in this atmosphere. He called for a show of hands to close the debate; received a majority and the vote of confidence in the Government programme was taken and carried by 403 votes against 133. The Prime Minister then reappeared in the Assembly for the first time since he had announced the programme, made a brief speech of thanks for the vote of confidence and the Assembly adjourned.

14. This lamentable scene is a bad augury for the future of Parliamentary government in Turkey. Everyone had expected something of the kind to happen but the Governor of Ankara, who attended the debate in the diplomatic box with a member of my staff, said that the violence of the scenes and the bitter hostility on both sides were unprecedented in his experience of the Grand National Assembly since its foundation.

15. There were undoubtedly faults on both sides, although the initial provocation came from M. Inönü. The object of the Opposition was clearly to infuriate the Government and to obtain maximum publicity for their campaign about irregularities during the elections; and there is no doubt that they succeeded. Their attitude remained boisterous and mischievous, but seldom angry, throughout, whereas a large proportion of the Democrat Party Deputies including certain Cabinet Ministers were often in a state of uncontrollable fury.

16. This is unquestionably a bad beginning to the new legislative term. The Democrat Party Parliamentary Group had a prolonged meeting on the 5th of December to consider the situation and it is more than likely that, among other measures, legislation will be proposed to restrict the time of Assembly debates and the freedom of speakers to stray from the point. Certainly the substantive question (of the Government's programme) was on this occasion completely swamped in the waves of invective and counter-invective.

17. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Athens, Washington, Baghdad and Tehran, to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at Paris and New York, to the United Kingdom High Commissioner at Karachi and to the Governor of Cyprus.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

RGC 10344/154 No. 30

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON DECEMBER 6, 1957

Mr. Selwyn Lloyd to Sir James Bowker (Ankara)

(No. 254. Secret) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *December 12, 1957.*

I invited the Turkish Ambassador to call on me on the 6th of December to carry a stage further the discussions on Cyprus which he had had with the Permanent Under-Secretary on the 21st of November, and which your Excellency had with the Turkish Prime Minister on the 27th of November.

2. His Excellency said that he had no instructions from his Government to make any particular point. Speaking personally, he said that the enquiry made by Sir Frederick Hoyer Millar and yourself about the Turkish reaction to the idea of a solution based on guaranteed independence prompted the enquiry whether Her Majesty's Government were now more inclined themselves towards such a solution. I said that I wished to make it quite clear that our enquiries on this point were purely exploratory. Our stand was still on the December 19 statement. The reason for our exploratory enquiry was that both M. Spaak and the Americans had been discussing the idea of an alternative solution short of partition. It must not be inferred that Her Majesty's Government supported such an idea. The reason for discussing it with the Turks was in order to consider with them how best we should deal with the suggestion. The plan which emerged from various discussions contained the following elements:—

(*a*) extra-territorial British bases;
(*b*) either a NATO base operated by Turkey or an extra-territorial Turkish base;
(*c*) a Statute governing the internal Constitution of Cyprus which would be subject to international guarantees in the form of a treaty providing for minority rights under the supervision of a resident High Commissioner responsible to the treaty Powers;
(*d*) an external Statute, also under the supervision of the High Commissioner, settling the foreign and defence policy of Cyprus and perhaps making some provision for internal security with the object of preventing a Communist régime;
(*e*) subject to the foregoing provisions, independence for the rest of the Island.

3. In reply to a question from M. Birgi, I said that I thought that M. Spaak had discussed this idea with the Greek Foreign Minister. In our own discussions with M. Spaak we had deliberately kept free of commitments, but had encouraged him to explore the ground further.

4. M. Birgi pointed out that the one common element in M. Spaak's idea and in the Turkish Government's own position was that there should be a British extra-territorial base. This, in his view, should encourage Her Majesty's Government not to give up the idea of partition. He thought that the sort of plan which M. Spaak had been advocating might look fine on paper, but was so elaborate that it would never work. It would be better to look for a simpler solution which could have a practical result.

5. I said that the new element in M. Spaak's approach was the suggestion for Turkish troops on the Island. M. Birgi said that to think that the Turkish Government could be satisfied by a Turkish base on the Island implied that they wished to take it over. What the Turkish Government wanted, on the contrary, was an arrangement in conformity with the geographical position. It was not merely a question of flag-flying. They did not want a scheme which would increase the difficulties in Cyprus. He hoped that at the NATO meeting the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister would have the opportunity to make their position clear to M. Spaak.

6. I said that while his Excellency had pointed out the objections to M. Spaak's ideas, we for our part also saw great complications and difficulties in the way of partition. Another idea which had been put forward was shared

sovereignty. We had thought this over and saw difficulties over the appointment and responsibilities of a Governor. M. Birgi replied that shared sovereignty was a parody of partition which had all the complications and no additional advantages. It was the sort of thing which was said to children who were quarrelling over a toy. The practical question always was who was to have the toy.

7. M. Birgi said that the Labour Party's declaration of the 27th of November had upset the Turkish Government both because of its timing immediately before the Debate in the United Nations and because of its emphasis on the majority. He said that he had been trying to explain to individual leaders of the Labour Party that if they carried out their present intentions when they came to power they would impair good relations between the United Kingdom and Turkey. He had told them that he was not asking for any promises from them but was solely concerned with making the Turkish case plain to them so that there could be no misconceptions in the future. I encouraged M. Birgi to persevere with these attempts.

8. In conclusion the Ambassador asked if there was any change in Her Majesty's Government's attitude to the return of Makarios to Cyprus. I told him that our position remained unchanged for the present.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington and Athens, to the Heads of the United Kingdom Delegations at New York and Paris, to the Political Representative with the Middle East Forces, and to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.
SELWYN LLOYD.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

RK 1012/2

No. 31

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN TURKEY

Sir James Bowker to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (*Received December 16*)

(No. 219. Confidential) *Ankara.*
Sir, *December 13, 1957.*

I have the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 175 of the 17th of September, 1956, to send you herewith my report for 1957 on the leading personalities in Turkey.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOWKER.

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(Compiled in November-December 1957)

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Obituary

Hüseyin Cahit Yalçin

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1. Açikalin, Cevat

Born in 1898, he was educated at Galatasaray and studied law in Geneva. After graduating in 1921, he joined the Turkish Foreign Service and served in Warsaw, Kabul, Prague, Tehran and Moscow; he attended the negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne and the Montreux Conference.

In 1938 he was Turkish High Commissioner in the Hatay before it was incorporated in Turkey, and in 1939 he was appointed deputy Secretary-General of the Ministry. In 1939 he accompanied the Foreign Minister to Moscow, and later that year and in 1940 he had contacts with the Allied Commanders-in-Chief both in Ankara and at Aleppo and Haifa.

In July 1942 he was appointed Ambassador in Moscow, and in July 1943 Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Ambassador in London in October 1945, and in January 1952 he became once again Secretary-General of the Ministry. After a period of indifferent health during which he appeared to leave the bulk of the work to his deputy, M. Birgi (*q.v.*), who succeeded him at the Ministry, M. Açikalin moved to Rome as Ambassador in October 1954.

M. Açikalin, who is deaf, speaks English and French well. His wife, a sister of the former wife of Atatürk, does not appear in society. He has substantial private means.

2. Adivar, Madame Halide Edip

Born in 1886 of Dönme parentage, and educated at the American Girls' College in Istanbul. She was already well known in Turkish political life in the days of the C.U.P., and at the beginning of the War of Independence she toured Anatolia addressing the troops. After an unsuccessful attempt to influence Atatürk she quarrelled with him and left Turkey in 1926. On her return, after several years of travel in Europe, she became Professor of English at Istanbul University and took no further part in political life until in 1950 she was elected Independent Deputy for Izmir with Democrat support. She has made some vigorous and independent speeches in the Assembly. Resigned her deputyship and retired from politics in 1954.

She is well known as a writer of novels, some of which have been written in English, and she is still a very important figure in the intellectual world in Turkey. She has an acute brain but is usually swayed by her emotions. She is well disposed to the British but even more so to the Americans. She speaks English and French very well. Her husband, Adnan, died suddenly in July 1955.

3. Ağaoğlu, Samet

Born in 1909 of a family of Azerbaijani Turks, a brother of Madame Süreyya Ağaoğlu (*q.v.*), and son of the late M. Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was one of the founders of the Free Party in the late '20s.

M. Ağaoğlu's career began at the Ministry of Commerce where he held several appointments at departmental level. He left the Ministry to join the Democrat Party and by 1949 was a member of the Party's Administrative Council. Elected a Deputy for Manisa in 1950, he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State the same year. His conduct in office quickly lost him popularity and he resigned from these posts to become Minister of Labour. He again fell foul of public opinion and resigned from the Cabinet. He continued to be active in party politics and the Prime Minister eventually found it safer to have him in the Cabinet rather than out of it. In December 1954 he was re-admitted as Minister of State Industries and has remained in this appointment ever since.

M. Ağaoğlu is erratic and quarrelsome and has his critics in the Democrat Party. He has, however, gained a reputation for honesty and hard work in his present appointment and he is undoubtedly one of the strongest personalities in the Party. He appears now to be fully in the confidence of the Prime Minister.

He is married with three children, one of whom was at Oxford. He speaks some French and a little English. His wife speaks passable English.

4. Ağaoğlu, Madame Süreyya

Born in 1905 in Azerbaijan, she is the sister of M. Ağaoğlu (*q.v.*). She arrived in Turkey in 1920 obtaining Turkish nationality about 1921. Became the pioneer practising woman lawyer in Turkey and built up a lucrative practice including commercial interests with an office in London. She was very pleased with her reception and the help she received in England in late 1947.

She was at one time secretary of a Liberal Association in Istanbul but she often adopts violently Nationalistic views. Although strongly anti-Russian she married in 1952 a German lawyer, much younger than herself, named Werner Taschenbrecher, who had been dismissed from the West Berlin Legal Service in June 1951 owing to his Communist connections.

In July 1954 she presided at a Congress of Women Jurists at Helsinki and in June 1955 attended the International Congress of Jurists at Athens, when she walked out in protest at an attempt by Greek lawyers to raise the Cyprus question.

She is a mischievous tale-bearer and must be treated with caution as she is alleged to work for the Turkish security police. Speaks English, French and Russian.

5. Akdur, Falk Zihni

Born about 1895. Between 1937 and 1939 he served as consul at Aleppo and consul-general at Beirut. He returned to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in July 1939 and became Director-General of the Third (General) Department. Appointed head of First Department in 1942. Minister at Sofia in January 1945 and ambassador at Moscow in 1946. In June 1949 he returned to the Ministry as Secretary-General. In August 1951 he was appointed ambassador to Madrid, and in September 1952 he was transferred to Rome, and to Berne in October 1954. Appointed ambassador at Cairo in July 1957.

M. Akdur is not very prepossessing in appearance and socially he is heavy though affable. Whilst he was Secretary-General he was friendly, helpful and quite communicative. He speaks good French but no English.

6. Aker, Abdullah

Born in 1905 at Yalova, a professional economist. He was at one time Head of the Inspectorate at the Ministry of Economy and Commerce. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Izmir in 1954, one of the founders of the Izmir Chamber of Commerce. Appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce to replace M. Mandalinci (*q.v.*) in November 1956. Visited Cairo in July 1957 as Head of a Turkish Delegation to the opening of the Cairo Fair at the invitation of the Egyptian Government. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and re-appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Aker has shown little ability or initiative so far as a Minister: and is generally accepted as being little more than a yes-man to the Prime Minister.

7. Aknöz, Nurettin, General

Before his retirement General Aknöz had risen rapidly in the Army. He became a Brigadier-General and Divisional Commander in 1945, was promoted Major-General in 1947, Lieutenant-General in 1951 and General in 1956. After serving as Head of the Ordnance and Supplies Departments in the Ministry of Defence he commanded the Second Corps in October 1952, and became Commander of the Third Army in August 1954. Appointed Martial Law Commander for Istanbul after the riots of September 6–7, 1955, and Commander Land Forces in June 1956.

To the general surprise he retired from the Army in September 1957 to stand as a Democrat Party candidate for Tekirdağ and was duly elected in the October, 1957, elections.

He was a strong and energetic officer who understood Turkish needs for modern equipment. Pleasant and friendly with both British and American officers. He speaks German and some French and understands a little English. He has an agreeable German-speaking wife.

8. Aksal, Ismail Rüştü

Born in 1911 in Pamukova and educated at the School of Political Sciences, he was appointed an assistant inspector in the Ministry of Finance in 1934 and in 1938 an inspector. In 1939 he went to France to study. In 1942 he was appointed Financial and Commercial Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in London. In 1945 he returned to Turkey and held various high posts in the Ministries of Finance and Commerce. In 1946 he was elected deputy for Kocaeli and became Minister of Finance on the formation of the Günaltay Cabinet in January 1949. He was defeated in the 1950 and 1954 elections, and after a period of obscurity has recently become more prominent in P.R.P. affairs. Re-elected a P.R.P. Deputy for Ankara in the 1957 elections.

He speaks good English and French, and was divorced in 1953 from a charming wife.

9. Aksalur, Izzet, General

Born in 1894 at Tosya, he was commissioned in 1914 and served in the Dardanelles, Palestine and on the Russian front. In the War of Independence he fought as a Captain; and in 1929, then a Lieutenant-Colonel, he went on a military mission to Afghanistan. By 1940 he was a Divisional Commander, and by 1944 a Corps Commander. In 1948 he was promoted General, and in 1949 Vice-Chief of the General Staff. Closely associated with the P.R.P., he was replaced in June 1950, but he managed to ingratiate himself with the Democrat Minister of Defence and became Secretary-General of the Supreme Council for National Defence. In September 1952 he was appointed ambassador in Tokyo and later in the year he was accredited also to the Chinese Nationalist Government in Formosa. In May 1955 he was appointed Ambassador to Tehran.

General Aksalur was considered to be one of the ablest of the Turkish Commanders in his day. He was prepared to accept new ideas and was very friendly to British officers. He speaks fair French and some German. His wife, who is much younger than he, speaks French and some English and is very friendly.

10. Akurgal, Ekrem

Born in 1911 at Istanbul and studied archaeology at the University of Berlin. He has been Professor of Archaeology at the University of Ankara since 1949 and is Secretary-General of the Turkish History Society, a member of the Institutes of Archaeology in Berlin and Vienna and an honorary member of the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies.

He has published a number of works on the archaeology of Turkey and has made many excavations in Anatolia particularly the excavation of the old town of Izmir in collaboration with the British Institute of Archaeology in Athens.

He speaks German, French and English.

11. Altincan, Sadik, Admiral

Born at Izmir in 1896. Graduating in 1918, he was in command of destroyers from 1934 to 1941 and of the Submarine Fleet from 1941 to 1944. He was promoted rear-admiral in 1946 and vice-admiral in 1947. He was until August 1949 Admiral Commanding the Naval Training at Heybeliadu, where he took active steps to inaugurate the new system of training officers and ratings on Royal Navy lines. Appointed Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Fleet, in July 1949. After the 1950 general elections he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces, a post corresponding to that of First Sea Lord. Promoted Admiral (junior) in 1951 and Admiral (senior) in August 1955, and also held the appointment of NATO Naval Area Commander (COMEDNOREAST).

Retired in September 1957, to stand as a Democrat Party candidate for Giresun where he was elected in the October 1957 general elections.

A submarine specialist who received his early training in Germany, Admiral Altincan was a progressive and efficient officer and the only Turkish Admiral who can compete with the army generals on equal terms at present. Speaks little English and fair German. A bachelor.

12. Alyot, Halim, Dr.

A Turk from Crete, born about 1900. Studied law at Istanbul University and in Paris. Appointed Director-General of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism in 1950, and visited the United Kingdom in 1953 as leader of a Turkish Press delegation. Visited the

United States in 1954 and has represented Turkey abroad at several international conferences.

He fell from favour with the Prime Minister in 1954 and was removed from the Democrat Party list of parliamentary candidates. He stood unsuccessfully as an Independent in the 1954 elections and lost his job at the Press bureau. He returned to favour in 1956 and in December was reappointed to his old post. In October 1957 he resigned, at the Prime Minister's wish, to stand as a Democrat Party candidate in the elections and was duly elected on the Democrat Party list for Çanakkale.

Dr. Alyot has written books on Press legislation and electoral methods and he took part in the drafting of the new Turkish Electoral Law of 1950. He is ambitious and rather pompous but afraid of responsibility and reluctant to take new initiatives. The Press department was not very efficiently run under him. He speaks French and Greek and, though sensitive, is friendly to us.

13. Ariburun, Tekin, Major-General

Born in Istanbul in 1903, he joined the Army in 1925 and transferred to the Air Force as a pilot in 1926. After long studies in Britain and Turkey, he was Assistant Air Attaché in Berlin from 1936 to 1938, and Air Attaché in Washington from 1941 to 1943 and 1946 to 1948. After appointments including Deputy Director of Operations and Training in the Turkish General Staff, and Divisional Commander at Eskişehir, he was appointed Chief of Staff, Turkish Air Force, in September 1954. In 1956 he fell foul of the Turkish General Staff as a result of his efforts to lobby for the separation of the Air Force from the General Staff structure, and was transferred to Izmir to open a new Training Command. After about a year in this appointment he was appointed Deputy Commandant of the War School at Istanbul.

General Ariburun is an intelligent and highly competent officer but it is likely that his forthright ideas will prove an obstacle to his further advancement. His wife, Madame Perihan Ariburun, is also extremely intelligent and an active feminist. She is a practising barrister and was elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Izmir in the October 1957 general elections.

Both the Ariburuns speak excellent English and both are extreme and highly sensitive nationalists. At times this high sense of nationalism appears to influence the General's judgment and it certainly has a marked effect on his wife's character. They have two children, a boy and a girl; the boy is unfortunately spastic.

14. Arnom, Refet, Vice-Admiral

Born about 1906, a regular naval officer. He has been Naval Attaché at Rome and was (in 1953) the first Turkish Naval Representative at Headquarters, Allied Forces, Mediterranean, in Malta. Appointed Commander of the Surface Action Group in 1954 and Director of Intelligence of the Turkish General Staff in 1955. Transferred as Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Navy, in 1956. Promoted rear-admiral in 1952 and vice-admiral in 1955.

He speaks English and Italian and is married to a charming wife who speaks a little Italian. He is able and enlightened and popular in the Navy. An admirer of the Royal Navy. He did much in his appointment as Director of Intelligence to ease the irksome restrictions to which Foreign Service Attachés were formerly subject.

15. Arzik, Şerif

Of Georgian descent he was born in Istanbul in about 1907 and was educated there at the Galatasaray Lycée. He served in Greece for several years as a member of the Mixed Committee dealing with the exchange of populations and in the mid-thirties joined the Anatolian Agency in which he rose to be principal editor. During the last war he was the agency's special correspondent in Budapest and after the occupation by the Red Army, was transferred to Athens in the same capacity. In 1948 he resigned from the agency and was appointed Head of the Foreign News and Monitoring Department of the Press Bureau. At the same time he began to make daily broadcasts as the editor of *Radio Journal*, a semi-official review of political events.

In this latter capacity, he established his reputation among the Democrat Party leaders as a political propagandist and in August 1953 he was appointed Head of the Anatolian Agency. He now enjoys the favour of the President and the Prime Minister, both of whom he has regularly accompanied on tours in Turkey and abroad, including the President's visit to the United Kingdom for the funeral of King George VI.

Stood (unsuccessfully) as a Democrat Party candidate for Hatay in the October 1957 elections and has now returned to the Agency.

Unreliable and erratic, he is intelligent and has a keen sense of journalism. Apparently friendly to us but an unattractive personality. He speaks French, Russian and understands English, German and Greek. He has an attractive and ambitious wife who speaks English, French and German, and is something of a *clairvoyante*.

16. Atay, Falih Rifki

Born in Istanbul in 1894, he was educated at Galatasaray and became a teacher. At the end of 1920 he joined Mustafa Kemal and wrote for the nationalist Press. He was Deputy for Bolu from 1923 to 1935 and for Ankara from 1935 to 1950. During this time he went on several missions abroad and attended a number of international conferences. He lost his seat in the Assembly in the general elections of 1950.

For many years he was chief leader-writer of *Ulus*, the official paper of the P.R.P. Government; and during the last war his articles showed that his sympathies lay with the Allies. As a close adviser of Atatürk and later of M. Inönü he was an important figure in Kemalist Turkey, up to the fall of the Peker Government in September 1947. Early in 1952 he founded the P.R.P. daily *Dünya*. One of Turkey's most talented writers and one of our most consistent supporters, he is still a powerful and popular opposition writer. Always a member of the Conservative wing of the P.R.P. he has attacked the Government over a long period, though at one time he changed his line to support them against religious reaction, apparently responded at the time of the 1954 elections to the attention of the Prime Minister, and acted with some caution in 1955 while under the threat of confiscation of his printing plant by the Treasury on the grounds that it was a P.R.P. property illegally acquired. He has since thrown caution to the winds and attacks the Government relentlessly. Atay is conceited and ambitious, a gambler and a speculator; he makes enemies, but is found of social life.

Formerly President of the Commission for the Reform of the Turkish Alphabet, he was a notable champion of the new script. He speaks French.

17. Athenagoras, H.A.H., I.

Born in 1886, a Turkish citizen of Epirus, he completed his studies at the Theological Faculty of Halki (Princes Islands) in 1909, and was appointed Archdeacon in Monastir, where he distinguished himself by his support of the Greek population. He

left Monastir for Athens in 1916 when the town was occupied by German and Bulgarian forces and was later elected Metropolitan of Corfu. He took part in several Christian congresses, including the Lambeth Conference, and in 1930 was appointed Archbishop of New York, where he worked for a reconciliation between all the Orthodox Churches in the United States.

Whilst he was in America he acquired United States citizenship, but later renounced it when in November 1948, to the satisfaction of the State Department and of the Turkish authorities, he was elected (Ecumenical) Patriarch.

Athenagoras is very active, impressive and a man of subtlety. He enjoys the full support of the Greek Government but has naturally met some local opposition in his attempts to reform the Greek Orthodox Church. He is popular with the Turks and on good terms with the Turkish Government. In the spring of 1952 he exchanged visits with the Prime Minister. His prestige was further enhanced by the courtesies shown to him by the King and Queen of the Hellenes during their visit to Turkey in June 1952. Strongly anti-Communist and well disposed to Britain and America, he has attempted to reduce the Muscovite influence in the Orthodox Patriarchates of the Middle East. He has so far refrained from taking sides in the Anglo-Greek dispute over Cyprus. Behaved with dignity and restraint after the riots of September 6–7, 1955, and the Turkish Government were quick to offer him moral amends. Has subsequently used all his influence to re-establish good relations with the Government and to re-create an atmosphere of security amongst his flock, although he has from time to time come under heavy fire in the Grand National Assembly from extremists in the Democrat Party on charges of anti-Turkish and pro-Greek political activity. He knows English, French, Turkish, Russian, Italian and German as well as Greek.

18. Aygün, Kemal

Born about 1910, he joined the Police Force and held several posts in the Istanbul Directorate of Police, including that of Head of the Fourth Section, which deals with foreigners. When the Democrats came to power in 1950 he was appointed Chief of Police in Istanbul, and in 1952 he was appointed Vali of Ankara and acting Director-General of Security in the Ministry of Interior. In May 1954 he became acting Mayor of Ankara as well as Vali, but no longer Director-General of Security. After the riots of September 6–7, 1955, he was reappointed Director-General of Security and relinquished the offices of Vali and Mayor. In September 1957 he was again appointed Vali of Ankara and relinquished the Directorate-General of Security.

M. Aygün is a nephew of M. Koraltan (*q.v.*) and a man of influence who is close to the Prime Minister. He is extremely intelligent, able and energetic. His main preoccupation is the improvement of the Turkish police force, and he looks to British police methods as an example. In March 1956 he visited the United Kingdom under British Council auspices mainly to study police methods.

Jovial and fond of wrestling, M. Aygün is a good friend of Britain. He understands some French and English but prefers to express himself in Turkish only.

19. Baban, Cihat

Born in Istanbul in 1911, he studied law and later took up journalism and edited *Tasvir* until the paper ceased publication in 1949.

Elected Independent Deputy for Istabul in 1946, he actively opposed the P.R.P. Government and in 1950 was elected Democrat Deputy for Izmir.

He has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, a delegate to the Assembly of the Council of Europe and Chairman of the Interparliamentary Union Conference in Istanbul in 1951. Re-elected a Deputy in 1954.

By 1956 his articles in his paper *Tercüman* were becoming increasingly anti-Government, and in November 1956 he resigned from the Democrat Party and joined the Freedom Party. He severed his connection with *Tercüman* and became editor of the new Freedom Party Ankara daily, *Yeni Gün*. This paper has already gained a reputation for inaccuracy and for a violently anti-Government trend. The front page is not infrequently filled almost entirely with *démentis*. M. Baban failed to be re-elected as a Freedom Party Deputy in 1957.

Proud of his Kurdish origin, M. Baban is good humoured and friendly to us, but rather unreliable. In September 1956 he visited the United Kingdom with a party of Turkish journalists and appeared most satisfied with his visit. He speaks French and German.

20. Babaoğlu, Şükrü

Born in Istanbul of Kurdish origin in 1893, he studied law in Istanbul and Paris, and became a journalist before the first world war. After the end of the first war he is said to have been associated with movements for Kurdish independence. Abandoning journalism, he became teacher, and later professor, of economics at Istanbul University.

He resumed journalism during the second world war in *Tasvir*, which belonged to his nephew Cihat Baban (*q.v.*). In 1946 he became leader-writer of *Yeni Sabah*. His main lines are economics and anti-colonialism.

In early 1957 he fell foul of the then Minister of Labour, M. Turhan (*q.v.*), over a series of seminars at the economic faculty of Istanbul University, which the Minister alleged were anti-Government and even subversive. He has however weathered the storm and the echoes of the affair have died down.

21. Barlas, Cemil Sait

Born in Istanbul in 1905, he studied law in Istanbul and Heidelberg. After practising law for some time he was elected P.R.P. Deputy for Gaziantep in 1947.

In June 1948 he was appointed Minister of Commerce, and in June 1949 Minister of State in charge of foreign aid. He acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absences of the Minister.

He lost his seat in the general elections of 1950, and returned to practise as a barrister. Owner-editor of the pro-P.R.P. Ankara daily, *Son Havadis*. He was an unsuccessful P.R.P. candidate in the elections in May 1954. He also visited the United Kingdom in 1954 with the party of Turkish journalists. He advocates Fabian Socialism and would like to found a party on those lines.

He was an unsuccessful P.R.P. candidate for Gaziantep in the October 1957 elections. Incidents broke out in the town after the elections which the Democrat Party won with a very narrow margin and M. Barlas and the other unsuccessful P.R.P. candidates were arrested for complicity.

M. Barlas is pleasant and helpful but volatile and liable to make impetuous statements. He speaks French and German and favours German interests. He is married and has two children.

22. Barutçu, Faik Ahmet

Born in Trabzon in 1894, a graduate of the Istanbul University Law Faculty. Published a newspaper during the War of Independence. Elected Deputy for Trabzon in 1939, he became Deputy Secretary-General of the People's Republican Party in 1945. Minister of State and Deputy Prime

Minister in M. Saka's Cabinet from 1947 to 1949. Re-elected a Deputy in 1950 but failed for re-election in 1954. He remained in obscurity for two or three years but was elected a member of the P.R.P. Executive Committee in 1956 and regained his seat in the National Assembly as a P.R.P. Deputy for Ankara in October 1957.

M. Barutçu has always been a moderate in the P.R.P. and he has worked in the past to improve relations between the P.R.P. and the Democrat Party. He commands a good deal of respect and popularity in his Party. He speaks French.

23. Bastimar, Zeki

Born in Surmene in 1905, he became interested in Communism at an early age and in 1926 he studied Marxism in Russia. On his return to Turkey he did his military service and was later employed for seven or eight years as a clerk in the Prime Minister's library.

In 1944 he served a year's imprisonment and, on his release, became active in the reorganisation of the Turkish Communist Party, which had been broken up by the Ankara arrests in 1944. During the years from 1946 to 1951 he was the Central Organiser of the clandestine party throughout Turkey and kept in close touch with the provincial committees in Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir.

On October 28, 1951, he was re-arrested and tried with 184 Turkish Communists in 1954, receiving a sentence of ten years' imprisonment on October 7, 1954.

24. Bayar, Celal

Born at Gemlik in 1884 and educated privately, he became cashier in the Bursa branch of the Deutsche Orient Bank. After serving in the War of Independence as a guerrilla, he was elected Deputy for Izmir and appointed Minister of National Economy in 1923. Appointed Minister of Reconstruction in 1924, he soon resigned to become Director-General of the Iş Bank, whilst remaining a Deputy.

In 1932 he was again appointed Minister of National Economy and during next few years visited Athens, London, Paris and Berlin as head or member of delegations negotiating various economic agreements.

In 1937 he became acting Prime Minister to allow Inönü a rest; and when Inönü resigned soon afterwards he was appointed Prime Minister. He remained Prime Minister after the election of Inönü as President in 1938, but resigned unexpectedly in 1939 at a time when several serious financial scandals were being investigated. No stigma of direct responsibility for these scandals attached itself to Bayar personally.

At the end of 1945, with Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü, he founded the Democrat Party and became its leader. He himself was elected Deputy for Istanbul in 1946, but his party won only about 50 seats. In the general elections of May 1950 his party was returned to power with a large majority and he was subsequently elected the third President of the Republic, at the same time resigning from the official leadership of the Democrat Party.

In February 1952 he headed the Turkish Delegation to the funeral of His Majesty King George VI, and in January 1954 paid a successful official visit to the United States. He also paid State visits to Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran and Jordan in 1955. He was re-elected President of the Republic on May 14, 1954, and again on November 1, 1957.

M. Bayar's manners in public are easy and informal and he has dispensed with the formality and ceremony which used to surround M. Inönü. This, together with his reputation for honesty, sincerity and capability has given him high prestige and popularity in the country.

Although at first it seemed that he intended to retain effective power in his hands, he has tended more and more to leave the conduct of affairs to his Prime Minister, M. Menderes. During recent years there have been many rumours of differences between the President and the Prime Minister and the view was fairly widely expressed that M. Bayar had engineered the Cabinet crisis of November 1955. Since then, however, signs of rifts have decreased (except occasionally over controversial personalities such as M. Zorlu (*q.v.*)) and M. Bayar has frequently accompanied the Prime Minister on provincial tours. He naturally showed complete solidarity with the Prime Minister during the election campaign in October 1957. It has also been said that M. Bayar would like to see more executive power concentrated in the President's hands, but that he feels himself too old to enter into a struggle to achieve this for himself, and would prefer to end his political career in Turkey as a venerated elder statesman. It is however widely felt that any moderating influence which he may have had on the Prime Minister is gradually decreasing. He is personally well-disposed to the British and a firm believer in the Turco-British connection.

He is married with three children and speaks a little French. In 1955 he made a rapid recovery from a serious internal operation conducted by Mr. Millin, an Irish surgeon.

25. Bayur, Yusef Hikmet

Born in Istanbul about 1882 and educated at Galatasaray, he entered the Turkish Foreign Service and served in Paris, Berlin, London, and in the Ministry. Appointed Minister in Belgrade in 1925, he became private secretary to the President of the Republic in 1927. Ambassador in Kabul from 1928 to 1932 and Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic from 1932 to 1933, when he was elected Deputy for Manisa. He was soon appointed Minister of Education, but resigned in 1934, ostensibly to devote himself to historical studies.

In 1946 he joined the Democrat Party, but left in 1948 to join the National Party, of which he was chairman in 1950 to 1951. Defeated in the 1950 general elections, he remained editor of the National Party newspaper *Kudret* until it ceased publication in July 1952.

A firm opponent of religious reaction, M. Bayur eventually resigned from the National Party in 1953 just before the party was proscribed. He was elected an Independent Deputy in the Democrat Party list in the 1954 and again in the 1957 elections. Although he has in the past been critical of Democrat Party authoritarianism, he has recently become fully reconciled to the party and is now a frequent spokesman against the Opposition, especially M. Inönü and the Republican National Party (the successor to his old party).

26. Belbez, Fikret

Born about 1906, a career diplomat who has served in London. He has been Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic since early 1955. He was previously President Bayar's Chef de Cabinet and acting Secretary-General. Personally devoted to President Bayar and known to be concerned at the weakness of the Presidency in relation to the Executive headed by a forceful Prime Minister with a docile Assembly, he is probably a conscientious and able official, but it is doubtful whether he has much influence.

He appears to be in delicate health. Married to the daughter of a former Foreign Ministry official. Both he and his wife speak good English and French and are friendly and agreeable.

27. Bele, Refet, General

Born at Truovo in 1881, he first achieved fame as the defender of Gaza in 1916, and was a Corps Commander in Palestine in 1918. He became one of Mustafa Kemal's chief commanders in the War of Independence. He held office as Minister of the Interior, Minister of National Defence and Governor of Thrace.

Elected Deputy for Istanbul in 1923 he opposed the Republic and supported the Caliph. He later became one of the leaders of a new Progressive Party. In 1926 he was tried for conspiracy against Atatürk's life but was acquitted.

He was elected Independent Deputy for Istanbul in 1935 and again in 1947, but he lost his seat in 1950. However, he remains on good terms with the Democrat leaders and is still Turkish representative on the Advisory Commission of the United Nations Near East Relief and Works Agency, to which he was appointed in 1949.

General Bele, who was one of the most able of the Nationalist leaders, is a vivacious and pleasant old gentleman. His prestige is still high, but he belongs to the past. He is not often seen in Turkey nowadays; he seems to be settling down in Beirut and his health is said to be failing. He speaks French.

28. Belge, Burhan

Born in 1899 he was educated at the Galatasaray Lycée and in Germany at Munich and Kassel. For a time he was private secretary to the President and in the early thirties acted as Anatolian Agency correspondent in the Balkans. From 1933–43 he was Director of the Press Bureau under the Ministry of the Interior and, after leaving the public service, joined the Democrat Party in 1946, working for them as a journalist in Izmir as editor of the newspaper, *Demokrat Izmir*. He left the paper in 1948 as the result of a difference with the party leaders and in 1949 became a contributor to the Istanbul daily, *Yeni Istanbul*.

Just before the General Election of 1950, he left the Democrat Party and during the election campaign strongly supported the P.R.P. The party's defeat at the polls was a severe blow to his prospects and he disappeared from the public view for some time. Adnan Menderes, however, still retained a good opinion of him and he is now back in full favour as a member of the board of control of the Government organ, *Zafer*, recently acting as editor-in-chief, and a regular broadcaster. In 1954 he proved an exacting and querulous leader of a group of Turkish journalists who were guests of Her Majesty's Government on a visit to the United Kingdom, though he has shown evidence of the visit's educative effect upon him. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Muğla in the elections of October 1957.

An experienced journalist, he is capable and intelligent and enjoys the friendship and patronage of the Prime Minister. Formerly married to the Hungarian film actress, Tza-Tza Gabor; his present wife, who is his third, does not appear in public. During his varied career, he has—not surprisingly—earned a reputation for unreliability and of being a turncoat.

He is pro-British and speaks good English, French and German.

29. Benderlioğlu, Atif

Born in Ankara about 1905, he studied law in Istanbul and practised as a lawyer until he was elected Mayor of Ankara soon after the victory of the Democrat Party in the general elections of 1950. In 1951 he was also elected to the Executive Committee of the Democrat Party.

In 1951 he visited the United Kingdom at the invitation of the British Council and came back very pleased with his reception there. In 1952 he attended an International Conference of Mayors in the United States. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy (for Yozgat) in October 1957.

M. Benderlioğlu has a reputation for honesty and for being a moderating influence within the Democrat Party. He is alleged to be an opponent of M. Menderes's uncompromising attitude towards the Opposition.

30. Berk, Medeni

Born in Aksaray in 1913. A graduate of the Economics Faculty of Istanbul University. Has served in the Department of Monopolies and was for some time a Branch Manager in the Agricultural Bank. In 1950 he joined the General Directorate of Agricultural Co-operatives and from 1951 until 1957 was Director-General of the Real Estate and Credit Bank.

Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Nigde in the October 1957 elections when he was in fact the only Democrat out of the seven Deputies returned for that province. Appointed Minister of Construction (a new Ministry created to deal with the extensive town planning operations) in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Berk has a reputation for honesty and industry. He is said to be a close friend of the Prime Minister and to have worked with him during the early part of 1957 on the various town planning schemes. He is married and speaks French.

31. Beyatli, Yahya Kemal

Born in 1884, the oldest and generally accepted to be the greatest of Turkish contemporary poets. He is regarded as the unofficial poet laureate of Turkey and has had considerable influence on Turkish poetry through two generations. His poems have appeared in anthologies and text books, but have not been published in full collected form. Nevertheless they are symbolic of the changes in the Turkish poetic tradition through the last days of the Ottoman Empire and into the revolutionary period.

32. Birgi, Muharrem Nuri

Born in Istanbul in 1908, he studied at Galatasaray, in Paris and in Geneva. A career diplomat, he has served in Washington, Vichy and Madrid. Recalled to Ankara, he was appointed successively head of the Co-ordination Department, head of the Consular Department, head of the Second Department, Assistant Secretary-General and, at the beginning of 1953, Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry.

In October 1954 he succeeded M. Açikalin (*q.v.*) as Secretary-General, having for some time carried most of the important work of the Ministry on his shoulders. As Secretary-General he nearly always accompanied the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister on official visits abroad. He attended the London Conference on Cyprus in August 1955 and was responsible for the production of most of the documents on Cyprus produced by the Turkish Government. He headed the Turkish Delegation to the London Conference on Suez in August 1956.

As Secretary-General he worked almost single-handed, delegating very little authority and thereby delaying the execution of routine business. He worked very closely with the Prime Minister, whose confidence he clearly enjoyed, and was invariably helpful to us. He was appointed Ambassador at London, replacing M. Urgüplü (*q.v.*) in March 1957.

M. Birgi is of more than average intelligence and is popular among his colleagues. He is inclined to push subtlety to the point where action becomes difficult; nevertheless, his rise through the ranks of the Turkish Foreign Service has been rapid. He is fond of music and antiques. He speaks excellent French and good English. He is divorced from his wife and lives with his mother who is said to exercise some influence over him.

33. Böllükbaşi, Osman

Born in Kirşehir in 1913, he studied law. He joined the Democrat Party soon after its foundation in 1946, but quarrelled with the party leaders and founded the National Party.

Elected Deputy for Kirşehir in the 1950 general elections, he was the only National Party Deputy in the Assembly. Played a leading part in the formation of the Republican National Party early in 1954, after the suppression of the National Party.

He is considered to be the ablest orator in Turkey; his speeches invariably draw large audiences and his personal popularity is out of proportion to the power of his party. Although he was largely responsible for the failure of the three main Opposition parties to collaborate in the autumn of 1956 to form a united Opposition to the Government, his attacks on the Democrat Party régime became increasingly violent. At the end of June 1957 he attacked M. Menderes in the National Assembly in terms of the strongest personal abuse. As a result his Parliamentary immunity was lifted and he was imprisoned on July 1, 1957, on a charge of insulting the moral integrity of the Assembly. He remained in prison throughout the election campaign of October 1957 and, although he was re-elected a Deputy for his home province of Kirşehir, he was not released from Prison until December 1, 1957. His imprisonment has generally made a martyr of him and his popularity has probably increased accordingly.

He is a colourful and magnetic personality, although apparently little more than a demagogue. It is doubtful whether he would be effective except in opposition. He speaks a little French, and is married to a wife who speaks Turkish only.

34. Budukoğlu, Esat

Born in Balikesir in 1911 he studied law and served in various posts in the Ministry of Justice, after which he practised as a lawyer in Balikesir. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Balikesir in 1950 and re-elected in 1954. Has for some years been one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Grand National Assembly. Appointed Minister of Agriculture in the fourth Menderes Cabinet in December 1955, he has not so far shown any marked ability, and has gained a reputation for subservience to the Prime Minister's wishes. Appointed Minister of Justice in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957 in succession to M. Göktürk (*q.v.*).

Speaks only Turkish.

35. Burçak, Rifki Salim

Born in Ankara in 1913, he is a graduate of the School of Political Science, of which he is still a member. He was professor of diplomatic history there until his election as Democratic Deputy for Erzerum in 1950. In March 1951 he was appointed Minister of Customs and Monopolies.

In October 1951 he was elected to the Executive Committee of the Democrat Party, and soon afterwards, following complaints that the Committee was packed with Ministers, he resigned from the Government and chose to continue to serve on the Committee. However, in April 1953 he was brought back into the Government as Minister of Education. He was re-elected a Deputy in May 1954, but was replaced at the Ministry of Education by the former Minister of State, Celal Yardimci (*q.v.*). He is a regular contributor to *Zafer*, the Government mouthpiece, and a member of the board of control. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957.

He is married and has two children.

36. Çavuşoğlu, Muammer

Born in Kuşadasi in Izmir in 1903, he is a qualified engineer. He has had a very successful career as a civil servant in the Ministry of Public Works and was in charge of the departments concerned with town planning, building, and roads, highways and bridges. For two years M. Çavuşoğlu was Under-Secretary in the Ministry. He was elected Democrat Party Deputy for Izmir in May 1954 and appointed Minister of Communications in place of General Üresin. As he received a part of his training in Germany, he had a preference for German railway and other equipment. He was, however, favourably disposed towards United Kingdom aircraft.

He survived the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 and was appointed Minister of Public Works in the fourth Menderes Cabinet. He resigned in October 1956 for genuine reasons of ill-health and was subsequently operated on successfully in the London Clinic. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957.

Married with two children, he speaks German, French and English. His wife is most intelligent, and is an advocate for women's rights in Turkey. Both M. Çavuşoğlu and his wife are pleasant and friendly towards us.

37. Cebesoy, Ali Fuat, General

Born in Istanbul in 1882, he is said to have both German and Polish blood. Graduating from the Military School in 1905, he was Military Attaché in Rome from 1908 to 1911. During the first world war he fought on the Palestine and Caucasus fronts. He was one of the first to join Mustafa Kemal and from 1920 to 1922 he was the latter's Ambassador in Moscow, where he negotiated the Turco-Russian Treaty of 1921. Elected Deputy for Ankara in 1923, he soon became associated with the opposition to Kemal and in 1924 he resigned from the People's Party and became Secretary-General of the new Progressive Party. In 1926 he was tried for participation in the alleged plot against Kemal but was acquitted. He lived in retirement until 1933, when he was elected Deputy for Konya.

He was Minister of Public Works from 1939 to 1943 and Minister of Communications from 1943 to 1946. In 1948 he was elected President of the Assembly, but was replaced later in the year because some elements in the People's Republican Party, who had the support of the President of the Republic, objected to his liberal disposition and his intimate relations with members of the Opposition. Just before the general elections of 1950 he resigned from the P.R.P. and was elected Independent Deputy for Eskişehir with Democrat Party support. When the first Democrat Government was formed he hoped to become Minister of Defence or President of the Assembly, and was disappointed when no appointment was offered to him. In 1952 he led the Turkish Parliamentary Delegation to the United Kingdom. Re-elected as an Independent Deputy on the Democrat Party list in May 1954, and as a Democrat Deputy (for Istanbul) in October 1957. He is now the doyen (by age) of the Assembly.

As a Minister General Cebesoy was above the average. Parsimonious but agreeable and urbane, his tastes are essentially European. He likes bridge and is fond of the ladies. He speaks French.

38. Çelikbaş, Fethi

Born in Burdur in 1912, he studied law at Istanbul. Taking up the academic profession, he eventually became Dean of the School of Political Sciences in Ankara. In 1950 he was elected Democrat Party Deputy for Burdur, and in April 1953 he was appointed Minister of State, with the responsibility for co-ordinating the economic policies of the Government. In May 1953 he became Minister of Commerce. He suffered a slight demotion in the Cabinet changes of May 1954 following the elections, when he changed posts with the Minister of State Industries, Sitki Yircali (*q.v.*).

M. Çelikbaş became out of favour with the Prime Minister and lost his place in the Cabinet to M. Ağaoğlu (*q.v.*) at the beginning of December 1954. He then became prominent as leader of a small group of intellectuals in the Democrat Party who were campaigning for a repeal of "undemocratic" laws and specifically for more liberal treatment of the Press and more independence for the judiciary. He resigned from the Democrat Party in the summer of 1955 and became one of the founder members of the Freedom Party of which he was elected a Deputy Parliamentary Group Leader in December 1955. He has since proved himself an effective debater in the Grand National Assembly and the Prime Minister himself has frequently had to speak in defence against M. Çelikbaş's attacks on the Government's economic policy.

Re-elected as a Freedom Party Deputy for Burdur in 1957, he is now the only prominent member of the Party in the Assembly.

Intelligent and critical, he is a sociable and cultivated man. He is married and speaks French well.

39. Coşar, Ömer Sami

Born in 1919. Educated at the French School in Istanbul and in Paris. A journalist by profession, he first worked for the Anatolian Agency and later as a reporter for two small Istanbul papers. In 1944 he joined *Cumhuriyet* and has been the paper's diplomatic commentator since 1950. He visited the United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in 1952 and visited Cyprus in 1957.

He is a trusted protégé of M. Nadi (*q.v.*) and has gained almost full control over the foreign policy of *Cumhuriyet*. He writes slickly and well and is regarded by the proprietors of *Cumhuriyet* as an adopted son. He is, however, pathologically antipathetic to the British and British policies, particularly over Cyprus. In the summer of 1957 he wrote a series of articles following his visit to Cyprus condemning British policy there in violent terms and with little regard for the truth.

40. Çoşkun, Salih, Lieutenant-General

Born about 1898, he was commissioned about 1918 and served as an infantry officer. From 1937 to 1939 he attended the German Staff College. He was colonel in 1946, brigadier in 1947, Director of Military Training in 1950 and major-general in 1951. In 1952 he commanded the 28th Division and the following year served on the General Staff. In November 1953 he headed the Turkish group at the Balkan Pact military talks at Belgrade. He was promoted lieutenant-general in August 1954. In April 1955 he visited Pakistan with the Turkish military delegation. Director of Operations and Training from 1954 to 1956. Appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff in June 1956.

General Çoşkun sometimes appears rather unpleasant and uncouth. His inspections are reported to be thorough and efficient but he is probably out of date in his tactical knowledge. He does not get on with British and American officers and in 1952 was guilty of gross discourtesy to the Military Attaché, was forced to make apologies and was switched to another job. He is married and has some knowledge of French. Lately (1955) he has seemed more friendly and one may attribute his uncouth manner, at any rate to some extent, to his language difficulties.

His wife Madame Aliye Çoşkun, is an active member of the Democrat Party and was a Deputy from 1954 to 1957. She lost her seat in the October 1957 general elections.

41. Değmer, Şefik Hüsnü, Dr.

Born in Salonika in 1887 of Dönme parents, he is a fanatical orthodox Marxist who was for many years the Secretary-General of the illegal Communist Party of Turkey. He became actively interested in communism in France during the first World War and, on his return to Turkey in 1919, he formed the Turkish Workers' and Peasants' Party, which acted as a screen for the clandestine activities of the Turkish Communist Party. In 1925 he fled to Russia and was sentenced in his absence to fifteen years' imprisonment. Returning to Turkey after the amnesty in 1926, he again became active in building up the party.

In December 1946 he was arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment and, although he was released during the second amnesty in 1950, he was kept under constant police supervision. As a result of this he retired from active party work in 1951, handing over the direction of the Central Committee to Zeki Bastimar (*q.v.*) and living quietly himself in Istanbul, where he practised professionally as a specialist in venereal diseases.

In February 1952 he was arrested during the general round-up of Communists. He was tried with 184 accused and on October 7, 1954, sentenced to five years and ten months' imprisonment.

42. Demirer, Arif

Born in Afyon in 1909, he entered Government service and subsequently studied economics at Munich and Berlin Universities. In 1939 he became Director-General of the State Airways and subsequently Director-General of the Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Administration. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Afyon in 1954 and appointed Minister of Communications in the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955.

M. Demirer visited the United Kingdom in early 1957 and was eventually almost entirely responsible on the Turkish side for pushing through the BOAC/THY Participation Agreement in July 1957 in the face of strong American competition. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 but dropped from the 5th Menderes Cabinet in favour of General Uçaner (*q.v.*).

M. Demirer speaks French and German. He is agreeable and is reputed to be a good technician in the field of communications. As Minister of Communications he gave the impression of efficiency and honesty and seemed very pro-British.

43. Dikerdem, Mahmut

Born in 1915 at Istanbul, he studied at Galatasaray and graduated in 1938 from the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. Entered the Turkish Foreign Service in 1939 and has served in various posts abroad and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Counsellor in Cairo until 1955 when he returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a spare Director General. In the Ministry he was periodically responsible for the Second Department (dealing with Middle

East, Far East and Eastern European affairs, including Cyprus). Appointed Ambassador at Amman in April 1957.

At the Ministry M. Dikerdem was always helpful and friendly and talked freely, although it was sometimes difficult to understand whether he was expressing a personal point of view or his Government's. He is divorced from his wife who married his colleague, M. Eralp (*q.v.*). He speaks good French and some English and is an excellent bridge player.

44. Dülge, Mithat

Born in 1899 in Salihli (Ægean), he is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences. Governor of a sub-district (1923–24); Inspector at the Ministry of Finance (until 1931). Chairman of the Inspector's Committee at the Turkish Agricultural Bank (1932–38), assistant director-general of the bank (1938–46), member of the board of directors, Central Bank (1946), assistant director-general, Central Bank (1946–49). He was appointed director-general of the Agricultural Bank on 1st July, 1950, after the Democrat Party accession to power.

An efficient administrator, Dülge has played a prominent role in the Democrat Party Government's policy for agricultural development throughout the country, especially by increasing the volume of agricultural credits to peasants and farmers. Dülge, who is on very good terms with the President and the Prime Minister, is married and speaks French.

45. Dülger, Bahadir

Born in Istanbul in 1911, he was educated at Galatasaray and the Instanbul Faculty of Law. A journalist by profession, he wrote for several newspapers in Istanbul until he was elected Democrat deputy for Erzurum in 1950.

In 1952 he became temporary head of the Anatolian Agency, but was not a success and was replaced by Şerif Arzik (*q.v.*) in August the following year. He retained his seat in the Assembly in May 1954. He was a regular contributor to the Democrat Party Ankara organ *Zafer* until 1957 when he was appointed editor of the Democrat Party Istanbul paper *Havadis*. He resigned after a few months in this job and has not so far joined another paper. Re-elected a D.P. Deputy (for Gaziantep) in the October 1957 general elections. He is married and speaks French.

46. Emeç Selim Ragip

Born in Istanbul in 1899, he is the owner and editor of *Son Posta*, an Instanbul evening paper which he founded in 1931. He studied at the Galatasaray Lycée and graduated from Istanbul University Faculty of Law. During World War I he served as a reserve officer in Syria and Palestine and, after the cessation of hostilities, resumed his studies at the university, at the same time contributing articles to various papers. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Bursa in 1950 and re-elected in 1954. Changed his constituency in 1957 and re-elected on the Democrat Party list for Izmir.

He is favourably disposed to Her Majesty's Government but is occasionally critical of Britain's trade policy towards Turkey. He speaks fluent French.

47. Eralp, Orhan

Born about 1913, a career official, he has spent a lot of his Foreign Service career at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1950 and 1951 he served on the Turkish Delegation to the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine and was subsequently Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in London for about a year. Transferred in early 1953 to be Head of the Second Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and appointed Ambassador at Stockholm in 1956. He accompanied President Bayar to America in 1954 and M. Zorlu (*q.v.*) to Bandoeng in 1955. He also attended the London Conference on Cyprus in August 1955 and the Suez Canal Conference in 1956 and frequently accompanied the Minister for Foreign Affairs on visits to foreign countries.

Married in 1956 to the ex-wife of one of his colleagues, M. Eralp speaks almost perfect English, and is outstanding in the Turkish Foreign Service and is obviously a coming man. He is intelligent and capable and was probably one of the very few officials in the Ministry whom the Secretary-General consulted on important matters.

He is friendly and social and plays excellent golf and tennis. He is also a good bridge-player.

48. Erdelhün, Rustü, General

Born in 1895 at Edirne of a military family, he was commissioned about 1914 and was wounded on the Caucasus front in 1917. Between the wars he passed through the Staff College. As lieutenant-colonel he served as Military Attaché in Tokyo in 1933, and as Military Attaché in London from November 1939 to August 1943. By 1945 he was a brigadier-general commanding the 15th Division. After promotion and two other divisional commands, he was appointed Head of the Turkish Liaison Mission in Tokyo in November 1951. He reached the rank of lieutenant-general in August 1952. He accompanied President Bayar on his visit to the United States in February 1954, and in May was Turkish Military Representative at the Geneva Conference. In August 1954 he was appointed Deputy Chief of Staff. Appointed Commander, Second Army, in June 1956; and promoted to full general in August 1956.

General Erdelhün is a smart soldier and a considerate commander. He has charm and tact. He has been a successful military attaché, and is a conscientious and capable officer, ambitious and with a knowledge of modern ideas acquired outside his country. He has a great admiration for the British and has been helpful to the British Training Staffs in Turkey and to successive military attachés.

General Erdelhün speaks French, fairly good English, and German. His pleasant wife speaks English.

49. Ergin, Şemi

Born in Gebze in 1913, he studied law and served in various posts in the Ministry of Justice until 1947 when he resigned to take up private practice. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Manisa in 1950 and re-elected in 1954. Elected one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Grand National Assembly in May 1955 although he was not officially sponsored by the Democrat Party General Executive Council. Appointed Minister of State (responsible for land settlement, refugees and immigrants) and acting Minister of National Defence in the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. In July 1957 he was confirmed in the appointment of Minister of National Defence and automatically relinquished his Ministry of State. Reappointed Minister of Defence in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Ergin, who speaks only Turkish, is friendly but generally unimpressive. He has, however, taken some interest in improving the welfare of the armed forces, and is a very popular Minister of National Defence in the services.

50. Erim, Nihat

Born in 1912, he studied law locally and at the Sorbonne. Was at one time legal adviser to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and accompanied the Turkish Delegation to the San Francisco Conference in that capacity.

Deputy for Kocaeli until 1950, he was Minister of Public Works from 1948 to 1949 and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State from 1949 to 1950. Lost his seat in the 1950 elections and failed again in 1954 and 1957.

M. Erim is generally known as a political turncoat. He was once an active and controversial member of the P.R.P. and a violent opponent of the Democrat Party. In early 1955 he changed his tactics and became reconciled to the Prime Minister. In late 1956 he was chosen as Turkish Representative to examine the Radcliffe Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus and visited Cyprus and London for talks, in which he showed understanding and good sense. It was rumoured at the time that he had joined the Democrat Party, but he eventually stood unsuccessfully as a P.R.P. candidate for Istanbul in October 1957.

He now holds no office in the People's Republican Party organisation and is said to be discredited politically with both parties owing to his frequent changes of front.

51. Erkin, Feridun Cemal

Born in 1898 and educated at Istanbul, he was at first destined for a business career. In 1924, however, through the influence of M. Saracoğlu (to whom he owed his later advancement) he entered the Turkish diplomatic service and from then until 1942 he served in London, Berlin and Beirut, and accompanied M. Saracoğlu on various missions.

In 1942 he was appointed Secretary-General in the Ministry, and in 1945 he was Chief Adviser to the Turkish delegation to San Francisco. In 1947 he was appointed Ambassador in Rome, and in 1948 Ambassador in Washington. In June 1955 he was transferred to Madrid and replaced by a colleague with economic experience, Haydar Görk (*q.v.*). Appointed Ambassador at Paris in May 1957 replacing M. Numan Menemencioğlu (*q.v.*).

M. Erkin, who enjoyed the confidence of President Inönü, was expected to lose his post when the Democrats came to power in 1950, but he soon found favour with the Democrats also. One of Turkey's most intelligent diplomats, he is vain and sensitive. He is also apt to be a pessimist and an alarmist. He is married to a Bagdad lady with expensive tastes and a good *mezzo-soprano* voice.

52. Erkmen, Hayrettin

Born in Tirebolu in 1915, he was educated at the Istanbul School of Political Sciences and studied economics in Geneva and law in Lausanne. Until his election to the Assembly as Democrat Deputy for Giresun in 1950, he was an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Istanbul. In April 1953 he was appointed Minister of Labour. Reappointed May 1954.

As Minister he was merely a safe nominee of the Prime Minister and exercised no real power. He resigned with the remainder of the Cabinet in November 1955 and was not reappointed in the new Cabinet. In December 1956 he replaced M. Namik Gedik (*q.v.*) as Leader of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group and was re-elected to this post in November 1957. He was, however, brought back to the Cabinet the same month in his old appointment of Minister of Labour.

Unmarried, he speaks French and some English.

53. Esenbel, Melih

Born in 1913. He was educated at the Galatasaray Lycée and at the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. He joined the Turkish Foreign Service in 1936 as a junior secretary and served at the Consulate-General in Paris in 1939, returning to work in the Protocol Department in 1943. In 1945 he was First Secretary in Washington and became Counsellor in 1950. In 1952 he returned to the International Economic Affairs Department of the Ministry of which he later became Director-General.

In June 1954 he was promoted Minister and became Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs; and in April 1957 he replaced M. Birgi (*q.v.*) as Secretary-General. Since his appointment as Secretary-General he has carried out some much needed reorganisation in the handling of business in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and has shown himself to be competent if not brilliant. He appears to be popular with his senior subordinates. He can be socially awkward and uncommunicative to the point of boorishness, but seems personally well disposed to us. Speaks adequate French and English. Is married to an attractive but somewhat unstable wife, who is a cousin of Nuri Birgi (*q.v.*). They have two children, one of whom is crippled.

54. Esin, Seyfullah

A senior member of the Turkish Foreign Service, M. Esin was born about 1900 and educated at the Galatasaray Lycée and in Germany. After being a junior secretary in Washington in 1936 he served in the Cabinet du Ministre in 1937. In 1939 he served in Buenos Aires and later in Tokyo, where he married. He was transferred to Stockholm in 1942 and back to Ankara in 1944. In 1946 he was a Turkish delegate to the United Nations and head of the First Department in the Ministry. In 1949 he became the first Turkish representative in Tel Aviv, as Chargé d'Affaires with the rank of Minister. In 1952 he became Minister in Vienna and in September 1954 was appointed Ambassador in Moscow. In 1955 he was one of several candidates considered for the vacant post in London. But in the event he was transferred as Ambassador to Bonn. Appointed Permanent Turkish Delegate to the United Nations in June 1957.

Both M. Esin and his wife are pleasant and friendly, and western in their outlook. Both have cultivated tastes and speak English, French and German well. M. Esin was helpful to the Embassy while at the Ministry.

55. Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü

Born in 1890 of Turkish Cypriot origin and educated at Columbia University, he is a journalist by profession. A contributor to *Vakit* after the first world war, and chief editor of *Son Saat* in 1926, he was editor of *Milliyet* in the 'thirties, and a person of considerable importance in the journalistic world.

Elected Deputy for Istanbul in 1939, he has since visited the United Kingdom and the United States several times. After the war he became foreign editor of *Ulus;* and in 1947 he was appointed head of the Turkish Information Office in New York. In 1949 he became director-general of the Press Bureau. Having unsuccessfully contested Ankara as P.R.P. candidate in the 1950 elections he had to resign from the Press Bureau and became Professor of Diplomatic History at the School of Political Science. He is also diplomatic correspondent of *Ulus*. A member of the Turkish Press delegation to the United Kingdom in September 1953. An unsuccessful candidate in the general elections in May 1954.

Western in outlook, and particularly pro-American, M. Esmer looks considerably less than his age. A keen student of foreign affairs, in which he is widely read. He has a tendency to detect the remnants of "imperialism" in British foreign policy. He has, however, been sound in his commentaries on the Enosis question, following an educative visit to Cyprus in 1955, and has since shown a generally more friendly and sympathetic attitude to Britain. He became chairman of the Turkish branch of the Atlantic Association in January 1956.

He speaks excellent English and French and knows some German. His Finnish wife speaks good English.

56. Fenik, Mümtaz Faik

Born in Istanbul in 1904. A graduate of the Istanbul faculty of law, he took up journalism early and worked on the staff of several Istanbul newspapers. In 1937 he moved to Ankara to become the principal sub-editor of *Ulus*. After the signing of the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939, he received a special assignment from the People's Republican Party to write a history of the British Empire, which was widely distributed in the party.

In 1946 M. Fenik, who was no longer a supporter of the People's Republican Party, was dismissed from *Ulus* and returned to Istanbul to work with Yalman (*q.v.*). Returning to Ankara in 1949, he became a Democrat Party Press officer and started *Zafer*, which has developed into the official organ of the Democrat Party. Imprisoned for a Press offence early in 1950, he was released after his election as a Democrat Deputy for Ankara in May 1950.

In 1951 M. Fenik led the Turkish Press delegation to the United Kingdom. In November 1952 he was elected member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly. Emotional and very touchy, he needs careful handling: some of his unbalanced leading articles have got him into trouble with his own party, many of whom can now see that he is a liability. In 1952 he lost his exclusive control of *Zafer*, for which the Democrat Party appointed a committee of management. He was re-elected a Deputy in 1954. He was ousted from *Zafer* in 1955. His influence has diminished as his favour with the Prime Minister declined. Lost his seat as a Deputy (for Ankara) in the October 1957 elections, and is now the editor of the Democrat Party Istanbul newspaper, *Havadis*.

An average writer and an undistinguished editor, M. Fenik is a close friend of President Celal Bayar. He has indulged in vicious attacks against us, notably in connection with our commercial differences with Turkey. He finds writing difficult and is said to seek inspiration from the bottle. He speaks French. His wife, also a journalist, was elected to the Ankara Municipality in September 1950.

57. Feyzioğlu, Turhan, Professor

Born about 1918 of a rich family. Studied political science and did research in 1952 and 1953 at Paris and Oxford. Became Dean of the Political Science Faculty of Ankara University in 1954. In 1956 he was suspended for introducing party politics into the faculty and resigned. He joined the People's Republican Party and, after being very active in their election campaign, was elected a Deputy on the P.R.P. list for Sivas in the 1957 general elections.

Professor Feyzioglu is an intelligent representative of Turkey's small group of "intellectuals" and a coming man in the P.R.P. He is, however, highly emotional and his maiden speech in the National Assembly was so violent that he was suspended for three sessions. He speaks French and English.

58. Gedik, Namik

Born in Istanbul in 1911, he studied at the Medical Faculty of Istanbul University and as a doctor specialised in internal diseases. Was for some years a specialist in the T.B. section of the Haydarpaşa Hospital in Istanbul. He was elected Democrat Party Deputy for Aydin in 1950 and was re-elected there in 1954. Appointed Minister of the Interior in May 1954 in succession to Ethem Menderes (*q.v.*).

He resigned after the riots of September 1955 and was replaced at the Ministry of the Interior by Ethem Menderes. Although apparently on good terms with the Prime Minister, he was not appointed to the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. Elected Leader of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group after the resignation of Dr. Burhanettin Onat in May 1956. He remained in favour with the Prime Minister and was reappointed Minister of the Interior in December 1956. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and confirmed in his appointment as Minister of the Interior in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

Married with two children, M. Gedik speaks French.

59. Gencer, Leyla

Mme. Gencer, who is in her mid-thirties, is Turkey's best opera singer and has already gained an international reputation. She only began to study singing in 1945 and two years later was giving concerts. She has sung frequently in Europe and the United States during the last three years. She made her American debut in Francesca di Rimini and sang in Verdi's Requiem at the funeral of Toscanini in Milan. Speaks Italian, French and German. She is married to an agreeable but undistinguished banker, who inevitably rarely sees her.

60. Gidel, Nail

Born in Vodena in 1907, and educated at the School of Political Sciences and in Paris, he joined the Ministry of Interior and served in the provinces as well as in Ankara. In 1936 he joined the Ministry of Finance as assistant accountant, and by 1950 had risen to be Director-General of the Treasury. In 1953 he was appointed Assistant Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Finance and acting as Under-Secretary until July, when he was appointed Director-General of the Central Bank.

Personally charming and friendly, he was notoriously "difficult" as Director-General of the Treasury. He is rarely, and his wife never, seen in society. He speaks good French.

61. Gökay, Fahrettin, Kerim

Born about 1892 at Eskişehir, the son of a local merchant. Graduated from the Istanbul Medical Faculty in 1922 and studied mental diseases in Munich. Appointed Professor of Mental Diseases at the Istanbul Medical Faculty in 1933. A long-standing member of the People's Republican Party he was appointed Vali and Mayor of Istanbul in 1949. He resigned from the party on this appointment and retained his post after the Democrat Party victory in the 1950 General Elections. In the spring of 1953 he made an extensive tour of the United States at the invitation of the State Department. In spite of frequent rumours that the Government were going to make him a scapegoat for the Istanbul riots in September 1955, he eventually survived in his post and it was generally felt that he was blameless. He paid an official visit to Paris in April 1956.

In the summer of 1957 he was alleged to have opposed M. Menderes's grandiose plans for the

reconstruction of Istanbul; and he thus began to fall from favour. He was absent from his post on a European tour during most of the election campaign in the autumn of 1957 and there were rumours that he had refused an offer to stand as a Democrat Party candidate. After the elections the rumours grew that he had fallen from favour owing to his attitude to the reconstruction programme and his allegedly equivocal attitude towards the Democrat Party during the elections, and his appointment as Turkish Ambassador at Berne was officially announced on November 21. He was replaced at Istanbul by M. Mümtaz Tarhan (*q.v.*).

A diminutive man of tireless energy who has made himself extremely popular among the people of Istanbul, although he was inclined to apply himself more to the public side of his functions as Governor than to the systematic work of administration. He made numerous foreign tours. A former President of the Green Crescent (the Turkish anti-alcohol league) he is noted for his extreme temperance views. Pompous and vain but friendly, he speaks French and German and his wife, a quiet and pleasant woman, speaks English.

62. Göker, Hamdullah Süphi, Lieutenant-General

Born in 1901 he took part in the War of Independence as a non-commissioned officer. Graduated as an Air Force pilot in 1924 and studied aviation in the United Kingdom in 1929. Promoted to major in 1938 and was Turkish Air Attaché in London from 1938 to 1941. Promoted lieutenant-colonel in 1943 and appointed Chief of Staff at the Air Inspectors Department. Became a colonel in 1945 and a brigadier in 1948 when he was appointed Commandant of the Air School at Eskişehir and Commander of the 1st Air Division. In 1951 he was appointed Director of Operations at Turkish Air Force Headquarters and promoted to major-general. In 1953 he became Chief of Staff at the 6th Tactical Air Force Headquarters at Izmir, and subsequently Head of the Logistics Department at the Turkish General Staff. In 1957 he was appointed acting Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Air Force on the retirement of General Uçaner (*q.v.*)

General Göker is a likeable and friendly character and one of the most co-operative senior officers in the Turkish Air Force. He speaks excellent English. During the war his son was killed during flying training in the United Kingdom.

63. Gökman, Oğuz

Born in 1916 in Manisa, a career member of the Turkish Foreign Service. Has served in Paris, Buenos Aires and Sofia, in the latter two places as Chargé d'Affaires. Speaks good French and Spanish and a little English. In 1956 made Director-General of the Department of Commerce and Commercial Agreements in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Presides over all negotiations with foreign delegations for commercial agreements, and has acted as chairman in oil refinery talks with the four foreign oil companies in Turkey, and in Turco-Iranian negotiations over proposed Qum-Iskenderun pipeline. A protégé of Fatin Rüstu Zorlu (*q.v.*) he seems destined to go ahead. With a strong physical resemblance to Juan Perón, he is an aggressive and rather unpleasant negotiator, but an effective chairman. Has a pleasant wife.

64. Göksenin, Muzaffer, General

General Göksenin was born at Monastir in 1889. He joined the Army in 1915 and served as a cavalry officer in Palestine, where he was taken prisoner by the British forces. He returned to Turkey in 1920 and took part in the War of Independence. After taking flying courses at Izmir and in France, he was made Director of Flying at the Aircraft School at Eskişehir, where he stayed from 1927 until 1947. From 1947 to 1949 he was Under-Secretary for Air in the Ministry of National Defence and in 1950 he became Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Air Force. In that position he co-operated well with the United States Mission. He resigned from the Air Force owing to a dispute over the Turkish Air Force Budget for 1953–54.

In 1953 he was appointed Vali of Izmir. Although bitterly disappointed at having to leave the Air Force, he was popular in his new position and active in promoting the welfare of the Vilayet.

In November 1954 he was appointed Turkish Ambassador in Baghdad, but has not shown the ability needed to play a full and constructive part in the Baghdad Pact Organisation.

Forceful and hard-working as an officer, General Göksenin is very anglophil and speaks English well. For a Turk he has a keen sense of humour. His wife always accompanied him to social engagements in Ankara but was rarely seen in public in Izmir. She speaks no English. He has a daughter who speaks some English.

65. Göktürk, Hüseyin Avni

Born in Nigde in 1901, he studied Law and was appointed to the Council of State. He subsequently studied law at Geneva and Berlin Universities. He then became Professor of Civil Law at Ankara University and, in 1946, Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Labour. Appointed Minister of Justice in the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. Failed to be re-elected a Deputy in his home province of Nigde in the October 1957 elections and automatically relinquished his Cabinet appointment. Appointed Head of the Turkish Security Services in November 1957.

M. Göktürk speaks French, German and some English. Although by reputation an honest and competent lawyer, as Minister of Justice he was completely subservient to the Prime Minister and became a symbol of governmental interference with the independence of the judiciary. His popularity throughout the country rapidly declined and it was no surprise that he was not re-elected.

66. Görk, Haydar

Born in Istanbul in 1904 he studied at the American Robert College and later attended the faculty of Political Science at the University of Paris. He entered the Turkish Foreign Service in 1929 and served in Moscow, Rome, Tokyo (1943) and Warsaw (1946). He returned to Ankara in 1949 and in 1950 was appointed Director-General of the International Economic Affairs Department. In 1952 he became Deputy Secretary-General for Economic and Commercial Affairs in which he has specialised.

In June 1954 he moved to the Presidency as Secretary-General with the personal rank of Ambassador. In May 1955 he was appointed Turkish Ambassador in Washington. Transferred to Madrid in April 1957 and replaced by M. Ürgüplü (*q.v.*).

M. Görk is rather taciturn but intelligent, and a tough negotiator.

He speaks French and English. His wife is shy and undistinguished; she is learning English. They have no children.

67. Gülek, Kasim

Born at Adana in 1906 of a rich family, he studied economics at Columbia University and for a short time at Cambridge. He was a P.R.P. Deputy for

Adana until 1950 and in 1943 was elected to the Executive Committee of the Party.

Having helped to form the "liberal" wing of the P.R.P. he was appointed Minister of Public Works in 1947 and Minister of Communications in 1948. He was dropped from the Günaltay Cabinet in 1949. As a Minister he was however efficient and helpful to us. The same year he was a delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and was later Chairman of the United Nations Commission in Korea.

He lost his seat in the 1950 elections but was soon after elected Secretary-General of the P.R.P., and re-elected at the 1953 Congress. In spite of incurring criticism as a result of the failure of the P.R.P. in the 1954 elections, when he himself was an unsuccessful candidate, his popularity in the party was again demonstrated when he was re-elected Secretary-General by an overwhelming majority at the 1956 Party Congress. He was re-elected to the Grand National Assembly in the P.R.P. list for Adana in the 1957 elections.

M. Gülek has always been a relentless opponent of the Democrat Party. He is a good speaker and has attacked the Government incessantly both for their economic policy and anti-Democratic practices. (Although he constantly calls for economic planning, he appears to have no constructive alternative suggestions.) The Government accused him in 1955 of causing artificial shortages and price increases by propaganda but he was eventually acquitted by the Court. In August 1955 he was arrested (which he greatly enjoyed) and charged with casting doubts on the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly at a Press conference. He was quickly released but in June 1956 was sentenced by the Court to one year's imprisonment followed by four months' banishment to Bursa. He has appealed, so far successfully, against the sentence and has now regained parliamentary immunity.

M. Gülek is a strong and controversial personality, but although he has differed in the past from the P.R.P. leader, M. Inönü, he has recently shown complete loyalty to him. He has often provoked the Democrat Party grievously, but his extreme statements and clumsy tactics have sometimes made him look foolish. He has incurred the special displeasure of the Prime Minister to whom he is the main "red rag" in the P.R.P.

He is cultivated and intelligent and very energetic, but often wild in his statements. He maintains close contact with foreigners in Ankara, especially the Americans and British, and is a popular figure at social gatherings. He speaks nine or ten languages, including excellent English. He is not married.

68. Günaltay, Şemsettin

Born in 1882, he was elected deputy for Sivas in 1926. He became in 1930 a member of the Committee of Public Construction of the Grand National Assembly. In 1939 he was elected a vice-president of the G.N.A. and a professor of the Faculty of Languages, History and Geography at Ankara University. In January 1949 he was appointed Prime Minister in succession to Hasan Saka.

His undistinguished period of office was brought to an end by the 1950 general elections, in which the Democrat Party were returned to power; he himself was elected P.R.P. Deputy for Erzincan, and became chairman of the P.R.P. Disciplinary Committee. Failed to be re-elected a Deputy in May 1954.

In 1952 and again in 1955 M. Günaltay fell out with M. Inönü over questions of party policy and organisation and there were rumours that he would leave the P.R.P. and form a new party. The rifts were, however, healed although he was the sole opponent to M. Inönü for the chairmanship of the P.R.P. at the Congress in May 1956 (he received one vote only).

In 1957 his influence in the party appeared to be again on the increase and he was elected Chairman of the P.R.P. organisation in Istanbul. It was reliably reported that if the P.R.P. had won the 1957 elections M. Günaltay would have been their first Prime Minister. In the event, although he stood as a candidate both in Istanbul and in Izmir he failed to be re-elected as a Deputy. He was, however, active in the P.R.P. election campaign and public interest again became focused on him to a certain extent.

Speaks Arabic, Persian and some French, and was known at one time for his fervent devotion to the Moslem religion.

69. Güreli, Enver

Born in Burhaniye in 1914, he is a graduate of the School of Political Science in Ankara. He served in various commercial departments of the Government until he was elected Democrat deputy for Balikesir in the general elections of 1950.

In June 1952 he was appointed Minister of Commerce. A rather unstable character, he was emotionally upset by Britain's failure to buy Turkish; and in March 1953 he made a wild and violent statement threatening to retaliate on British goods.

He resigned in May 1953. No reason was given: he was probably at loggerheads with the Prime Minister. Re-elected a Deputy in May 1954. In 1955 he was a member of the group of dissident Democrat Party Deputies led by Fethi Çelikbaş (*q.v.*); and he eventually resigned from the Democrat Party and became one of the founder members of the Freedom Party. He was elected Deputy Leader of the Party in December 1955 and a member of the Executive Council. Failed to be re-elected as a Deputy in the October 1957 elections.

70. Hikmet, Nazim

A leading Turkish Marxist. Aged about 50. Is the most distinguished modern Turkish poet after Yahya Kemal, who is the representative of the traditionalist school. Is a nephew on his mother's side of General Ali Fuat Cebesoy and has both German and Polish blood. Has written much poetry and one or two novels which are greatly admired in Turkey and circulate secretly among many non-Communists. Celal Bayar, who was Prime Minister in 1937 when Nazim Hikmet was condemned to twenty-nine years' penal servitude, once stated that he always kept Nazim Hikmet's poems by his bed.

Nazim Hikmet was condemned by court-martial in 1937 for spreading Communist propaganda among officers, and at the same time a number of young officers were shot. He was sent to serve the first part of his sentence in the hold of the battleship *Selim Yavuz*. There he contracted tuberculosis and through the influence of powerful friends was transferred to Bursa jail. Several unsuccessful attempts were made to get him released, particularly by General Cebesoy (*q.v.*) and M. Yalman (*q.v.*).

He was finally released under the general amnesty of 1950, and lived quietly in Istanbul until June 1951, when he escaped through Roumania to Moscow. He is the nominal leader of the Turkish Communists in exile and a prominent Peace Partisan. He attended the Berlin Youth Festival and the Warsaw Congress of the International Union of Students in 1951. He also represented Turkey at the World Peace Council meetings in Berlin (1952), Peking (1952), Budapest (1953), Vienna (1953) and East Berlin (1954). In 1954 he was appointed a member of the World Peace Council

Bureau. He still broadcasts from behind the Iron Curtain, and in 1955 intervened in this way in the Cyprus question. Articles of his are also published in the Cominform journal, the *New Times*. He visited Warsaw in 1956 with Zekeriya Sertel (another Turkish Communist) at the invitation of the Polish Peace Defenders' Committee.

71. Hüsman, Hadi

Born in Gümüşhane in 1904, he studied political science at Ankara University and served for many years in various posts in the Ministry of Finance. Became Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in 1942 and Director-General of Monopolies in 1949. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Istanbul in 1950 and re-elected in 1954. Since his election he has served on the Grand National Assembly Budget Commission and was the Commission's *rapporteur* during the Budget Debates. Appointed Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and confirmed in his appointment as Minister of Customs and Monopolies in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957. A faithful Menderes follower. Speaks French.

72. Iksel, Settar

Born in 1908 at Istanbul, and studied at Galatasaray. Subsequently graduated from the Law Faculty of Istanbul University. Entered the Government Legal Department in 1929, but transferred to the Turkish Foreign Service in 1930. After serving in various posts abroad and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs he was appointed Ambassador at Athens in 1954. Transferred as Ambassador to Bonn in May 1957.

M. Iksel is a quiet and unassuming character of above average intelligence, who is said to be in the running as a future Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is married and speaks excellent French.

73. Ileri, Tevfik

Born 1912. Studied engineering and held various technical posts in the Ministry of Public Works. Elected Democrat Deputy for Samsun in 1950, he was appointed Minister of Communications in the first Democrat Government, and was transferred to Education to replace M. Başman three months later.

An extreme nationalist, M. Ileri spent much energy in ridding the schools of those suspected of fellow-travelling. His zeal to promote religious education made him unpopular with the intellectuals; and he was forced to resign in April 1953, largely on account of his encouragement to the Association of Nationalists, which had been convicted of extremism and suppressed. Re-elected a Deputy in May 1954, and elected Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly. He was re-appointed Minister of Education in April 1957 and, after being re-elected a Deputy in October 1957, was promoted to Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

Tough and energetic but not very bright, M. Ileri is said to be one of M. Menderes' most devoted and influential followers. He wields much power within the Democrat Party and is said to be a coming man with some influence over the Prime Minister. He speaks Turkish only.

74. Ilkin, Nedim Veysel

Born about 1899. Member of Turkish diplomatic service. Was for many years on staff of the Turkish Consulate at Geneva and thereby closely associated with the permanent Turkish delegation. Returned to Ankara and from 1939 until 1944 was private secretary to M. Saracoğlu. Became Director-General of the Press Bureau with the rank of Minister in 1944.

In March 1948 he was appointed Turkish Minister at The Hague, but was hastily recalled after a scene over his official invitation to the Coronation of Queen Juliana (M. Ilkin appears to have been rather stupid and the Dutch excessively *protocolaire*) and in 1949 he was appointed Turkish Minister at Brussels. In autumn 1952 he was appointed first Turkish Ambassador to Iraq, and transferred to Prague in December 1953. Appointed first Turkish Ambassador at Rabat in February 1957.

M. Ilkin is a steady, competent, though rather featureless, official. He probably lacks drive. He is, however, well disposed and in principle willing enough to cooperate.

75. Inönü, Ismet, General

Born in Izmir in 1880 and brought up in Malatya, where his father was a minor official. Educated at the Military College, he served in Thrace and the Yemen and joined the General Staff in 1914. In 1915, he was Chief of Staff of the Caucasus army, and he served in Palestine in 1917 and 1918. In 1920 he joined Mustafa Kemal and soon became his Chief of Staff.

After the defeat of the Greeks in 1922, for which much of the credit must go to him, he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs and was the chief Turkish negotiator at the Treaty of Lausanne—which he eventually signed—in 1923. At Lausanne he showed himself a stubborn but able negotiator. He was Prime Minister, with one short break at the end of 1924, from 1923 to 1937. Since 1923 he has also been Chairman of the P.R.P. During his period as Prime Minister he paid official visits to Moscow and Rome in 1932, to Sofia in 1923 and to Belgrade in 1937. In 1937, too, represented Turkey at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. Often criticised, or thought to be in disagreement with Atatürk, he triumphed over all his critics until autumn 1937 when he resigned and was succeeded as Prime Minister by Celal Bayar.

On the death of Atatürk in 1938 he was elected President of the Republic. He soon dismissed from power several of the wilder members of Atatürk's entourage, and it was generally thought that he was responsible for the revelation of a number of financial scandals which resulted in the resignation of Celal Bayar and the dismissal of a number of Government officials in 1939.

During the second world war he showed himself a supporter of the pro-British policy initiated by Atatürk, and his meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in Cairo in December 1943 gave him much personal pleasure.

During 1945 he came to the conclusion that there was no adequate successor to himself as head of a one-party Government and that a two-party system must be inaugurated and an Opposition party educated up to its responsibilities. However, he was alarmed at the unexpected strength which the Opposition showed during the electoral campaign of 1946, and he allowed interference with the elections in favour of the P.R.P.

In the free general elections of 1950 which resulted in the overwhelming defeat of his party, he was himself returned by a small majority in Malatya.

As President he was prepared to maintain Atatürk's reforms thoroughly and relentlessly, but he had neither the greatness nor the popular appeal of Atatürk. Nevertheless he enjoyed great respect and his word was law.

The measure of his unpopularity was shown in the elections of 1950. Once he was out of office his enemies began to blacken his reputation, although he

still retained his position as an elder statesman. His campaigning prior to the May 1954 elections (in which he kept his seat) was inept, and his reputation also suffered in a series of acrimonious exchanges with M. Menderes.

Since the 1954 elections, however, M. Inönü, in spite of his age, has led a renaissance in the P.R.P. and his reputation has been considerably enhanced. In 1950 he was generally considered as an inefficient and uninspired dictator, but now he appears to many people more in the light of a political progressive who is trying to restore true democracy to Turkey after the failure of the early promise of the Democrat Party. The improved performance of the P.R.P. in the 1957 elections was probably largely due to M. Inönü's personality and he is very disappointed that his party failed to win outright.

Although in 1955 and again in early 1957 he had brief reconciliations with the Prime Minister, his relations with M. Menderes have deteriorated steadily and they now attack each other remorselessly in public speeches. M. Inönü's wide allegations of irregularities in the 1957 elections will no doubt cause a further deterioration.

He is still a controversial figure in Turkey and there are no signs as yet that he has any intention of retiring from the Chairmanship of the P.R.P. which he has held for so many years. His utterances in the Grand National Assembly are generally statesmanlike and untainted with demagogy and he still commands a good deal of respect even from the Democrat Party. He was extremely active in the P.R.P. election campaign and appeared exhausted by the end. Nevertheless the ovation he received in Ankara in the closing days of the campaign was infinitely warmer than that accorded to the Prime Minister the previous day. There is a general feeling in his party that his retirement or death would be a very serious blow to their popularity and support.

He has been a consistent friend of Britain, and is a wise and cultivated man. Unruffled and courteous, he suffers from deafness, which he probably finds convenient at times. He is married and has three children.

76. Işik, Hasan

Born in 1916 in Istanbul, he studied at Galatasaray and graduated in 1940 from the Law Faculty of Ankara University. Entered the Turkish Foreign Service in 1940 and has served in various posts abroad and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was Turkish Consul-General in Geneva until his transfer to the Ministry in 1954 as Director-General of the Department of Commerce and Commercial Agreements. He has since been promoted to be Assistant Secretary-General for Economic Affairs.

M. Işik is a pleasant person to deal with and does his best to be helpful. He does not, however, give an impression of forcefulness and it is difficult to tell how much weight he carries. He speaks excellent French and English and is married to an agreeable wife.

77. Kalafat, Emin

Born in Salonika in 1902, he studied at the School of Political Sciences in Istanbul, specialising in Finance and Economy. He was a chief inspector at the Ministry of Finance until May 1950, when he was elected Democrat Party Deputy for Çanakkale. During the 1952 budget debates he took a leading part during the Committee stage and together with his friend, M. Çelikbaş (*q.v.*), strongly criticised the Government policy. The two men concentrated their attack on M. Ağaoğlu (*q.v.*) and, although the Prime Minister offered both new Ministerial appointments, they refused to enter the Cabinet until M. Ağaoğlu had been dismissed. The Prime Minister shortly afterwards met their request and M. Kalafat became Minister of Customs and Monopolies in April 1953. He was reappointed on the formation of the new Government in May 1954, when he retained his seat at Çanakkale.

He survived the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 and was appointed a Minister of State in the 4th Menderes Cabinet. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and confirmed in his appointment as Minister of State in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

A member of the Executive Committee of the Democrat Party, M. Kalafat is a diminutive but energetic man, in the intimate counsels of the Prime Minister. He used to be considered a potential dissident in the Party partly owing to his friendship with M. Çelikbaş. Nevertheless, after M. Çelikbaş's resignation, his attitude hardened and he is now one of the most outspoken critics of the Opposition. He is married and speaks Turkish only.

78. Kapani, Osman

Born in Izmir in 1915, he studied in France and Germany, soon became a prominent lawyer in Izmir and was chief leader writer in the newspaper *Demokrat Izmir*. Elected Democrat Deputy for Izmir in 1950, he became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly and a Turkish delegate to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe since 1950. In September 1952 he was nominated Minister in Brussels but he refused the appointment and in November 1952 he was elected deputy chairman of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group. Appointed a Minister of State in May 1954, he was responsible for various administrative branches of government, including land problems and the resettlement of refugees. He resigned in September 1955 presumably because of his responsibility for refugees and students, and their share in the September riots. But he had many enemies in the Democrat Party. He has not been prominent since, and is now one of the three Democrat Party Inspectors for Istanbul. Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957.

M. Kapani is friendly to us, but socially he is rather trying, for he is a persistent and pompous bore with little sense of humour. He prides himself on his knowledge of foreign affairs, and is very sensitive on matters affecting Turkey's prestige as a European country.

He speaks French and German and a very little English.

79. Karaosmanoğlu, Fevzi Lütfi

Born in Manisa in 1900 of a historic family, he is a wealthy farmer, but in his youth he worked as a journalist.

Elected Democrat Deputy for Manisa in 1950, he was soon afterwards appointed Minister of State for Marshall Aid. He was dropped from the Cabinet in March 1951 but reappointed Minister of State in June 1951. Meanwhile, however, the responsibility for Marshall Aid affairs, over which he had disagreed with the Prime Minister, had been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In December 1951 he was appointed Minister of the Interior, but in April 1952, after one of his many disagreements with Samet Ağaoğlu, who had the Prime Minister's backing, he resigned from the Government.

Karaosmanoğlu was one of the most popular and influential leaders of the Democrat Party; he strongly criticised the Government for pursuing a repressive policy after the 1954 elections, and his relations

with the Prime Minister suffered accordingly. His prestige in the Democrat Party, particularly in the Ægean area, is high. Re-elected a Deputy in May 1954.

In 1955 his relations with the Prime Minister again declined and he resigned from the Democrat Party. He was elected Leader of the Freedom Party at its Foundation in December 1955. Although Party Leader, he has not been prominent in Freedom Party campaigning for support and it may be that he was chosen for his influential name and general reputation. In the Grand National Assembly he left the debating mainly to Fethi Çelikbaş (*q.v.*) and the younger members of the party.

Failed for re-election as a Deputy for his home province of Manisa in the October 1957 elections. It is widely believed that he will now retire from politics and return to farming.

A fall from a horse affected his spine and gave him the appearance of a hunchback. He is married and understands but does not speak French. His strength lies in his integrity and obvious sincerity.

80. Karaosmanoğlu, Yakop Kadri

Born in 1888, the best known and one of the most prolific modern Turkish novelists. He was a Deputy from 1927 to 1934, during which time he represented Turkey at several congresses abroad. Appointed Minister to Albania in 1934 he was transferred to Prague in 1936 and to The Hague in 1939. In 1942 he was appointed Minister in Berne and in 1949 Ambassador at Tehran. In 1951 he returned to Berne and retired soon afterwards.

He has recently returned to some prominence in the Turkish Press and has delivered slashing attacks on the Democrat Party for their conduct of the 1957 general elections.

As a novelist he has concentrated on social questions and his works are controversial among the more nationalistic elements in Turkey. His most famous novel is "Yaban," which describes the mental isolation of an intellectual stranded in a Turkish village.

81. Kavur, Şadi

Born about 1905, he is a career member of the Turkish Foreign Service. He was "Chef de Cabinet" to the Minister in 1944 and in the following year was a member of the Turkish Economic Mission to the United Kingdom. In September 1945 he became Counsellor in London and acted as Chargé d'Affaires. He returned to Ankara in 1950 and in 1952 became the first Director-General of the newly-formed NATO Department with the rank of Minister. At the end of April 1955 he was appointed Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade.

He has been most friendly and helpful and, while not brilliant, is well above the average level of competence among his colleagues. He has a pleasant personality and speaks good English. He is divorced.

82. Kilicioğlu, Safa

Born about 1910, of Syrian origin, he is the son of a former member of the Syrian secret police. Educated in Arab countries, he settled in Istanbul at the age of 16 and, as a servant of a member of the Presidential staff, was given employment at the Dolmabahçe Palace in 1928. He left this post in disgrace and was at one time suspected of being an agent of the Baghdad secret police.

He joined the Democrat Party on its foundation but was expelled for his ceaseless intrigues. He then joined the National Party and before long secured absolute control of the Istanbul daily paper, *Yeni Sabah*, which was the party's official organ. He still owns the paper, which is one of the most powerful and influential in Turkey, but which has repeatedly been accused by the present Government of attempting to exploit religious feeling and reaction. During the 1954 elections the paper supported the R.N.P.

A man of little education, M. Kilicioğlu has been a vehement critic of the Democrat Government and, in particular, the Prime Minister. But early in 1955 (at a time when he was facing a charge of inciting public opinion by his serialisation of a story on life in Moscow) he improved his relations with the Prime Minister, and accompanied him on his official visit to Iraq; his paper has modified its criticisms of the Government accordingly, and is now one of the very few Independent Istanbul papers which does not openly oppose the Government.

He speaks some French but no English.

83. Kirdar, Lütfi

Born in 1888 at Kirkuk, he studied medicine in Germany and subsequently joined the Government Medical Service. Elected P.R.P. Deputy for Kutahya in 1935 but resigned his seat for financial reasons in 1936 and became Vali of Manisa. Appointed Vali of Istanbul in 1938, where he remained until replaced by Professor Gökay (*q.v.*) in 1949. He visited the United Kingdom in 1947.

In September 1949 he was appointed Turkish Minister at Stockholm, but the appointment was cancelled and he was elected P.R.P. Deputy for Manisa in October of the same year. Lost his seat in the general elections of 1950 but subsequently joined the Democrat Party and was elected on the Democrat Party list for Istanbul in 1954. Re-elected in October 1957 and appointed Minister of Health in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

As Vali of Istanbul Dr. Kirdar gained a reputation for honesty and for being an earnest moderniser. He has, however, been politically in obscurity since 1950.

He is married to a Circassian wife of an influential family.

84. Koç, Vehbi

Born about 1900, the son of a small landowner from Ankara. Went into business and obtained the Ford Agency for Turkey in 1928. This was the foundation of his fortune and he has since extended his business interests so far that he is now the richest man in Turkey. He controls a large import and export business and, apart from being the Ford agent, holds the agency in Turkey for Fiats and General Electric. Built and owns the second largest hotel in Istanbul and is also sole owner of Turkey's main rubber goods factory.

M. Koç was a supporter of the People's Republican Party until 1950. He has, however, kept the favour of the Democrat Party by means of large contributions to party funds and by founding a number of academic and social institutes. He is a shadowy figure but has great financial influence. Speaks only Turkish.

85. Köprülü, Mehmet Fuat

Born in Istanbul in 1890, he is a descendant of the famous family of Grand Viziers and enjoys some prestige as the bearer of one of the very few surviving historical names in Turkey.

Köprülü became a professor of history at the University of Istanbul at the age of 23. Between the two world wars his oriental scholarship received international recognition: honoured by several continental universities, he visited Russia in 1925 and

1929, Czechoslovakia in 1929 and Tehran in 1934. His best known works are his contributions to the "Encyclopaedia of Islam," and he was a leading authority on the history of the Shahs of Khwarizm and the Azerbaijan and Çagatay Turks.

Deputy for Kars for many years, he was Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Public Instruction in 1924. He was one of the original founders of the Democrat Party and a prominent critic of successive R.P.P. Governments: in May 1950 he was elected Democrat Deputy for Istanbul and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

He worked persistently for the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and his final success during 1951 and 1952 enhanced his prestige and seemed to justify his methods. The Tripartite Treaty with Greece and Yugoslavia, signed in 1953, and the ceremonial visits surrounding it, have fed his vanity even more. He is a thorough-going enemy of the Soviet Union.

The Prime Minister, M. Menderes, always exerted a strong influence on M. Köprülü's policies. He was criticised for his handling of the expulsion of the Turkish Ambassador from Cairo in 1954 (Hulusi Tugay) and his lack of prominence during the negotiations prior to the agreement between Pakistan and Turkey gave rise to speculation that he would be replaced as Minister for Foreign Affairs. It became more and more obvious that the Prime Minister was taking the conduct of foreign affairs into his own hands, and M. Köprülü, though accompanying M. Menderes on his visits to Middle East capitals, played little part in the negotiations for the Turco-Iraqi Pact. It therefore came as no surprise when in April 1955 the Prime Minister took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and M. Köprülü became merely another Minister of State. After a period of comparative obscurity he re-emerged in December 1955 as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Fourth Menderes Cabinet. But his relations with the Prime Minister soon deteriorated, partly as a result of the Prime Minister's high-handed action over two of Professor Köprülü's relatives in the Democrat Party. He eventually resigned from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1956, probably because of his disgust at the white-washing of Mükerrem Sarol (*q.v.*). Subsequently his relations with the Prime Minister and with the Democrat Party rapidly worsened and, in September 1957, he resigned from the party on the grounds that it no longer stood for the principles on which it had been created. His example was followed by only two or three Deputies and he did not stand as a candidate in the October 1957 elections. He has so far remained independent although his sympathies are evidently with the Freedom Party and he has written a number of powerful Press articles denouncing M. Menderes and the Democrat Party. Nevertheless, now that he is no longer in the Assembly the conviction is growing that his political career is at an end.

He speaks fluent French. His wife, whom he met when she attended his lectures as a student at the Istanbul University, is not easy to entertain, though she speaks some German and is now making some progress with English, which she likes to practise. His daughter, who recently married a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, speaks English.

86. Köprülü, Orhan

Born in 1920 and educated at Istanbul University, where he was a lecturer in the Faculty of Letters from 1945 to 1949. Did research at London University from 1951 to 1953 on the history of Anglo-Turkish relations. After returning to Turkey in 1953, when his father, Fuat Köprülü (*q.v.*), was still Foreign Minister, he joined the Democrat Party and was elected Chairman of the party's Istanbul organisation in June 1955.

M. Köprülü's relations with the party deteriorated in 1956 and 1957, owing to his dislike of the increasing authoritarianism of the Prime Minister. He eventually resigned from his chairmanship and from the party in July 1957 and joined the Freedom Party. Elected Chairman of the Freedom Party Istanbul organisation in September 1957 and was an unsuccessful candidate on the Freedom Party list in the 1957 general elections.

An intelligent and forceful character, he is regarded as an up and coming man in Turkish politics, but may have seriously handicapped himself by adherence to the Freedom Party.

87. Koraltan, Refik

Deputy for Içel, Koraltan was born in 1899 at Divrik in Central Anatolia. Having graduated from the Law Faculty in Istanbul, he practised law for some time. He played a role of some importance in the War of Independence as president of the fifth Independence Court responsible for Central Anatolia. From 1920–35 he was Deputy for Konya. Since 1943 he has been Deputy for Içel.

One of the original founders of the Democrat Party, he was rewarded with the office of Chairman of the National Assembly in 1950 which he retains. He is an adequate figurehead. By the Constitution he acts as President of the Republic when the latter is out of the country. He now appears to play little part in political life, although he controls Assembly debates with a strong governmental bias and in the manner of a parade-ground sergeant-major. He headed parliamentary delegations to Iraq and Italy in 1956.

Re-elected a Deputy in the 1957 elections and also to his traditional post of Chairman of the National Assembly.

He is married, has four children, and speaks a very little French. He is friendly, but rather slow-witted, and extremely vain.

88. Körez, Nafiz

Born in Kula in 1909, he graduated in medicine and served with the Ministry of Health. A specialist in internal diseases.

Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Manisa in 1950 and re-elected in 1954. Appointed Minister of Health in the Fourth Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. As a Minister he showed no particular signs of energy or ability. Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957, but was not re-appointed to the Cabinet.

89. Korur, Ahmet Salih

Born about 1910 and educated at the School of Political Sciences, he became a civil servant and in 1947 was appointed Director-General of the Land Registry. Whilst in this post he earned the gratitude of Adnan Menderes, whose lands in Aydin he is said to have defended against R.P.P. designs.

After the victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 elections, he emerged from comparative obscurity to become Under-Secretary to the new Prime Minister, M. Menderes. In 1952 to 1953 he was for sometime also acting Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior. He was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Coronation of Her Majesty The Queen, and returned much impressed.

In 1954 he was appointed Under-Secretary of State at the Prime Ministry, where he became increasingly influential as more administrative work was delegated to him by the busy Prime Minister. He resigned at M. Menderes's wish in September 1957 to stand as a Democrat Party candidate for Ankara. Defeated at the elections in October 1957 he returned to his post at the Prime Ministry.

Intelligent, but brusque and unpopular. M. Korur lives on the Prime Minister's favour and is said to

be one of the few people in Turkey who has any influence over M. Menderes. A coming man. He is married and speaks only Turkish.

90. Korutürk, Fahri, Admiral

Born in 1904 and commissioned in the Turkish Navy in 1923. A submarine specialist, he was Naval Attaché in Rome, Berlin and Stockholm. Appointed Director of Intelligence of the Turkish General Staff in 1954 and Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Fleet, in 1955. Replaced by Admiral Ulusan (*q.v.*) in August 1956 and appointed Commander, Straits and Marmara.

Appointed acting Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Navy, and COMEDNOREAST in place of Admiral Altincan (*q.v.*) in October 1957.

Admiral Korutürk, who is married to a rich and well-connected wife, is one of the best Turkish naval officers. He is efficient and has a strong personality. Although outwardly dour, he is in fact pleasant and co-operative.

91. Köymen, Hulusi

Born in Istanbul in 1891, he studied law and later practised as a lawyer. In June 1949 he became a member of the Administrative Council of the Democrat Party, and in May 1950 he was elected Democrat Deputy for Bursa and Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly. In December 1950 he was appointed Minister of Labour, and in the Cabinet reshuffle of March 1951 he was transferred to the Ministry of National Defence. In November 1942, he resigned from the Ministry of Defence and was elected chairman of the Democrat Party Parliamentary Group and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly. In January 1953, he led the Turkish Parliamentary delegation to Yugoslavia. Re-elected a Deputy in May 1954. In January 1955 he was in the Prime Minister's party for his official visit to Baghdad and Beirut. Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957.

He is married and has two children. He speaks Turkish only.

92. Küfrevi, Kasim

Born in Bitlis in 1920, he followed Islamic studies at Istanbul University and was then on the staff of the Literature Faculty at the university. He was elected Democrat Deputy for Ağri in 1950 and retained this seat in 1954. In 1955 he worked with Fethi Çelikbaş (*q.v.*) to form an Opposition group of young Deputies within the Democrat Party. He resigned from the Party in the summer of 1955 and remained an Independent, resolutely declining to join the Freedom Party allegedly because it might prejudice the Government against his Kurdish Constituents. In September 1957 he was persuaded by the Prime Minister to rejoin the Democrat Party and was re-elected a Deputy for Ağri on the Democrat Party list in the October 1957 elections.

A Kurd, he is lively and intelligent and speaks fluent English, Arabic and Persian. Married with one child.

93. Kuneralp, Zeki

Born in 1914 in Istanbul and brought up and educated in Switzerland. Graduated in 1938 from the University of Berne and entered the Turkish Foreign Service in 1940. Has served in Bucharest, Prague and in the Turkish delegation to NATO. Was "chef du Cabinet" to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1947. In 1957 he returned to the Ministry and was appointed Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs with the rank of Minister.

M. Kuneralp is a competent, honest and hard-working official whose Swiss background is apparent in his work and manner. He speaks good English, French and German, as well as some Russian. Married with two children.

94. Kural, Adnan

M. Kural is one of the abler members of the Turkish Foreign Service. In September 1945 he returned to the Ministry after being First Secretary in Moscow. In 1948 he was a member of the Turkish Delegation to the United Nations. From 1951 to 1955 he was in the Third Department of the Ministry dealing with international organisations, and from 1952, on promotion to Minister, he was head of the department. He co-operated closely with the Embassy and showed sound judgment and considerable intelligence.

In February 1955 he was nominated Turkish Ambassador to Syria, at a particularly critical time for Turco-Syrian relations. He took up his post the following month and made a favourable impression in Damascus.

He is either separated or divorced from his intelligent wife. He speaks very good English and excellent French.

95. Kurbanoğlu, Muzaffer

Born in 1913 in Manisa. A lawyer by profession. Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Manisa in 1950 and re-elected in 1954 and 1957. Appointed a Minister of State in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

Before his appointment to the Cabinet M. Kurbanoglu was an inconspicuous back-bencher in the Democrat Party; and is alleged to be a devoted follower of M. Menederes and a personal friend of the other Minister of State, M. Kulafat (*q.v.*). He is married and speaks French.

96. Kurtbek, Seyfi

Born in 1905 and educated at the Istanbul Military School and War Academy. He spent most of his life in the army, was a Military Attaché in Paris before the war and in Greece during the early part of the war. Later in the war he was a military observer attached to the British Eighth Army. By 1950 he was a staff colonel and acting head of the Mobilisation Department. On the eve of the 1950 general elections he resigned and joined the Democrat Party, wrote some articles for the Democrat Party newspaper advocating a reduction of military expenditure, and was elected Democrat Deputy for Ankara. In August 1950 he was appointed Minister of Communications and in November 1952 he became Minister of National Defence.

Colonel Kurtbek was an energetic, ambitious and intrepid staff officer and wrote several books on military subjects. His position as Minister was resented by many senior officers who would not tolerate being subordinate to an ex-colonel, and this led to his resignation in 1953, when he appeared to lose the support of the Prime Minister. He was re-elected a Deputy in May 1954. In 1955 he was associated with Fethi Çelikbaş (*q.v.*) in the dissident group of intellectuals within the Democrat Party. In the event he remained in the Democrat Party and withdrew his support from the dissidents. Failed for re-election as a Deputy (for Ankara) in the elections of October 1957.

He is reserved and inconspicuous but determined and obstinate. He speaks French and some English.

97. Mandalinci, Zeyyat

Born in Bodrum in 1915, he studied Political Science in Paris and then went into business. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Mugla in 1950

and re-elected in 1954. Has three times represented Turkey at the Council of Europe and became a member of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly in 1952. Appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce in place of M. Fahrettin Ulaş (*q.v.*) in May 1956. Although he made a good job of presenting the scrappy so-called economic reforms to the National Assembly and had at the time the reputation of being a good "Menderes man," he resigned in November 1956 and was replaced by M. Aker (*q.v.*). Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957, he is now said to represent the moderate faction in the Democrat Party and to be opposed to M. Menderes' high-handed methods.

He speaks French and English.

98. Mavroudi, Constantino T.

Born in a village between Silivri and Istanbul on December 9, 1884, he was educated at Galatasaray, Istanbul and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1901. During his career in the Foreign Service of the Ottoman Empire he served in Athens, Batoum, Belgrade, Rome, London (1912), Rome again and finally Washington. He left the service in 1917 and for a time worked in banking and business circles. In 1926 he was Secretary to the British Agent on the Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal and in 1929 joined *The Times* of London as assistant correspondent in Istanbul. He became full correspondent in 1940 and a staff correspondent in 1941. A well-known figure in Turkish political and journalistic circles, he is a well-informed and reliable observer, but now rather a past number and looking forward to his retirement.

Since the riots of September 1955 there has been a good deal of private criticisms of M. Mavroudi's reporting, especially on Cyprus, in view of his alleged pro-Greek sympathies. His health has lately been failing.

99. Mayatepek, Hüveyda

Born in Istanbul in 1914, he graduated in 1940 from the Law Faculty of Rome University and subsequently gained a Doctorate of Law there. Entered the Turkish Foreign Service in 1944 and has served in many appointments in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and abroad. He was First Secretary in the Turkish Delegation to NATO at Paris until 1954 when he was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Assistant Director of the NATO Department. Promoted to be Head of the Department and subsequently combined this post with being Assistant Secretary-General for NATO matters.

M. Mayatepek is friendly and co-operative but not very bright. He speaks good French and Italian and voluble but often incomprehensible English but his apparently procrastinating methods are partially redeemed by his acute sense of humour. He has the distinction of being married to a daughter of Enver Damad, an intelligent woman and practising chemist.

100. Menderes, Adnan

Born in Aydin in 1899. He graduated from the Law Faculty of Istanbul University and learnt English in Izmir. He served throughout the War of Independence as a reserve officer. A large landowner in Aydin and practical farmer, M. Menderes became chairman of the People's Party in Aydin, and in 1933 he was elected Deputy for that place and became a member of the Finance Commission of the National Assembly.

A strong critic of the Land Reform Law of 1945, he took a leading part in the formation of the Democrat Party, was elected Democrat Deputy for Kütahya in 1946, and soon became well known as one of the most powerful Opposition speakers in the Assembly.

After his party's victory in the 1950 general elections, M. Menderes became first Democrat Prime Minister, and after M. Bayar's election to the Presidency of the Republic he was elected chairman of the Democrat Party. His ability, dynamic personality and forceful oratory had already elevated him to a position of complete domination among his Ministers and in the party.

On coming to power, M. Menderes embarked on an extensive programme of capital construction and industrialisation far beyond the resources of the country. His rule became more personal and more intolerant of criticism as his power and confidence increased. Already in 1952 two Ministers and a high party official resigned as a protest against his high-handedness. Before the elections of 1954, he forced through the Assembly measures designed to place the P.R.P. Opposition at a disadvantage, notably confiscation of the P.R.P.'s properties and restrictions on the freedom of the Press.

In May 1954 M. Menderes' Democrat Party was returned to power with a large majority, due more to his genuine achievements than to these partisan laws, and his prestige reached its height. However, his authoritarian tendencies further increased and more laws were passed to cripple the Opposition. By now the country's economic development was outrunning its sources of credit and M. Menderes' hopes to save the situation by means of a large loan from the United States in the spring of 1955 were disappointed.

From time to time M. Menderes has made conciliatory approaches towards the Opposition and invited them to collaborate in Parliamentary government on an amicable basis. But any criticism at once stung him to further attacks, and since mid-1955 his relations with the Opposition parties have been consistently bitter, except for an ephemeral reconciliation with M. Inönü in the spring of 1957. It was not, however, till 1955 that his authoritarian attitude and the deteriorating economic situation led to serious opposition within his own party.

This crystallised first in the resignation from the party of a group of dissidents led by M. Karaosmanoğlu (*q.v.*) and M. Çelikbaş (*q.v.*), who founded the new Freedom Party in December 1955; and, secondly, in a revolt of the Party Parliamentary Group in late November which resulted in the resignation of M. Menderes and his Cabinet. Nevertheless, he received a personal vote of confidence from the group and formed a new Cabinet in which he included a number of new and hitherto unknown Ministers. He undertook to carry out a number of democratic reforms and also measures of economic retrenchment; but it was not long before he again felt strong enough to resume his autocratic methods. The political reforms did not materialise and in 1956 he rushed more undemocratic laws through the Assembly designed to muzzle the Press and restrict the activities of the Opposition. Equally he refused to modify the ambitious capital development programme on which he sets great personal store. He soon appeared in fact to have regained full control of the Democrat Party and of the Government.

In 1957 he decided that, on account of the rapidly deteriorating economic situation and the continued pressure of the Opposition, it would be as well to advance the date of the general elections constitutionally due in May 1958. Before the announcement of the October 1957 elections was made he further restricted the activities of the Opposition by ordering the arrest, in July, of M. Bölükbaşi, the leader of the Republican National Party, for insulting the moral personality of the National Assembly, and also by rushing an amendment to the Electoral Law through the Assembly preventing the Opposition parties from combining against the Democrat Party in the elections. As a result of these further illiberal

measures M. Fuat Köprülü (*q.v.*) and two or three other Deputies resigned from the Democrat Party.

M. Menderes conducted the 1957 election campaign with great personal vigour and concentrated mainly on the past achievement of the Democrat Party and the promise of a glorious future under their continued régime. In the event his party won the elections but with a reduced majority of only 240 seats. Rumours immediately became current that the elections had been rigged and relations between the Prime Minister and the Opposition further deteriorated. It was evident however that the Prime Minister was not prepared to make concessions either to the Opposition or to the moderate elements within his own party, and his Fifth Cabinet contained an even higher proportion than usual of yes-men. Nevertheless he had already encountered opposition from within his own party as demonstrated by the fact that it took him twenty-five days to form his new Cabinet.

It is thought that President Bayar disapproves of M. Menderes' autocratic tendencies and also of his predilection for certain discreditable cronies; and that the President sternly opposed the inclusion of M. Zorlu in the Fifth Cabinet. Nevertheless during the election campaign the President and the Prime Minister appeared to be working together in complete harmony.

M. Menderes takes a strong interest in foreign affairs; he has paid official visits to many European and Asiatic capitals, including London, and also to Washington. He attended the coronation of Her Majesty The Queen. In early 1955 M. Menderes was indefatigable to promote the Turco-Iraqi Pact and has been a consistent supporter of the Baghdad Pact which grew out of it. He took the conduct of foreign affairs more and more into his own hands and in April 1955 dismissed Fuat Köprülü (*q.v.*) and took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs himself until July 1955, when Fatin Zorlu (*q.v.*) became Foreign Minister. He has always worked closely with M. Zorlu and has relied on him for advice, but has continued to exercise close personal control of foreign policy whoever the Minister in office might be. He was the Turkish spokesman in the talks that took place during the Secretary of State's visit to Ankara in March 1956 and expressed himself with his usual clarity and force. After the Suez crisis in the autumn of 1956 he played a leading part in the meetings of the Moslem members of the Baghdad Pact and considered himself with some justification responsible for persuading the other members not to expel Great Britain from the Pact.

He dresses carefully, is married and has one son.

Although rumours are constantly current that he is developing paranoiac tendencies and that he is becoming increasingly unstable, he always presents a front of complete self-possession and suavity. His powers of concentration are immense and he has the outstanding faculty of being able to divorce himself from his many preoccupations and concentrate exclusively on the problem under discussion whatever its nature may be. He speaks some English which, though hesitant, is improving, and understands it reasonably well.

101. Menderes, Ethem

Born in 1899 in Izmir, he studied at the Istanbul Faculty of Law and practised law in Aydin for many years. He was Mayor of Aydin several times. In the early thirties he was associated with Fethi Okyar's Free Party, and he joined the Democrat Party at the time of its foundation. He stood as Democrat candidate for Aydin in the general elections of 1946 and 1950, and in 1950 he was returned. In August 1952 he was appointed Minister of the Interior. He has acted as Foreign Minister during the absences of M. Köprülü. Appointed Minister of National Defence in May 1954.

He was appointed Acting Minister of the Interior after the riots of September 6–7, 1955, and was confirmed as Minister of the Interior on September 30. He survived the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 in the same appointment and was appointed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs after the resignation of Professor Köprülü (*q.v.*) in June 1956. Appointed Minister of Public Works in October 1956, he relinquished the Ministry of the Interior but remained as acting Minister for Foreign Affairs until replaced by M. Zorlu (*q.v.*) on the formation of the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957. He remained as Minister of Public Works only. Visited West Germany, France and the United Kingdom in 1956.

A wealthy landowner, he is a boyhood friend but no blood relation of Adnan Menderes. His zeal for the Democrat Party earned him his appointment to the Ministry of the Interior, and he is reputed to be capable and energetic, but in none of his Ministerial appointments does he seem to have made any strong impression. He is courteous, pleasant to meet and personally friendly to us. He speaks Turkish only but his wife speaks French.

102. Menemencioğlu, Numan

Born in 1880 of an influential family, he was educated at Galatasary and studied law in Switzerland. In 1915 he joined the Turkish Foreign Service and served successively in Vienna, Berne, The Hague, Athens, Budapest, Beirut and the Ministry, until in 1933 he was promoted Ambassador and appointed to the new post of Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Having played a prominent part in the Montreux Conference and the Alexandretta negotiations, he was elected Deputy for Gaziantep in 1937 in order to become Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, but soon afterwards, when this post was abolished, he resigned his seat and returned to his previous post. He conducted the negotiations for the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939 and for the Turco-German Credit Agreement of the same year. In August 1942 he was elected Deputy for Istanbul, and a few days later appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. In June 1944 he resigned and was appointed Ambassador to Paris. From 1949 to 1951 he was accredited also to Lisbon.

In the summer of 1957 he retired from the Foreign Service and, to the general surprise, stood as a Democrat Party candidate for Istanbul in the general elections of October 1957. He was duly elected and it is expected that he may play some part in the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Grand National Assembly.

For many years M. Menemencioğlu was the leading authority on foreign affairs and his influence in shaping Turkish policy was considerable. Intelligent, subtle and hard-working, he is an able and unscrupulous negotiator, and is generally considered to be Turkey's leading diplomat. He was probably mainly responsible for keeping Turkey out of the war early in 1944.

Now deaf and in indifferent health, he is somewhat retiring, but friendly and likeable. He is a good bridge player, and speaks excellent French.

103. Mengüç, Fevzi, General

Born in 1896 and commissioned in 1914, he served on most fronts in the first world war and took part in the War of Independence. Between 1929 and 1931 he attended courses at German military schools.

Promoted major-general in 1941, he was for some time Inspector of Engineers. He was appointed Commandant of the Staff College and promoted lieutenant-general in 1947. In 1952 he was appointed to command the Third Army (Erzurum). In 1954

he became Commander of the Combined Staff Colleges at Yildiz. Appointed a member of the Supreme Military Court and Chairman of the Supreme Military Court of Appeal in June 1956. Appointed acting Chief of the Turkish General Staff on the retirement of General Tunaboylu (*q.v.*) in September 1957.

Although shrewd and hard-working, he is not impressive as a Commander. He is very friendly to British officers. Married, he speaks German, some French, and is teaching himself English, which he can now speak a little.

104. Müstecabi, Esat Adil

Born about 1890, he was once a judge and a reformist prison governor. However, he resigned from the public service and devoted himself to social reform. In 1946 he formed the Turkish Socialist Party and began to publish a newspaper.

He was arrested at the end of 1946 for alleged Communist activity ; but in 1949 he was acquitted and released for lack of evidence, and in 1950 he refounded his Socialist Party and became editor of a new Socialist newspaper *Gerçek*. The newspaper soon died out, and the Socialist Party attracted little support : in the 1951 by-elections Müstecabi himself polled less than ·1 per cent. of the votes in Istanbul. In June 1952 his party was suppressed for alleged Communist activity and he himself was rearrested and imprisoned. He is now at liberty again but remains under constant police supervision.

Originally not a dogmatic Communist, he has shown no undue pro-Soviet leanings, at any rate in public, though some of his newspaper articles urged neutralism.

105. Nadi, Nadir

Born in Fethiye in 1908, he studied at the Galatasary Lycée and in Germany and Austria. He inherited from his father *Cumhuriyet*, one of the most powerful newspapers in the country.

Elected Independent Deputy for Muğla with Democrat Party support in 1950, he has been a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly; and every year since 1948 he has attended a number of international conferences as an official Turkish delegate. In 1954 he was a member of the Turkish Delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, but was defeated in the Democrat Party parliamentary group's election for this position in May 1955.

Elected as an Independent candidate in the Democrat Party list in May 1954, he did not stand for re-election in the 1957 elections. Although his newspaper is still theoretically independent it has moved away from support of the Democrat Party and is now strongly oppositional. On foreign affairs it has recently taken a marked anti-British line especially over Cyprus thanks to the activities of the foreign news editor, M. Coşar (*q.v.*).

M. Nadi is Westernised, worldly and strongly anti-religious and spends much time in Western Europe. An admirer of German culture and formerly pro-Nazi, he now supports Turkey's ties with the West. He is however extremely stupid and exercises less and less control over his staff, especially M. Coşar. (His brother, Doğan Nadi, who is co-editor, is a very similar character.) Both he and his wife speak French.

106. Nasuhioğlu, Rükneddin

Born in 1894 at Scutari. Educated at the Istanbul School of Political Science, he entered civil service and rose to be Governor of Içel in 1935 and in 1939 Director-General at the Ministry of the Interior. After four more governorships he was placed *en disponibilité* in 1949. Elected a Democrat Deputy in 1950, he was appointed Minister of the Interior in the first Democratic Government. In the Cabinet reshuffle of March 1951 he exchanged the portfolio of the Interior for that of Justice.

However he had been too closely associated with the P.R.P. for the more radical members of the Democrat Party, who alleged particularly that he had rigged the 1946 elections against them in Samsun ; and in November 1952 he was forced to resign. Re-elected a Democrat Party Deputy in May 1954. In January 1955 he was a member of the Prime Minister's party for his official visit to Iraq and the Lebanon. Re-elected a Deputy (for Edirne) in October 1957.

Retiring, but not unfriendly, he is married and speaks some French.

107. Okan, Zekai, General

Born in 1894, and commissioned in 1912. He served in the First World War and in the War of Independence. In 1936, when he was a colonel, he was appointed to form an Armoured Combat Command and became its commander. In 1938 he was promoted brigadier. Promoted major-general and a divisional commander in 1940. 1944, inspector of signals ; 1947, G.O.C. air defence ; 1948, promoted lieutenant-general and corps commander; 1950, Vice-Chief of the General Staff. In 1951 he led a "goodwill" military mission to Pakistan, and in 1952 he was promoted general and became G.O.C., First Army. In July 1952, however, he returned to his previous post as V.C.G.S. In 1954, after being head of the Turkish Liaison Mission in Japan (for Korea), he retired but was recalled in May 1955 to become a member of the Supreme Military Council. Appointed Turkish Ambassador at Kabul in December 1955.

General Okan is self-opinionated and difficult to get to know. The American Mission used to complain that he never fulfilled his undertakings. He is married.

108. Ökmen, Nedim

Born in Kilis in 1908, he is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences. Originally a civil servant, he had risen to be Chief Inspector at the Ministry of Finance before his election as Democrat Deputy for Maraş in 1950.

In March 1951 he was appointed Minister of Agriculture, and he was reappointed in May 1954. After the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 he was appointed Minister of Finance. There were stories that his financial policy was opposed to the Prime Minister's and that he was a possible successor to M. Menderes. He resigned in August 1956, most probably on account of his opposition to M. Menderes' financial policy and to M. Zeyyat Mandalinci's (*q.v.*) activities as Minister of Economy and Commerce. His resignation disappointed those who saw him as a possible successor to M. Menderes, and he sank into temporary political obscurity. He was re-elected a Deputy (for Gaziantep) in the general elections of October 1957 and was appointed Minister of Agriculture in the fifth Menderes' Cabinet in November 1957. His return to the Cabinet was interpreted as a possible concession by M. Menderes to the moderates in the Democrat Party.

He speaks some French and his wife some English. Both are friendly.

109. Oral, Cavit

Born in Adana in 1904, he studied at Würtemberg Agricultural School and the Istanbul School of Political Science. Elected Deputy for Nigde in 1935 and in 1943 Deputy for Seyhan. On the formation of the second Hasan Saka Cabinet in June 1948 he became Minister of Agriculture and continued to hold this portfolio on the formation of the Günaltay Cabinet in January 1949. He lost his seat in the 1950 general elections. For some time he remained an influential member of the party and associated himself with Şemsettin Günaltay's plans for its reform. He has now completely severed his connections with the P.R.P. and supports the Government whole-heartedly. He was elected as an Independent Deputy in the Democrat Party list in May 1954, and joined the party shortly after the elections. He is now on good terms with the Prime Minister, and is trying to build up his position in the Democrat Party in the rich Adana area. Nevertheless he failed to be re-elected as a Democrat Party candidate in the elections of 1957.

He owns, and at one time edited, the *Bugün Gazetesi* of Adana and early in 1951 started a daily paper, *Hürses*, in Ankara, which he edits and to which he contributes regularly.

He speaks some German and is friendly to us.

110. Orbay, Hüseyin, Rauf

Born in 1881, he was trained as a naval officer, and distinguished himself as captain of the *Hamidiyeh* during the Balkan wars. In the first world war he eventually became Chief of the Naval Staff, and at its close, as Minister of War, he signed the armistice at Mudros on the 30th October, 1918.

Elected Deputy to the Ottoman Parliament in 1920, he helped Atatürk to create the Nationalist movement and was arrested and deported to Malta. In 1922 he became Atatürk's Prime Minister, but he resigned after the Treaty of Lausanne in protest against his constitutional policy. In 1924 he went into opposition and became president of the new Progressive Party. In 1926 he went to London and soon afterwards was sentenced, *in absentia*, to ten years' imprisonment for conspiracy against Atatürk's life. He remained in exile until 1936 and was never reconciled to Atatürk. In 1939 he was elected Deputy and officially exonerated from any part in the plot against Atatürk; and in 1942 he was appointed Ambassador in London. He resigned in 1944.

A charming and popular old man, M. Orbay is on good terms with all parties, but has himself made no serious effort to return to politics since his defeat in a by-election in Istanbul in 1949. He is a consistent and ardent supporter of Anglo-Turkish friendship and speaks English well.

111. Ozansoy, Muniz Faik

Born in 1911 at Mitylene, of which his father, Faik Âli was governor, later an Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior and a celebrated poet. There was a long family literary tradition in which M. Ozansoy has followed. He is a well-known poet and has published two literary periodicals, *Marmara* and *Hisar*.

M. Ozansoy was educated at Galatasary, at Istanbul and took his degree in law at Ankara. He joined the Iş Bank in 1933. At the Ministry of Economy, which he joined in 1939, he was successively a Director of Section, an Inspector and a President of the Corps of Inspectors in 1946. In 1949 he became Director-General of the Foreign Trade Department and in May 1953 an Under-Secretary of State.

At the request of the Commission which investigated in early 1956 the alleged irregularities in office of Hasan Polatkan (*q.v.*), Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (*q.v.*) and Sitki Yircali (*q.v.*), he was placed *en disponibilité* for several months. He returned to office, thinner but much rested, shortly before the three ex-Minsters were exonerated by the Commission.

In February 1957 he was appointed an Under-Secretary of State at the Prime Ministry. Later in the year he resigned at M. Menderes's request to become editor of the Democrat Party paper *Havadis*. He stood, unsuccessfully, as a Democrat Party candidate for Ankara in the 1957 general elections and was subsequently given the appointment of Director-General of the Department of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism in place of Dr. Alyot (*q.v.*).

He is hard-working but "heavy" and long-winded. But he is patient and willing to listen to complaints. He is honest and reasonably intelligent but not well equipped as an economist. He speaks English and excellent French.

112. Perin, Mithat

Born in 1917 at Nevrekoj in Macedonia, he was educated at the Galatasary Lycée and at Brussels University.

He played a prominent part in the establishment of the Democrat Party in Izmir in 1946 and but for a difference with the party leaders would have been a candidate there in the general election of 1950. He had journalistic experience with several newspapers in Istanbul and in 1946 joined the staff of *Demokrat Izmir*, the Democrat Party organ in that area. For a time he was principal sub-editor of the Istanbul daily, *Yeni Istanbul*, but soon resigned and started his own newspaper, *Istanbule Ekspres*, which is a daily evening paper. He is still owner-editor of this newspaper which supports the Democrat Party Government, and he is on good terms with the Prime Minister. He is active in the Democrat Party in Istanbul as a member of the party executive and was elected a Deputy on the Democrat Party list for Istanbul in the 1957 general elections.

Widely travelled in Europe and the Middle East, Perin, who is pro-British, visited the United Kingdom as a member of the Turkish Press delegation in 1953. He speaks French and has a fair command of English which, however, he is shy to use. His wife is an attractive woman who speaks excellent English.

113. Polatkan, Hasan

Born in 1915 of a Tartar family of Eskişehir, he studied at the School of Political Science and specialised in finance and banking. He was Inspector at the Agricultural Bank until 1946, when he joined the Democrat Party and was elected a Democrat Deputy. Re-elected in 1950, he was appointed Minister of Labour in the first Democrat Government. In December 1950 he was appointed Minister of Finance and very soon afterwards presented the first Democrat Party budget, which was mainly the work of the Prime Minister himself. In September 1953 he went to the United States to attend the I.M.F. meeting. In May 1954 he was reappointed Minister of Finance and was generally considered to have been a success in the post.

In 1955 his task became increasingly difficult as the country's economic situation deteriorated. He had to accept directives on economic policy from Fatin Zorlu (*q.v.*) and was said to have offered his resignation several times. Forced to resign in the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 he (with Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and Sitki Yircali (*q.v.*)) became subject to a Parliamentary Investigation into his activities while at the Finance Ministry. He was (with the others) exonerated by the Commission in June 1956, and returned to his old appointment as Minister of Finance in December 1956. Re-elected a Deputy

in October 1957 and remained as Minister of Finance in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Polatkan is young and intelligent but has gained the reputation of being an ambitious political opportunist. His wagon is firmly hitched to M. Menderes's star and he is alleged to be unpopular in the Democrat Party.

114. Rizan, Kadri

Born about 1893. A career diplomat, he was appointed Consul at Hamburg in 1925. First Secretary in Washington 1927–30. After serving in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a year he served as Counsellor at Rome, Warsaw, Brussels and London. Recalled to the Ministry in 1942, he was Director-General of the Protocol Department from 1944 to 1949, when he was appointed Minister to Prague, but did not take up the appointment owing to the objections of some members of the Cabinet. He was unemployed until May 1950, when he was appointed Counsellor in London. In the spring of 1952 he was sent to Bucharest as Chargé d'Affaires, and in September 1952 he was appointed Minister in Amman. Appointed Ambassador at New Delhi in April 1957.

M. Rizan, who, as "Chef du Protocole" was competent but not always tactful, speaks fluent English and takes a pride in his English outlook. He is cultured, but not an engaging man; he is a snob. A bachelor.

115. Sarol, Mükerrem

Born in Gediz in 1909. He studied medicine in Istanbul and in Germany. Joined the Government Medical Service and was transferred to Aydin, where he became friendly with M. Menderes and joined the Democrat Party.

Elected a Democrat Party Deputy for Istanbul in 1950 and appointed Minister of State (for Press Affairs) in May 1954. At the end of 1954 and in 1955 he gained notoriety as the prosecutor of several journalists for libel and one of them was eventually sentenced in 1956 to nine months imprisonment. He found it politic to hand over nominal control of his own newspaper, *Türk Sesi*, since, as Minister of State, he controlled the allocation of newsprint and the placing of official advertisements. He resigned from the Ministry of State in October 1955 and became subject to a parliamentary investigation on charges of corruption. He was exonerated in June 1956, to the dismay of the Opposition and to some of the Democrat Party, but, although he still retains the Prime Minister's favour, he has not yet returned to political prominence. Re-elected a Deputy (for Edirne) in October 1957.

Dr. Sarol is intelligent but unpopular in the Democrat Party and generally believed to be politically and morally dishonest. He is, however, a firm crony of the Prime Minister, who protected him against his own party while Minister of State. His unpopularity was such that he was taken off the Democrat Party candidate list for Istanbul in the 1957 elections as they feared that his presence might lose them the elections in that province.

He is married and speaks French and German.

116. Sarper, Selim Rauf

Born in Istanbul in 1896 and educated at Heidelberg, he joined the Turkish Foreign Service and served in Moscow, Odessa, Berlin, Bucharest and in the Ministry. In 1939 he was appointed head of the newly created Central Information Bureau, which in 1943 was reorganised as the Directorate General of Press and Propaganda.

Appointed Ambassador to Moscow in 1944, he was transferred to Rome in 1946 and soon afterwards became Turkish representative to the United Nations Organisation

During his many years at the United Nations his reputation increased and he made a number of forceful speeches on Turkey's behalf, particularly on the Cyprus problem. He is a tough and resolute character with plenty of common sense. Appointed Turkish Permanent Delegate to NATO at Paris in June 1957, but returned temporarily to New York in October to handle the Turkish case in the Syrian crisis.

He speaks good English, is very presentable and has a very attractive wife.

117. Saygün, Adnan

Born in 1907 and educated partially in Paris. He is the best known Turkish composer and has taught at the Ankara Music Teachers' College and has also been a professor of music at both Istanbul and Ankara Conservatoires.

His most famous compositions are The Yunus Emre Oratorio which has been performed in Paris and the first Turkish opera, Kerem.

118. Tacan, Necati, General

Born about 1895 and commissioned about 1914, he was an infantry officer. He served in the First World War and in the Turkish War of Independence. In 1945 he was promoted brigadier-general, and major-general in 1947. He commanded the 11th Division in 1948, the 23rd Division in 1949 and the 6th Dvision in 1951 when he was promoted lieutenant-general. He joined the Turkish General Staff in 1952 and in February 1953 took part in the Balkan Pact Staff talks in Ankara. In August 1953 he became Commander of the 15th Corps and Garrison Commander in Istanbul. In April 1954 he visited Belgrade as head of the Turkish group to the Balkan Pact Staff talks. Appointed Commander, Third Army, in June 1956; and promoted to full general in August 1956. Appointed Commander, Land Forces, in December 1957.

General Tacan is cheerful and popular and has always had good appointments, although he does not appear to be very intelligent. He speaks no foreign languages, but his wife speaks some English.

119. Tanriöver, Hamdullah Süphi

Born in Istanbul in 1885, and educated at Galatasary, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and occupied himself in writing poetry. In 1910 he was appointed Professor of Turkish Literature at Istanbul. He travelled in Germany during the first world war and joined Mustafa Kemal in 1920.

In 1921 and in 1925 he was Minister of Public Instruction; and during the 'twenties he held several other high appointments. In 1923 he became President of the Turkish Ocaks, to which he devoted most of his time and energy; but in 1931, to his great grief, the Ocaks were merged into the Halkevis of the P.R.P. In the same year he was appointed Minister and later Ambasasdor in Bucharest.

He returned to Turkey in 1945, and was elected P.R.P. deputy for Istanbul in 1946. He resigned from the P.R.P. in 1947 and was elected Independent deputy for Manisa in 1950. In 1948 he tried to restart the Ocaks, but without great success. Elected an Independent Deputy in the Democrat Party list May 1954. Joined the Freedom Party in 1957 and stood unsuccessfully on the Freedom Party list for Istanbul in the October 1957 elections.

A pan-Turanian and sometimes pan-Islamic idealist, M. Tanriöver decided in 1946 to urge the moral value to youth of Moslem religious education. He secured an unexpected amount of support and obtained permission for religious classes. Smooth, genteel and platitudinous, his health is now indifferent. Elected President of the Franco-Turkish Cultural Association in 1955.

120. Taray, Cemal Hüsnü

Born about 1897, he was deputy for Gümüşhane from 1925 to 1930. In 1928 he was chief Turkish delegate for the Exchange of Populations, and in 1929 Minister of Education.

Minister in Berne from 1930 to 1936, he was a member of the Turkish delegation to the Disarmament Conference in 1932. Again elected deputy in 1936 he was head of a Turkish Mission which negotiated a number of treaties and conventions in Tehran. Appointed Minister to Brussels in 1938, he was transferred to Warsaw as Ambassador in 1939. Appointed Ambassador in Tehran in 1941 he was recalled for telling the Queen of Persia at a reception that she had the loveliest breasts in the world.

Appointed Ambassador in Rome in 1944, he was later recalled on account of another alleged scandal and was employed in the Ministry as an adviser. He was retired from the service in 1949, but he appealed to the courts against the decision and won his case.

In February 1952 he became head of the Turkish Section of the newly-formed Turco-Greek Mixed Commission. In September 1952 he was appointed Ambassador in Athens. Nominated to Santiago in December 1953, he took up his post a year later.

Cemal Hüsnü is pleasant to talk to, speaks French and plays a fair game of bridge. He is, however, very impetuous. Is unmarried.

121. Tarhan, Mümtaz

Born in Istanbul in 1907, he graduated in Law and entered the Ministry of Finance, where he served in various posts finishing in 1954 as Chairman of the Supreme Accounts Committee. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Ankara in 1954, and appointed Minister of Labour in the 4th Menderes Cabinet in December 1955. Visited United Kingdom as a guest of Her Majesty's Government in July 1956.

M. Tarhan has always been interested in education and is Chairman of the Turkish Educational Association and President of the Board of Governors of Ankara College; and some people had expected that he would be Minister of Education in the new Cabinet. But he failed for re-election as a Deputy (for Ankara) in the October 1957 elections and automatically relinquished his Cabinet appointment. He was, however, appointed Vali and Mayor of Istanbul in November 1957, replacing Professor Gökay (*q.v.*) as a consolation prize.

He is a man of some personality and drive, although he is rumoured to be prone to intrigue and favouritism. He is reputedly pro-British and is said to have been responsible for the policy of recruiting British (as opposed to American) teachers for Ankara College. He is very ambitious.

He speaks French.

122. Tlabar, Madame Nazli

Mme. Tlabar is prominent in cultural affairs, a keen Democrat Party organiser in Istanbul, and known outside Turkey as a delegate to the Council of Europe.

Born in Istanbul in 1913, she was educated at the American Girls' School and later in Germany. She had no specialist training but turned from being a housewife to become a Deputy in Istanbul in 1950. In 1952 she visited the United States as a guest of the State Department. Later that year she was elected a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly, and in November she was a member of the Turkish Parliamentary Delegation to the United Kingdom.

She was re-elected in the 1954 elections, and in 1954 and 1955 was a member of the Turkish Delegation to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. She is active in the Turkish Women's League and in the Turco-American Association. Visited United Kingdom at the invitation of a local Conservative Association in January 1956. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957.

She is well travelled and cultivated and speaks very good English as well as Greek. Nothing is heard in public of her husband. She has a son at school in Istanbul.

123. Törehan, Habib Edip

Born about 1890. A business man, he was engaged for many years in successful trade with Germany, but by 1936, as the result of unfortunate deals, he was penniless. Then, with the support of leading Nazis, he organised export and import offices in Berlin and Hamburg and prospered once again. During the Second World War he helped the Germans considerably, was suspected of being a German agent and was placed on the Allied black list.

Now a very wealthy man, he bought *Tanin* from M. Yalçin in 1948, but it did not appear. In 1950 he founded *Yeni Istanbul*, a paper which tends to sensationalism, and which reported the assassination of Marshal Tito during his visit to London in 1953.

Törehan is a dubious commercial adventurer. He speaks German and spends a lot of time and money on his estate in Switzerland. He married his German secretary. He has good taste and is agreeable to talk to.

124. Tozan, Satvet Lütfi

Born at Trebinje, Herzegovina, in 1889 of Serbian Moslem parentage. Studied law in Geneva at the expense of Prince Sabahettin, who opposed the Sultan. During the First World War he had to go into hiding and was later captured and imprisoned. Escaped and was at large until the Allies occupied Constantinople. The new Turkish Government sent him to Paris for economic negotiations.

Later, went into private business, buying and selling arms and other military supplies in many countries. During the Second World War he continued to trade in arms in many parts of Europe. In 1942 worked in the Balkans for S.O.E., was captured and sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, but escaped by undergoing an operation and bribing his captors and returned to Turkey. He subsequently received the O.B.E. He continues to travel widely on business.

Tozan is a wealthy adventurer who is not to be trusted. He makes a habit of tackling distinguished British personalities. The French consider that he worked against them and will not allow him to enter France (he owns a house in Paris). He at one time owned the Emirgân Kiosk on the Bosphorus, but this was expropriated by the Turkish authorities, who also distrust him. He is married to his former secretary, a German.

He visited the United Kingdom in 1956 and wrote a sensible letter to *The Times* setting out Turkish views on Cyprus. This may have been prompted by his recent rapprochement with M. Menderes, with whom he used to be on terms of the bitterest personal enmity.

125. Tunaboylu, Ismail Hakki, General

Born in Bulgaria about 1897 and commissioned in the artillery about 1916. Took part in the First World War and War of Independence. In 1942 he

spent six months in Germany on the Armament Purchasing Commission. Promoted brigadier in 1945 and major-general and divisional commander in 1948. Promoted lieutenant-general and became Chief of Staff, Land Forces, in 1950. In the summer of 1952 he was given acting command of the First Army. Later went as Chief of the Operations Branch to the Turkish General Staff for over a year, and in 1954 returned to command the First Army.

Having acted as Chief of the General Staff while General Baransel (*q.v.*) was ill, he was confirmed in the appointment in June 1956.

To the general surprise, he resigned in September 1957 (together with Admiral Altincan (*q.v.*), General Aknöz (*q.v.*) and General Uçaner (*q.v.*)) to stand as a Democrat Party candidate in the 1957 elections. He was duly elected on the Democrat Party list for Yozgat.

Hard-working and able, General Tunaboylu is mild-looking and wears glasses. He has a great admiration for the British Army and often recalls his visit to General Wavell's headquarters during the Second World War. Not talkative but friendly and receptive to modern ideas. He is held in high esteem by the United States military mission. Speaks poor French and no English. Married, but his wife never appears in public.

126. Türkmen, Behçet, Lieutenant-General

Born in 1899 in Mitylene, he was commissioned in 1915 and served in the infantry and on the General Staff. He served in Palestine and in the War of Liberation he fought against the Greeks at Izmir. After the war he served on the Eastern Frontier and distinguished himself in action against the Kurds. After an interval spent as Military Attaché in Athens, Moscow and Stockholm, he returned to the Eastern Frontier in 1942 and held two staff appointments there. From 1944 to 1948 he was Director of Military Intelligence on the Turkish General Staff. He was appointed Brigadier-General at Iskenderun in 1950 and promoted Major-General in 1951 and, in 1952, he became Turkish Assistant Commander at HALFSEE in Izmir.

In September 1953 he was appointed Head of the Turkish Security Service. In this appointment he pursued energetically a policy designed to turn the service from an inefficient family business into an organisation based on Anglo-American concepts; and his first months in office were stormy owing to the antipathy of the old staff to his reforms. He, nevertheless, consolidated his position and enjoyed the confidence of the President and Prime Minister. He took a great interest in the Counter-Subversion Committee of the Baghdad Pact of which he was Chairman for two years. In March 1957 he was appointed Ambassador at Baghdad.

General Türkmen is pompous and self-opinionated and rather a bore. He is, however, energetic and as Head of the Security Service was co-operative and helpful to us. He is Western in outlook and speaks French, Russian, English and some German. He has a bridge-playing and expensive wife and a son in the Turkish Foreign Service.

127. Uçaner, Fevzi, General

Born in 1900 of Kurdish stock. Served on Caucasian front in 1914–18 war, and on all fronts during the War of Independence. Was Chief of Air Staff on Turkish General Staff, and Director of Supply on the Turkish General Staff; and in April 1953 he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Air Force.

He resigned in September 1957 (together with other Service chiefs) to stand as a Democrat Party candidate in the October 1957 elections; and was duly elected on the Democrat Party list for Izmir. Appointed Minister of Communications replacing M. Demirer (*q.v.*) in the Fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

He has a striking blonde wife and no children. He speaks quite passable English. He is always friendly to us, but more so to the Americans, and is easier socially than most senior Turkish officers. He is not very intelligent or energetic.

128. Ulaş, Fahrettin

Born in Istanbul in 1911, he was a banker and former manager of the Istanbul branch of the Central Bank. Elected Democrat Party Deputy for Istanbul in 1954 and appointed Minister of State in the Cabinet reshuffle following the riots of September 6–7, 1955. Appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce in the Fourth Menderes Cabinet, in December 1955 he resigned, ostensibly because of ill-health (he does in fact suffer from high blood pressure) in May 1956 and was replaced by M. Zeyyat Mandalinci (*q.v.*). While in office M. Ulaş gained a reputation for industry, competence and honesty and his resignation was generally considered to have been caused by disagreement with M. Menderes' economic policy. Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957.

He speaks French and a little English.

129. Ulusan, Aziz, Vice-Admiral

Born about 1905, he joined the Turkish Navy after the First World War and attended courses at Portsmouth during 1929 and 1930. Promoted commander and appointed to the Turkish General Staff in 1938, he visited the United Kingdom in 1939 on a purchase mission, and again in 1940. Naval attaché in London from 1942 to 1946, he was promoted captain in 1944. He held several senior naval appointments until 1949 when he became Director of Naval Intelligence on the Turkish General Staff. He left this appointment in 1951 to be the Turkish member of the Military Representatives' Committee of NATO at Washington. He was promoted rear-admiral in 1950, and vice-admiral in 1955. He is now Under-Secretary of State at the Ministry of Defence.

Both Rear-Admiral Ulusan and his wife speak English well. He is well disposed to Britain and America. The leaders of the Democrat Party think well of him, but probably do not leave much to his initiative. He is clever and ambitious with a propensity for intrigue, and it may be that his charm of manner and ability to understand our point of view give a false impression of his Westernisation. Underneath he is probably as dyed-in-the-wool a Turk as any.

Although it was at one time almost certain that he would be appointed Turkish Ambassador to Canada, he was transferred in August 1956 as Commander-in-Chief, Turkish Fleet, replacing Admiral Korutürk (*q.v.*).

130. Ürgüplü, Suat Hayri

Son of the last Ottoman Sheikh-al-Islam, he was born in Damascus in 1903 and educated at the English school in Istanbul, Galatarasay, and the Istanbul Faculty of Law. In 1925 he was appointed Turkish General Agent on the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, and in 1932 he began to practise as a barrister in Istanbul.

Elected Deputy for Kayseri in 1929, he was appointed Minister for Customs and Monopolies in 1933. He resigned in 1946 after a sugar scandal, but in 1948 he was cleared of all charges against him.

Re-elected Independent Deputy for Kayseri with Democrat Party support in 1950, he represented Turkey at the 1950, 1951 and 1952 meetings of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and became a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly. In September 1951 he

joined the Democrat Party, and in September 1952 he was appointed Ambassador to the German Federal Republic. He is highly thought of in Government circles. He was appointed Turkish Ambassador at London in August 1955 and took up his post in September. Appointed Ambassador at Washington in February 1957 but only assumed his duties some months later after conflicting rumours that the appointment would not be finally approved. He was not very successful in London, and his command of English is limited.

He is said to be venal and untrustworthy and to have been mixed up in politics right up to his appointment to London.

131. Uz, Behçet, Dr.

Born in Buldan in 1895 he was educated at an Izmir secondary school and the Medical Faculty of Istanbul University where he specialised in children's diseases. From 1921 to 1930 he worked as a doctor in Izmir and in 1930 was elected to the Izmir Municipal Assembly of which he subsequently became president.

In 1941 he was elected P.R.P. Deputy for Denizli and for a few months in 1942 was Minister of Commerce in the Saracoğlu Cabinet. In 1943 he was appointed head of the P.R.P. in Istanbul and was re-elected for Denizli in 1944. In August 1946 he became Minister of Health in the Peker Cabinet but lost his place on the formation of the second Saka Cabinet in June 1948.

Dr. Uz lost his seat in the 1950 elections but was elected Deputy for Izmir as an Independent in the Democrat Party list in 1954. He had resigned from the P.R.P. in February 1953 because of personal differences with the Izmir leadership of the party and after his appointment as Minister of Health in May 1954 he officially joined the Democrat Party.

He resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in the crisis of November 1955 and was not reappointed. Little has been heard of him since, although he was re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957.

Married, he speaks good French and German and a little English. Capable and efficient, he has considerable drive and organising ability. A rabid anti-Communist, he is friendly to us but also admires the Germans.

132. Velibeşe, Zühtü

Born Izmir in 1890. Studied law at Salonika and in 1913 was appointed an assistant legal adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Resigned during the War of Independence to serve as a liaison officer with the Ministry on the east front. In 1923 he was called to the Izmir bar and later to the Ankara bar. He played a large part in preparing the Democrat Party's draft of the new electoral law of 1950.

Elected Democrat Deputy in 1950, he was appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce in the first Democrat Government, and generally acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs during the absences of M. Köprülü. His inefficiency as Minister was widely criticised in commercial circles, and he was dropped from the Government in March 1951 ; but he remains a close personal friend of the Prime Minister and is a member of the Executive Council of the Democrat Party. He is also chairman of the board which controls the Government newspaper *Zafer*. Re-elected a Deputy in May 1954, but was defeated in the 1957 elections.

He is friendly to us. He speaks French well. He is very deaf.

133. Yalman, Ahmet Emin

Born in Salonica of Dönme parentage in 1889, he was educated at the German school and the Law Faculty in Istanbul and studied economics at Columbia University. He was a correspondent in Germany during the first world war and afterwards he combined journalism with a sociological lectureship in Istanbul. In 1923 he started *Vatan*. In 1936, in co-operation with Zekeriya Sertel, he launched *Tan*, but left after a disagreement with Sertel and restarted *Vatan* in 1939.

Vatan had by 1952 begun to fall into disrepute, when in November a group of Moslem reactionary conspirators made an attempt on M. Yalman's life in Malatya. This incident and the consequent strong action taken by the Government against extremists brought M. Yalman back into prominence as something of a national hero.

An outspoken critic of the P.R.P. Government when in power, he did not hesitate also to criticise Democrat Party policies after the change of Government. His attitude towards the Democrat Party moved rapidly from independence to opposition and for the last year he has strongly attacked M. Menderes for the illiberality of the régime. The circulation of *Vatan* has risen accordingly, and the paper has also been reorganised completely with new capital.

Capricious, unstable, and given to sensational comment, he likes to think of himself as a liberal, and is a keen supporter of moral rearmament. He is a regular visitor to the United Kingdom where he has many friends. On foreign policy his attitude vacillates, but he is fairly consistently pro-American: on internal affairs he fights religious reaction and authoritarianism. Though difficult to reason with, he is personally friendly. He speaks English, French, German and Italian.

134. Yardimci, Celal

Born in Doğu Beyazit in 1911, he studied law in Istanbul and practised as a lawyer until his election as Democrat Deputy for Ağri in 1950.

In 1951 he was one of the Vice-Chairmen of the Assembly and in April 1953 he was appointed Minister of State and, in May 1954, Minister of Education, replacing M. Burçak (*q.v.*). He showed little sign of life in the Ministry but he survived the Cabinet crisis of November 1955 and was appointed Minister of State (responsible for Supreme Court and Religious Properties affairs) in the fourth Menderes Cabinet. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and appointed Minister of Education in the fifth Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

He is a faithful follower of M. Menderes, on whose favour he depends. He visited the United Kingdom briefly in 1954.

135. Yetkin, Nüvit

Born in Malatya in 1916, he is a lawyer by profession. Elected People's Republican Party Deputy for Malatya in 1954, he is rapidly becoming more prominent in P.R.P. affairs. He was the only candidate opposing Kasim Gülek for the post of Secretary-General at the Party Congress in 1956 and gained some votes.

He is generally said to be the coming man in the P.R.P. and is the main party spokesman in the Grand National Assembly. He has the reputation of being intelligent and balanced. Re-elected a Deputy in the October 1957 elections.

He speaks only Turkish.

136. Yircali, Sitki

Born in Balikesir in 1908, he studied law in Istanbul and Paris and afterwards practised as a lawyer in Balikesir, where he has also farming and industrial interests. Joining the Democrat Party soon after it was formed, he was elected to its Administrative Council in 1949; and in 1950 he was elected Deputy for Balikesir and became Vice-President of the Grand National Assembly. At the

Democrat Party Congress in October 1951 he was elected a member of the party's Executive Committee, and in December 1951 he was appointed Minister of Customs and Monopolies. In September 1952 he was transferred to the Ministry of State Industries.

Appointed Minister of Economy and Commerce in May 1954, he attended the Beirut Economic Conference of Middle and Near Eastern States in June 1955. He was forced to resign in November 1955 and, with M. Polatkan (*q.v.*) and M. Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (*q.v.*), was made subject to a Parliamentary Investigation. Exonerated with the others in June 1956, he was re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957 and appointed Minister of Press, Broadcasting and Tourism (a new Ministry) in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957.

M. Yircali's Ministerial career has so far been undistinguished. He is far from popular among the rank and file of the Democrat Party and is believed to depend entirely on the Prime Minister's favour. He is married with two children and his wife is active in Democrat Party circles. He speaks French.

137. Yücel, Hasan Ali

Born in Istanbul in 1897, and educated at Istanbul University, he was at first teacher and afterwards joined the Ministry of Education, in which he rose to be Inspector-General. He was deputy for Izmir from 1935 to 1950, and Minister of Education from 1938 to 1946. After losing his seat in the general elections of 1950 he resigned from the P.R.P. and withdrew from political life.

A successful Minister of Education, Yücel is a liberal and tolerant man who seems to lack entirely the normal Turkish suspicion of foreigners. He is, however, regarded as a slightly unreliable intellectual and was suspected of Communist sympathies while in office. He is interested in British and French education, and whilst a Minister he did much to help the British Council, in whose activities he still takes great interest. He visited Cyprus in June 1955 and lectured to the Turkish community. Pleasant and entertaining, especially over a drink, both he and his wife seem to find life infinitely amusing. He speaks French.

His son, Can Yücel, worked for a time in the Information Office of the British Embassy and now works for the Indian Press Attaché as a translator. He is a poet of some distinction.

138. Zeytinoğlu, Kemal

Born in Eskişehir in 1911, he studied engineering at Istanbul and Vienna and became a roads engineer. Elected Democrat Deputy for Eskişehir in 1946 and again in 1950, he was appointed Minister of Public Works in December 1950, and reappointed in May 1954.

M. Zeytinoğlu is a close friend of M. Menderes and was known under the previous régime for his bitter attacks in the Assembly on the People's Republican Party. He resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in November 1955 and was not reappointed. Little has been heard of him since. Re-elected a Deputy in the general elections of October 1957.

He is married and has two children.

He speaks German and a little French.

139. Zorlu, Fatin Rüştü

Born in 1910 at Istanbul. He studied political science at Paris and law at Geneva, and was admitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1932 where he soon began to specialise in economic subjects. He was appointed head of the department dealing with commercial negotiations in 1937 and headed the permanent delegation to the League of Nations in 1938. He was first secretary for a time in Paris and in 1942 counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow. In 1946 he was put in charge of the Economic Section of the Ministry and represented Turkey at the International Trade Organisation Conference at Havana, 1947–48. Was promoted to be an Assistant Secretary-General in 1950 and at the same time was put in charge of all E.C.A. and O.E.E.C. affairs. In the spring of 1952 he was appointed permanent Turkish representative on the North Atlantic Council, with the rank of Ambassador.

His influence with the Prime Minister grew rapidly and in May 1954 he was appointed Minister of State (the senior of three) and Deputy Prime Minister, and became Adnan Menderes' right-hand man. He dealt with NATO and O.E.E.C. affairs, advised the Prime Minister on economic policy and dictated instructions to the Minister of Finance and other economic Ministers. In April 1955 he represented Turkey with some forcefulness at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung. He suffered at set-back with the failure of his mission to the United States where he appealed for $300 million loan. He was appointed Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs from July to November 1955.

It was partly his unpopularity that precipitated the Cabinet crisis of November 1955, which started with a general call for his resignation from the Democrat Party Group. He duly resigned and was subjected to a Parliamentary Investigation into his activities as Head of the Finance Committee in his capacity of Deputy Prime Minister. He was, however exonerated by the Commission in June 1956 and was reinstated in the Cabinet as a Minister of State in July 1957. Shortly before his reappointment a disagreement arose between the President and the Prime Minister about M. Zorlu's future and he was appointed Turkish Ambassador to Berne. The Prime Minister carried the day and the appointment was cancelled. Re-elected a Deputy in October 1957 and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the 5th Menderes Cabinet in November 1957, in spite of the renewed alleged opposition of the President.

M. Zorlu is a protégé of the Prime Minister and is his principal adviser on foreign policy and is also counsellor on economic policy. Ruthless and cynical, but highly able, he is conscientious to the point of fanaticism in upholding Turkish interests. His knowledge of economics is limited, but he has great faith in his own quick decisions. He is a stubborn and inflexible negotiator and under a veneer of Westernism is probably a xenophobe. One of the most controversial political figures in Turkey, he is particularly unpopular with the Americans, arising out of his attitude to American Aid in 1955.

He speaks French and English and is frequently seen at social gatherings. His wife is the daughter of Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Atatürk's Foreign Minister who negotiated the Turco-Russian Agreement of 1923.

140. Zorlu, Rifki Rüştü

Born in 1905; a career diplomatist who, after serving in Switzerland, Sweden, France and Canada, was appointed Head of the Second Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1951. He became Turkish Minister at Beirut in 1952 and Ambassador at Cairo in November 1954. Appointed Ambassador at Brussels (accredited also to Luxembourg) in April 1957.

M. Zorlu is the brother of Fatin Zorlu (*q.v.*). He is unmarried.